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Abstract
This thesis is an investigation of the significance of Heidegger's dialogue with Eastern
thought. I attempt to show that this dialogue is primarily concerned with a unique subject
matter, namely, overcoming the forgetfulness of Being. The forgetfulness of Being,
characterized by Heidegger as the essence of Western metaphysics, has become the destiny of
the world in the fonn of global technologization. As basically non-metaphysical, traditional
Eastern thought can exemplify the consequences of the "end of philosophy" or the
"overcoming ofmetaphysics". However,l argue that Heidegger's dialogue with the East is not
meant to seek an alternative to Western philosophy, but to bring about a criticaJ reflection of
both Western and Eastern thought in regard to their different ways of"forgetfulness of Being".
My discussion throughout the thesis focuses on the question how Being in the primordial
sense, which transfonned into a metaphysical concept in Western philosophy, vanished in the
"ontological indifference" ofEastern thought from the very start. The linguistic comparison of
both Western languages and Chinese, and the discussion of two major philosophicaJ notions
in Heidegger and Eastern thought - ''the nothing" and "releasement"· make it plain that the true
meaning of Being and ofontological difference is not only covered by Western metaphysics,
but also dissolved in the distinctively non-metaphysical thinking of the East.
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Introduction
The main issue of this lhesis is lhe Heideggerian attempt to seek lhe way to "future
thinking" through a meaningful dialogue with Eastern lhought. The "future lhinking" (Dos
kiinfiige Denkell), according to Heidegger, is a planetaryconcem, a world building, which
as the response to lhe threat oflhe global dominance of technology can give rise to a new
historical destiny. I want to show in this thesis that Heidegger's dialogue with Eastern
thought makes lhis fundamental concern in Heidegger's thinking ralher explicit. I argue
lhat the "future lhinking" as beyond lhe difference between East and West is in fact
grounded in Heidegger's understanding oflhe primordial meaning of Christian theology
which for Heidegger is neither "Eastern" nor "Western".
Taking its origin in the Western philosophical tradition, Heidegger's thinking
moves at the limits of lhis tradition and tries to step out of it to encounter the kind of
lhinking lhat is entirely outside the "history of Being". For Heidegger, the East is to some
extent the antithesis of the West, and Eastern thinking, as basically non-metaphysical and
ofcourse non-Western, can exemplify the consequences of the "end of philosophy" or the
"overcoming of metaphysics". It is certainly true that Heidegger's personal interest in
Eastern thought, and particularly Chinese thought, lies in that fact that, as Jean-Fram,ois
Mattei points out, "Chinese thought presents rather unexpected analogies with the secret
intuition of the Heideggerian path."1 However, what the "future thinking" concerns is not
the alternative to, or the substitute for, Western philosophy but rather the attainment of a
place that is beyond the duality and difference between the East and the West. This might
offer the possibility of a discussion adapted to the situation ofglobal technologization.
To overcome metaphysics, for Heidegger, is ultimately to overcome the
forgetfulness of Being, or the forgetfulness of the ontological difference. Heidegger's
dialogue with Eastern thought bears a twofold task: it is not only a rethinking of the
Western philosophical tradition, but also a critical refection on Eastern thought. The latter,
though never becoming the principle concern of Heidegger's thinking, is an important hint
afforded by the Heideggerian attempt at planetary construction. Overcoming metaphysics,
understood as the deconstruction of metaphysical thinking, does not necessarily lead to
recovering from the forgetfulness of Being. characterized by Heidegger as the essence of
nihilism, allowing us to stand in the nearness of Being. I argue that the non-metaphysical
thinking of the East, as in some sense opposed to Western metaphysics, is nevertheless
another version of the forgetfulness of Being. IfHeidegger's call for future thinking lies
beyond the duality of East. and West, it must be conditioned by the ontological critique of
both Western and Eastern traditions, the one as the eclipse of the ontological difference and
the other as the abandonment of the ontological difference respectively. Although
Heidegger constantly denies the theological significance of his ontology, I shall argue that
his fundamentally Christian perspective becomes more evident and striking when his non-
metaphysical thinking is compared with the equally non-metaphysical thinking of the East.
To a large extent, "the West" understood by Heidegger is distinctively Greek, and the
primordial Christian world view for Heidegger is something beyond the East and the West.
His rethinking of the question of Being in terms of kairological temporality and
eschatological historicity,2 and his analogical treatment of the Christian motifs, reflect the
substantial Christian ground of his thinking. This ground, for Heidegger, also sustains a
meaningful dialogue between East and West. In other words, I argue that the influence of
Christian theology is still to be found and is indeed of crucial importance in understanding
the difference between Heidegger and Eastern thought.
In the first chapter, I will discuss the legitimacy of such a dialogue. If the dialogue
is possible and meaningful, it must be clarified on two levels: (I) The meaning of dialogue
in general; (2) The peculiarity of the East-West dialogue. Opposed to the "transcendental
pretense"] and the pragmatic "trick",4 dialogue presupposes the Other, it takes place in the
I-Thou relationship, involving listening and silence. Since, according to Heidegger, the East
and the West presumably live in different language houses, a dialogue between them is
more complicated in that it involves a different understanding of the nature of language.
However, I-1eidegger's conviction of the possibility ofa genuine East-West encounter is
grounded on his basic idea of the pre--ontological and pre-linguistic understanding ofBeing,
the "single source" that wells up in the different traditions.
Taking up the notion that language is "the house of Being", I shall undertake a
relatively detailed linguistic comparison of both Western and Eastern languages in chapter
2. In this chapter, I will compare Western languages in general (represented by Greek and
German) and Eastern languages (mainly Chinese) with regard to the grammatical
opposition of inflection and non·inflection. On the common ground of the hermeneutic as-
structure - the pre·ontological and pre-linguistic understanding of Being - Western
languages, defined by Heidegger as basically metaphysical languages, have transformed
the hermeneutic as-structure into the apophantic as-structure,s and thus gave rise to the
metaphysical understanding of the ontological difference. The Chinese language, on the
other hand, took the opposite road; not only has it eliminated the "natuml" tendency toward
the metaphysical dyad of Being and beings, but also erased the primordial understanding
of ontological difference, which as Heidegger maintains, underlies the nature of all
languages,
In chapter 3,1 will conduct a Heideggerian dialogue between East and West on the
notion of'1he nothing". Given the linguistic determination of the concept of Being which
is pecuHar to Western philosophy, the access to a dialogue between East and West cannot
be found in Being, but in its opposite, i.e. "the nothing", Semantically, "the nothing" can
be either the negalion of Being, or the negation of beings. Its free move between these two
sensesmight enable us to overcome linguistic constraints and hence to provide the field in
which a dialogue can be effective and successful. Heidegger's introduction of the nothing
in his thinking of Being is in fact meant to "deconstruct" the metaphysical understanding
of Being and thus release it from the context of Western philosophical discourse. To a large
extent, Heidegger"s thought on the nothing has much in common with the Eastern idea of
wu (translated as "nothing", or "nothingness''). The most striking similarity between them
is that both are considered as not deriving from the negation of Being. The mutual
dependence and sometimes even the identification of Being and the nothing no doubt
approximate the Eastern way ofthinkingyu (something) and It-1I (nothing). Such an Eastern
tendency in Heidegger's thought culminates in his affirmation of the paradoxical nature of
Being, which tends to dissolve Being altogether. For Eastern thought, there is no need to
pose the idea of Being in addition to that of beings (something. yu) and nothing (wu), for
Being can be no more than an empty, useless assumption. However. Heidegger's insistence
on the ontological difference, the difference between Being and beings, makes it clear that
the nothing is the "not" between Being and beings and the meaning of Being is more than
the relation between beings and nothing as in Eastern thought. His analogical appropriation
of the theological notion of the nothing as referring to God Himself in the sense of"wholly
other" than beings (creatures), keeps him far from the leap into the abandoning of Being
and of the ontological difference.
The increasing awareness of the indispensable dimensions, especially the divine
dimension, of Being in the later Heidegger, shows us clearly the incommensurability of
Heidegger's "nothing" and the Eastern wu. Although Being for Heidegger is
unambiguously not God, and the Heideggerianontology is not Christian theology, his stress
on the divine dimension of Being still suggests a possible link bern'een the question of
Being and the question of God. I will not develop a discussion on this intriguing and
fascinating problem in this thesis. It is so important that it needs a rather extensive and
detailed study under another title. What I want to show is that this link can be disclosed
explicitly when Heidegger's elaboration ofBeing and the nothing is compared with Eastern
thought.
In the final chapter, I will discuss Heidegger's notion of reieasement in regard to its
affinity to the Eastern idea ofwu wei (no action). Releasement (Gelassenheil) is described
by Heidegger as primarily an attitude of man toward the world, especially the world
dominated by modem technology. Heidegger borrows this term from Meister Eckhart but
strips it of the theological significance which the term originally bears. In emphasizing its
character as belonging to the nature of thinking, and hence to the relation of Being and
nothing, Heidegger moves close to the Eastern idea of wu wei (no action) which concerns
yu (beings, or something) and wu (nothing). Heidegger draws a distinction between two
kinds of thinking, the calculative and the meditative, which parallels the distinction
between philosophy and thinking in the announcement of "the end of philosophy and the
task of thinking".Since, inasmuch as Heidegger insists on the Western nature of
philosophy, he tends to regard Eastern thought as basically belonging to thinking rather
than philosophy (as the synonym of metaphysics). Since Heidegger defines calculative
thinking as essentially a kind of willing, or the "will to power", releasement for him is to
be understood as no-will, or more precisely beyond will and no-will. But to attain such no-
will, it is necessary at first to deconstruct the self as ego cogilO. As a matter of fact, the
fundamental ontology in Being and Time is an attack on the Cartesian ego and Kantian
transcendental subjectivity. But it is still trapped in a certain kind of transcendentalism
from which the later Heidegger tries to move away. Although it is arguable whether the
meditative thinking the later Heidegger proposes is not a transcendental thinking, the later
Heidegger tends to dissolve the self even more radically than he does in Being and Time
and hence approximates to the Eastern, particularly Zen's, way of destructing the self (no-
self). Nevertheless Heidegger does not make the final Zen leap that could lead to the total
abandonment of the notion ofOasein·· the abandonment of the "Da" as the "right place"
of Being's revelation. Although Heidegger sees the forgetfulness and the recollection of
Being as historical events of Being itself, rather than human deeds, he still appeals to the
poet, "the most mortal among mortals" as decisive for a tum in the world history. The
distinction drawn by Heidegger between the thinker (not philosopher) and the poet when
he claims that "The thinker utters Being. The poet names what is holy" (EB, p.360) But this
claim is often complemented by Heidegger's constant stress on the intimate relation
between the thinker and the poet. Both of them are committed to the same task. Meditative
thinking is close to poetic thinking in that the "matter ofthinking" as Being contains an
indispensable dimension which, however, only the poet can discern. The uniqueness of the
poet, as something different from the thinker is that he stands in the nearness to Being in
which Being discloses itself as the holy. Thus what Heidegger calls for by the nanle of
thinking (meditative) is rather a thinking that concerns Being in respect to its divine
dimension, or the holy. This constructive aspect of thinking which Heideggerconstantly
dwells on in relation to "building" and "dwelling" is the ultimate goal of the overcoming
of metaphysics. It finds no echo in the non-metaphysical world of the East.
It is my conviction that the development of a dialogue between East and West can
shed enormous light on the Heideggerian issue of overcoming the forgetfulness of Being,
and the overcoming of nihilism understood in a rather broad sense.
Notes:
I Dominique Janicaud and Jean-Fran~ois Mattei: Heidegger from Metaphysics to
Thought, trans. Michael Gengre, State University of ew York Press, Albany, NY,
1995, p.128.
2 Tillich distinguishes five interpretations of history: (I) Chinese Tao doctrine; (2) the
Indian Brahma doctrine; (3) the Greek nature doctrine; (4) late-European life doctrine;
and (5) the Christian doctrine of Kairos. They can be reduced to two main types: the
non-historical and the historical. Only the Christian doctrine of Kairos, according to
Tillich, is the historical interpretation of history. Cf. Pa.ul Tillich: The Protestant Era,
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948.
J Robert Solomon uses this tenn to designate the universalist impulse associated with
Western rationality which, however, is paradoxically the expression of the Western
provincialism. See Robert Solomon: The Bully Cullllre: Enlightenment, Romanticism,
and the Transcendental Pretense 1750-1850, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD,
1993.
• According to Rotty I "the other" in any dialogue is nothing other than that which can be
used to express ourselves, See Chapter I p. 15 of this thesis.
S See "henneneutic as-structure" and "apophantic as-structure" in Glossary.
Chapter One
Dialogue or Language Game: Heidegger's Encounter with the East
One of the most intriguing and enigmatic issues in Heidegger's lifelong philosophical
project is his lengthy engagement in the dialogue with Eastern thought. I No doubl, such an
engagement is primarily motivated by an attempt to think Western philosophy as a whole.
But the stepping out of the "history of Being" is itself an epoch of the "history of Being";
it belongs to the "destiny of Being", which as originally revealed in the West has become
the destiny of the world. An adequate examination of this engagement, I believe, can shed
enonnous light on the major questions of our time. Before undertaking such an
examination, I would like to discuss me legitimacy of Heidegger's call for such a dialogue,
since it has been called into question by many contemp)rary philosophers, and particularly
neo-pragmatists.2
In this chapter I anempt to provide a preliminary discussion of dialogue in general
and the East-West dialogue in particular.) I maintain that the Heideggerian·Gadamerian
henneneutics provides an access to an appropriate understanding of the nature of dialogue
and the peculiarity of the East·West dialogue. According to Gadamer, a genuine dialogue
is one in which each participant is concerned entirely with the subject matter (die Sache)
and with arriving at the truth with regard to it. In order to do so, each participant must be
concerned with discovering the real position of the other. One must eliminate the tendency
ofuying to reduce the views of the other to those ofone's own.4 To put it succinctly, (I) the
goal of dialogue is clearly the pursuit of truth; (2) the sound of the interlocutors is not
neutralized. Clearly, dialogue presupposes the "irreducible" and "infinite distance" betv.'een
different interlocutors. But the difference does not result in a fundamental separation and
incommensurability, for dialogue aims at the "fusion of horizons", in which arises the
shared truth, "the same and the one". In such a dialogue there is always involved openness
and surprising spontaneity, and even "'turns". In other words, the lrUth finally attained
through dialogue cannot be anticipated by some criteria set up in advance. However, the
neo·pragmatist attack on totalization and "transcendental pretense" results in total
abandonment of the notion of "the other", which, in tum, leads ultimately to denying
dialogue in the genuine sense and precluding the possibility of the East·West encounter.
The following tries to show that such an attempt to liberate discussion from the linal
constraints of metaphysics is itself trapped in the metaphysical discourse which the later
Heidegger has vehemently criticized.
Other than "the West"
The trend of adopting the detenninative "Western" to demarcate what was simply
called philosophy in the West suggests a strong awareness of the limitation afthe kind of
thinking which until now had claimed universality, an awareness of the need to re-
appropriate the notion of"the other" from theological discourse for the interpretation of the
nature ofphilosophy. But to think '"The West" as a whole as different from other worlds,
real and possible, does not necessarily suffice to identify "the other".
Western philosophy, through its culmination in the science-technology which
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dominates the whole world, has assumed a universal importance and ceaselessly extends
the frontiers of its domination, to such an extent that every comer of the world seems
inescapably to undergo Westernization.s That technology has become the destiny of the
whole world might seem to help prove the superiority of Western thinking which regarded
itselfas a meta-narrative couched in the languages with the subject-predicate structure. Its
alleged kinship to logos, understood as reason, ratio, or "rationality" seems to endow it
with "universal validity", to enframe the world, and thus to eliminate all other modes of
thinking real and possible. This contemporary situation as a reality was adumbrated by
Hegel in his ambitious encyclopedia, wherein the Spirit, as the transcendental Idea like the
sun moving from east to west, culminates in his own philosophy which accomplishes the
final synthesis. The difference between East and West is simply negated in the movement
of the "negation of negation". However, such claim for universal validity in philosophical
discourse and the tendency of totalizing the world meet the vehement attack launched by
the postmodern movement, which sees all of this as "transcendental illusion" or
"transcendental pretense". The Spirit, or the Absolute, as the "meta-narrative" or "final
vocabulary" which is taken to overarch all human intellectual achievements remains in
historically embedded Western discourse. As one of the philosophical sources of, and as
a parallel with, the postmodem critique, Heidegger's project of overcoming metaphysics
contains the most powerful articulation of such an attack. For Heidegger, the Hegelian
Absolute, is only a historical epoch of Being. In other words, it can never freely travel
outside "the West". Indeed, the East, in Hegel, as in many other great Western thinkers, is
a projection of their own thinking, no more than a dreamland, which is enframed by the
II
Western paradigm.6 For Heidegger, a genuine dialogue is conditioned by the appearance
of "the other" which must not be canceled or reduced.
However, as Heidegger observes, a true encounter of the East and the West in the
sense ofhermeneutic diaJogue has not hitherto taken place, in spite ofaJl assimilations and
intermixtures, including the Eastasians' chasing after European conceptual systems (OWL,
p.3), and the translation and incorporation of Eastern thinking in the West. For the central
concern in Heidegger's dialogue with Eastern thought is not to fmd something which is
simply lacking in his own tradition as, for example, Leibniz, who was fascinated by the
hexagrams of I-Ching when he was searching for a universallanguage.7 Nor is it the need
for an alternative to his own tradition because of his dissatisfaction with the general
tendency in which he takes his start, as in the cases of Schopenhauer and the young
Nietzsche. It is still far from being motivated by exotic fantasy or the idea of "cultural
diplomacy". As Mehta points out,
Heidegger's thinking has linle to do with "cultural synthesis" or with the
notion ofa "planetary culture", or with the idea ofa "universal philosophy"
for the man of today, gathering together the complementary insights of the
philosophies of the West and the East. His thinking is post-philosophical,
in the sense of being no longer "metaphysical" and no longer operating on
the presuppositions implicitly at work in all "philosophy".'
In this connection, his notorious claim that "Western European philosophy is, in
truth, a tautology" (WP, pJI) and his denying ofthe existence ofnon-Western philosophies
e.g. Chinese and Indian philosophies (WCT, p.224) are not the repetitions of what is
presented in Hegel's encyclopedia, which considers Eastern thought as pre-philosophy,
"pre-" in the sense of"immatute. His claims aJso differ from the observation that Eastern
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thought is basically "un-philosophical" for the analytic tradition, according lo which
language analysis, which is fundamental to philosophy, is lacking or at least weak in
Eastern thought.. Heidegger's insistence on the identification of philosophy and the West
is not meant to restate Western superiority but rather to arouse the awareness of "the other"
-- "other than the West" and "other than philosophy".9
2 Djfference and "Otherness"
Heideggcr's identification of philosophy and "the West" as a claim for difference
is also shared by many spokesmen of postmodernism, who constantly attack any
assumption of universal paradigm or totality. Jean-Fran90is Lyotard in his seminal book
The Poslmodern Condition announces "a war on totality" and promises to "activate the
differences and save the honor ofname".'o According to him, the postmodem world or the
post-industrial Western society is a world of difference and heterogeneity. Any attempt to
find the same is to level everything into the dull unifonnity of the equal or identical. The
emphasis on difference finds in the concept of heterotopia "the most famous image" of
"pure difference", "a name for the whole centerless universe of the postmodem".ll FoucauJt
claims that "difference" is an insurmountable gap which can divide these different worlds
or cultural systems as mutuaJly incomprehensible. Foucault quotes a passage from a story
by Borges to illustrate comically such total and irreducible difference. The order of things
described in the so-<:alled "Chinese encyclopaedia" is rather unthinkable and absurd to the
1)
extent that any attempt to find the principle for such ordering or categorization is doomed
to fail. 12 Foucault remarks, this Chinese "order" (disorder) of things is conceivable only in
heterotopia. Heterotopia is an inconceivable space that undennines the very possibility of
description in language; it repels and attracts at the same time, displaying the "exotic
charrn ofanother system of thought," while showing "The limitation ofour own, the stark
impossibility of thinking Ihat.,,13 However, Zhang argues that this conception of the East
(China) is precisely a Western fiction. He says,
... by citing that fiction as a representation of the Chinese mind, Foucault
does not disengage from the tradition of creation of cultural myths of the
Other· myths which have always presented the Other as pure difference,
a foil to the West, either as an illusion and exotic dreamland, a utopia where
the West has its ideals imaginatively realized, or the land of stagnation,
spiritual purblindness, and ignorance, against which the higher values of
Western progress and civilization stand out for everyone to see. 14
The East, or the other, is just a conceptual monstrosity. As a fiction, "the East" is
still created in Western discourse; it is an invented "other" through Western imagination.
Conner remarks that once such a heterotopia "has been cited and re--cited, it is no longer the
conceptual monstrosity which it once was, for its incommensurability has been in some
sense bound, controlled, and predictively interpreted, given a center and illustrative
function."u In other words, the falsity of the "otherness" defined in this way cannot avoid
being finally exposed. The different other is evoked by and for the West to facilitate its self·
knowledge or self·critique, and the heterotopia is created only to be metaphorically
colonized from the very start. The predicament is well observed by Jean·Luc Nancy, who
in the introduction to The Birth 10 Presence, asserts that "the irrepresentable, pure presence
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or pure absence, is also an effect of representation Gust as 'the East', or 'the Other World'
are effects of 'the West') ... (The] coming of another that the West always demands, and
always forecloses."16 Thus the West, as synonymous with philosophy in the sense of
representational thinking, is not limited by its relation to others, but by itself alone, it
"opens the world to the closure that it is. ,,11
It seems to me that the call for radical difference or heterotopia leads inevitably to
a pragmatist conclusion which Rorty embraces and explicates in a rather straightfolWard
way. According to Rorty, truth is invented rather than discovered. II The same can be said
for "the other". We can never discover the other, but only invent it. Since any account of
the other is always a projection of one's own thinking or imagination, it is necessary to
abandon such "pretense of otherness" just as we must abandon the "transcendental
pretense". Thus, according to Rorty, the person who engages in a dialogue with the other
only seems to be relating to the other. 1be other is virtually nothing other than himself. He
remarks, "for edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old
selves, by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings."'l9 In other words,
our encowlter with the other is for the sake ofl>ecoming a "new being". The relation to the
"other" is a self-relation in the sense of self-transfornlation. Thus the "other" is not really
other but is actually a moment in one's own self-becoming. Gadamer maintains thal in a
dialogue, "[b]oth partners must have the good will to try to understand one anolher."20
However, the hermeneutic "good will" (der gute Wille) in Gadamer thus transforms to a
pragmatist "trick". ''The lrick ofconversation", says Mark Taylor, "is to tum around (i.e.,
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con-verse) in such a way that one rediscovers se/fin other...21 But for Gadamer, dialogue
is a communion, which involves a sharing that unites rather than divides. ''Yo reach an
understanding with one's partner in a dialogue is not merely a matter of total self·
expression and the successful assertion ofone's own point of view, but a transfonnation
into a communion, in which we do not remain what we were."n However, the "new being"
in Rorty does not imply such communion and sharing with "the other"; it is virtually the
fulfillment of the "will to will", To a certain extent, Rorty's pragmatist "trick" is are·
appropriation of Hegel's "cunning of reason". Hegel maintains that to become itself, the
subject must enter into relation with others in such a way that their differences become
constitutive of the subject's own being. Rorty states that Hegel, if read in a certain way (a
pragmatist way for sure), is right. Rofty's return from Gadamer to Hegel is a return from
dialogue to monologue while the Absolute is displaced by "'the will to will',.ll
A sketch of the itinerary from FQllCault's "heterotopia" to Rofty's "trick" can show
how the distinctive posunodern call for radical difference and plurality transforms into the
assertion of the unavoidable "one·sidedness". As Conner puts it.
[Western postmodemist theory) names and correspondingly closes off the
very world ofcultural difference and plurality which it allegedly brings to
visibility. What is striking is precisely the degree of consensus in
JXlstmodemist discourse that there is no longer any possibility ofconsensus,
the authoritative announcement of the disappearance affinal authority and
the promotion and recirculation of a total and comprehensive narrative of
a cultural condition in which totality is no longer thinkable. If postmodem
theory insists on the irreducibility of the difference between different areas
of cultural and critical practice, it is ironically the conceptual language of
postmodem theory which flows into the trenches that it itself gouges
between incommensurabilities and there becomes solid enough to bear the
weight of an entirely new conceptual apparatus of comparative study,2(
16
The affirmation of the fundamental difference and incomparability of the East and
the West as originally aiming at the rejection of totalization becomes the reason for the
pragmatist utilization of the other. "One-sidedness", though, with a "universal" disguise in
Hegel, reappears in the form of confessed sheer "will to power". Rorty thus declares
himself as a "cultural imperialist" with great sincerity. He says, "Hoping to avoid cultural
imperialism by rising to that level seems to me as vain as the hope of avoiding monologue
by anthropomorphizing, or ratifying, the Other."lS
3 The Same as the "Single Source"
Heidegger's emphasis on difference does not lead to ultimate separation and
division, but rather to dialogue in the sense of sharing, wherein arises the one and same,
which, nevertheless, does not result from abstraction nor is it thus able to subsume what is
abstracted. Heidegger puts it quite clearly,
The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent
oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves
toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a
common denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging together of
what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say
"the same" if we think difference. It is in the carrying out and settling of
differences that the gathering nature of sameness comes to light. The same
gathers what is distinct into an original being-at-one. The equal, on the
contrary, disperses them into the dull unity ofmere uniformity. (PLT, p.219)
Here the sharp distinction drawn by Heidegger between "the same" and "the equal"
or "the identical" is of great significance. The same is not that which could be conceptually
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abstracted or reached by way of reduction; rather, it should be understood as that which
makes possible such a relation as the selfand the other, Le., the relation ofl-lbou (Ich-Du);
it still makes possible the very awareness of"othemess", lbe ·'I·lbou" relationship, as the
starting point of Gadamer's hermeneutics, by no means amounts to the subject-object
relationship in the Cartesian sense.216 Gadamer's description of the I-Thou relation is largely
based on Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world. In Being and Time,
Heidegger clearly differentiates Dasein's being-with·olhers (as a particular mode of
Dasein's Being-in-the-world) from his being with things as equipment. In Oasein's
primordial relation to the world as equipment ready-to-hand he encounters others. In other
words, as Dasein one recognizes that equipment as ready-to-hand is also serviceable to
other Daseins, However many pragmatist implications Rorty could draw from the notion
of "ready-ta-hand", it is still extremely difficult to see how "The other Daseins" in
Heidegger's analysis of "Being-in-the-world" can equally be reduced to mere equipment.
Dasein, through its use of the world as equipment, comes across other Daseins who also
usebeings as equipment and who themselves are not equipment. Only in the derivative way
would other Daseins become objects and equipment. In this regard, Dasein's relation to
other Daseins is radically different from his relation to beings as equipment. But the other
must not be confused with "the they" (das Man), which is surely not the other than the
Dasein that I am, but, to a certain extent, determines the mode ofmy existence, and of any
other's existence. "The they" is exactly what Heidegger means by "the equal" or "the
identical" that levels down of all differences into dull uniformity, which virtually
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characterizes Dasein's inauthentic mode ofexistence. "The same", in contrast, lies in the
authentic mode of existence in respect to Dasein's relation to other Daseins in a way that
he recognizes others as the same as himself in the sense they are also Dasein, not
equipment.
This analysis of Dasein's Being·with-others is also applicable to the problematic
of the East-West encounter inasmuch as the latter is equally of the I·Thou structure. The
West's relation to the East (or the non- West) should not be a relation to that which is pUi
in use as equipment, the means for self·reflection and self.critique. However, the dialogue
between the East and the West is never a safe play, it is constantly exposed to the danger
of slipping into one·sided monologue which will ultimately suffocate openness,
spontaneity, and unexpected discoveries. Even in his dialogue with the Japanese, the
possibility of failure of attaining a genuine dialogue, such as Heidegger assumes, is in
sight.17 In fact, the failure seems to be already anticipated by Heidegger in the progress of
that dialogue itself: "a dialogue from house to house remains nearly impossible." (OWL,
p.5) This likelihood of failure arises from the fundamental difference and the infinite
distance between one and the other, the East and the West. It is worth noting that the
response of the Japanese interlocutor to Heidegger's doubts really catches its subtle
implication that a dialogue is still possible however much danger there may he.2' But where
lies the "same" that would possibly bring the East and the West together? For the
Heidegger of Be;ng and nme, the possibility ofDasein's encounter with other Daseins is
conditioned by their relation to Being. The preliminary understanding of Being is the
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common ground for their mutual understanding and communication. In a similar way, the
later Heidegger claims that the understanding of Being in the more primordial sense is a
prerequisite for a dialogue between East and the West. Being in the primordial sense as the
trulh of Being is what Heidegger calls the "single source" that gives birth to and sustains
different traditions. But what is the "primordial meaning" of Being as the ground for such
a dialogue? Rorty suggests that Heidegger's attachment to the question of Being forces him
to face the alternatives: either referring Being to a ''transcendental signified" which, as the
one and same, transcends history and language (signifier); or thinking Being as historically
and linguistically determined in the sense that Being is meaningful only if it can be reduced
to beings. In other words, Heidegger's claim for a regress to the origin appears to be
incommensurable with his sketch of the history of Being. According to RoTty, much of the
confusion and contradiction in Heidegger's thought lies in his dogged effort to find a stance
which is beyond the contrast between the metaphysical tradition and the sheer postmodem
perspective of the Rortian irony. RoTty claims,
The reader of Being and Time is led to believe that the Greeks enjoyed a
special relationship to Being which the modems have lost, that they had less
trouble being ontological than we do, whereas we modems have a terrible
time keeping the difference between the ontological and the ontic in mind.
The reader of the later work, however, is often told that Descartes and
Nietzsche were as adequate expressions of what Being was at their times as
Parmenides was of what Being was at his time. This makes it hard to see
what advantage the Greeks might have enjoyed over the modems, nor how
Parmenides and Nietzsche could be compared in respect of the
"elementariness" of the "words of Being" with which they are associated.29
Since, according to RoTty, such a stance (beyond metaphysics and Rortian
pragmatism) presents real difficulty, Heidegger is often in a situation of hesitation and
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sometimes prone to go back to metaphysics. Rorty shares Derrida's critique of this
Heideggerian nostalgia. Thus in order to save Heidegger from this situation it is necessary
to read the pragmatist reduction into Heidegger's conception of the history of Being by
abandoning the ontological difference, which is a metaphysical remnant, the last
evaporating presence of the Platonic distinction of the real world and the apparent world.
For Rorty it is impossible to make a real distinction between the ontic and the ontological.
In other words, the various epochs of Being can be nothing other than the ordinary history
of man's activities.30
However, as Mark Okrent argues, Rorty is mistaken in his accusation against
Heidegger simply because he overlooks Heidegger's repeated claim concerning the
distinction between the truth of Being and Being.)l The truth of Being is thought as the
opening or clearing which allows Being as presencing to appear and manifest itself, but it
remains unthought. The various epochs of Being which constitute the history of Being, or
more precisely, the history of Western existence, are determined by what is absent, held
back. Okrent puts it succinctly: "The history of Being is a history of hiddenness, not of
presence. It is a history of the specific ways in which the place and truth of Being have been
forgotten, not of Being in the ontological sense, itself."n The truth of Being, in holding
back, grants not only the history of Western existence but also the history of Eastern
existence. It is the hidden source from which well up the language worlds of the West and
the East. It is the "the same" (as neither "the equal" nor "the identical"), "the belonging
together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference." (PLT, p.219) It
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grants and sustains the dialogue between different language houses. Heidegger calls it the
··single source" (eine einzige QueUe).
... in the end _. which would also be the beginning - a nature oflanguage
can reach the thinking experience, a nature which would offer the assurance
that European·Western saying and Eastasian saying will enter into dialogue
such that in it there sings something that wells up from a single source.
(OWL, p.8)
The single source is by no means "a general concept under which both the European
and the Eastasian languages could be subsumed." (OWL, p.24) It consistently resists any
conceptual grasp and remains concealed not only to the Western language world but also
to the Eastern language world. Heidegger's major task, as he describes it, is an
interpretation of the history of Western philosophy. In attempting to step back to the single
source from which Western metaphysics has sprung up, Heidegger wants to show that in
this source a wellspring hides in ilselfmuch that has remained unthought though it sustains
the foundation of Western philosophy. This slepping back to the single source is brought
about through dialogues with the Greek and Eastern thinkers who were "thinkers" rather
than ··philosophers" and whose relation to that single source was, Heidegger believes,
closer than those of modem Western man. That is why Heidegger speaks of the pre·
Socratic Logos as a parallel of the Chinese Tao (lD, p36) and tries to find in both of them
the prototype of Ereignis. But for Hcidegger a dialogue with the Greeks must be prior to
a dialogue with the East for the former is the precondition of the latter. (QCT, p.15?)
However, Rorty sees "the same" or the "single source" as still a "transcendental
signified"; he chastizes Heidegger's regress to the source as a metaphysical "nostalgia" for
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the source is nothing other than an equivalent of Plato's real world. He says,
The Heideggerian counterpart of Plato's world of appearnnce seen from
above is the West seen from beyond metaphysics. Whereas Plato looks
down, Heidegger looks back. But both are hoping to distance themselves
from, cleanse themselves of, what they are looking at. This hope leads both
men to the thought that there must be some purificatory askesis which can
render them fit for intercowse with something Wholly Other -- for
impregnation by the form of the Good, for example, or for Openness to
Being.))
Is it really impossible to differentiate Plato's real world and the single source (the
truth of Being)? A strikingly undeniable difference between Heideggcr's source and Plato's
real world is apparent. The source in Heidegger's understanding is not something which can
be separated from what it gives rise to and sustains. So a regress to the source cannot be
seen as distancing owselves from and cleansing ourselves of what we are pondering. In
fact, Heidegger never admits the stance of standing back from the passing show and
looking at it from outside with detachment. Dasein's historical nature and its "thrownness"
makes any such attempt impossible [and the attempt itself is somehow bound up with its
historical facticity). To understand history and historical events we must be on a certain
horizon which cannot be eliminated or reduced to an ahistorical one. Understanding is
interpretation in the sense that it always involves certain historical fore-structures. But it
does not amount to any arbitrary use of history. Rorty's pragmatist reading of Being and
Time simply misses the crucial point that the fundamental ontology is to make possible "our
access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down
to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn." (8T, pA3) Thus interpretation is not violent
appropriation according to our unbounded freedom. but rather a dialogue which must
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involve a "wholly other" as that which has its own horizon and hence is beyond our
horizon. The later Heidegger is more critical of any merely pragmatic use of history. He
says that we have been cut off from Being "because we only know, and only want to know,
history in the context of historiography which explores and exposes elements of the past
for the purpose of using them for the present."34
As against historical relativism which insists that history consists of disjunctive,
incommensurable epochs without any coherence, Heidegger's conception of history sees
history as a unified totality filled with significance; and hence it is close to Hegel's view,
aJthough Heidegger emphasizes the unpredictable nature of the history of Being. Rorty's
reading of the later Heidegger in respect to the history of Being overlooks the meaning of
history in Heidegger's understanding. Guignon puts the issue this way,
Heidegger's picture of history as a meaningful totality contrasts sharply
with the vision ofhistory Rotty draws from Kuhn and Foucault. On Rony's
view, history appears as a series of ruptures and revolutions, resulting from
accidental shifts in central metaphors, with neither continuity nor
coherence. If history seems to tell a story, that is largely the result of
imposing our contemporary world view on what has come before; it is
retroactive mythologizing. BlXause there is no unity in history, there can be
no lasting standards or constraints passed on to us by our forebears to
regulate our inquiries.35
It is necessary to point out that Heidegger's conception of history is rooted deeply
in the Judeo-Christian understanding of time as kairos (or Augenblick) and in the related
eschatology. Based on the notion of kairologicaJ time and the eschatological understanding
of history, Heidegger initiates his criticism of the metaphysical theory of "presence" and
the Platonic "real world". Such a criticism is radically different from that of the post-
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strUcturalists, e.g. Denida., for whom history is, using Guignon's words, "merely
mythology, an illusion we can live without",l6 and is endless, undetermined, open to any
decision we make on it. So when Heidegger speaks of epochs of Being (e.g. Pamlenides
and Nietzsche) he is concerned with the ontological difference, a view that Heidegger never
abandoned, but is rather a crucial aspect of his philosophy from the early to the later years.
As Guignon puts it, "even this later vision of history as 'the destining of Being' is
teleological: as Heidegger says, 'Being is, as destining, itself eschatological.'''31 Rorty is
not simply wrong in his observation of Heidegger's sketch of the history of Being that each
epoch of Being is an adequate expression of what Being is at its time.3I But his obvious
unwillingness to acknowledge the fact that the theme of the "forgetfulness of Being" is
central to Heidegger's sketch leads to a mistake. The strong eschatological implications in
the idea of the "forgetfulness of Being"are thus overlooked or minimized.
Since, as Heidegger claims, the dialogue with the Greek thinkers is the precondition
for dialogue with the East (QCT, p.158), Rorty advances his criticism from the former to
the latter. According to Rorty, Heidegger's dialogue with the East, like his dialogue with
the pre-Socratic Greeks, is an attempt to set his thinking free from the West, "free of the
will to power as a result ofhaving seen through its last disguise,"l9 and to escape to the East
as the "Wholly Other" than the West in order to look at the West as a whole. Yet, the East
in this dialogue can offer nothing more than another version of the conception of the
"Wholly Other" which is still, in essence, the same as the Platonic "real world" as separated
from the apparent world. He says,
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This thought [about the Fonn of Good, or Opennessof Being] is obviously
an important pan of the Western tradition, and it has obvious analogues
(and perhaps sources) in the East. That is why Heidegger is the twentieth·
century Western thinker most frequently "put into dialogue" with Eastern
philosophy.'"
According to Rorty, the East for Heidegger, as for anyone else, can only be his own
projection, his pragmatic use of a culture, that is, the very expression of the will to power
which he tries to escape. Thus any attempt to dialogue with the East or any non-Western
world is merely a symptom ofcontemporary Western self·hatred, which, in the Niettsehean
sense, is the inversion of the will 10 power. There is no such thing as "fusion of horizons",
but only the single Western will to power. However, Heidegger never takes "the East" as
a remote resort where one can find the "splendor of simplicity" in order to escape the
"busyness" of the West. Quite the contrary, Heidegger explicitly rejects the idea of taking
the road east. In the Der Spiegel interview, Heidegger maintains that the same Western
metaphysical tradition, which has inevitably grown into a world destiny, still contains the
possibility ofbringing about a turn in this destiny, a turn which could never take place by
simply replacing it with another tradition, for example, the tradition of the East. He assens:
It is my conviction that a reversal can be prepared only in the same place in
the world where the modem technological world originated, and that it
cannot happen because of any takeover by Zen Buddhism or any other
Eastern experiences of the world.· '
It is unlikely that Heidegger simply wants to downplay the impact of Eastern
thinking on the Gennan philosophical tradition as Zimmennan suggests.·2 Rather,
Heidegger attempts to clear off the kind of European hallucination of "the East" which
pervaded the fifties and the sixties under the influence of Suzuki's English publications
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which strongly attracted Heidegger himsel[·J Moreover, Heidegger wants to eliminate the
very thought of''taking over" or "displacement" which remains in every aspect "one-sided"
like an inverted Western "will to power" or what Rorty calls the "contemporary Western
self·hatred". In calling for another beginning which may lie in the unthought of the Western
tradition, lying beyond metaphysical thinking, as Mehta points out, ''The thinking of the
unthought of this imperishable Western beginning, however, is also the liberation of
thought from the parochial mould and its meeting with the unthought of the other few,
really great beginnings in human history.'>01.4 Thus, Heidegger's rejection ofa replacement
is clearly a rejection of the escape from the "busyness" of the West to the "simplicity" of
the East, the escape by which Rorty characterizes Heidegger's dialogue with the East. For
Heidegger, such a dialogue aims at working out a response to the global threat of
technology; it can help the preparation of the dawn of the new beginning in the world's
history. As Mehta puts it, "In no case can it be just a return to those beginnings but only the
gathering of resources for a novel beginning in the realm of thinking, for which perhaps,
as Heidegger hopes, the initiative and the preparation can come from Europe.,>45 In the same
interview Heidegger raises a significant question which sounds really like an expectation:
... who ofus can say whether or not one day in Russia and China the ancient
traditions of a "thought" will awaken which will help make possible for
man a free relationship to the teclmical world?,,6
In this regard, a dialogue with the East is inevitable. (QCT, p.l 58) Presumably, the
call for such a dialogue might be motivated by a deeper concern which has never been
explicated by Heidegger himself and is still overlooked by many commentators. Since the
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subject maner (die Sache) of such a dialogue concerns the world's destiny, it is necessary
to think the essence of technology not from the Western metaphysical tradition alone, but
from the tradition of the Eastern world, from its own necessity, since the metaphysical
mode of thinking has invaded and become part of this tradition. Rorty's criticism of
Heidegger's engagement in the dialogue with the East simply overlooks the real motivation
of this engagement and the subject matter of the dialogue.
4 The Quest jon concerning the Nature ofl,anguage' An!icjnating a Dialogue from "House"
The problematic pertaining to this particular dialogue, namely, the dialogue between
the East and the West, is greatly different from other dialogues for it involves the question
concerning the nature of language. Heidegger says when recalling hisearlier conversations
with COWlt Kuki, '1be danger ofour dialogue was hidden in language itself." (OWL, p.4)
This is the case because the nature of language for Europeans may be not adequate for
Eastasians. Heidegger asserts, "Ifman by virtue ofhis language dwells within the claim and
call of Being, then we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house than
Eastasian man." (OWL, p.5) Given that we can never transcend language, how can the
dialogue take place? Heidegger's skepticism about such a dialogue, expressed in his claim
that "a dialogue from house to house is almost impossible", gives an impression that he
moves close to linguistic relativism.
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To some extent, Heidegger belongs to the generation that takes the so-called
"linguistic tum" (more properly "hermeneutic tum" for German philosophers) which
characterizes the main stream of Western philosophy in this century. Heidegger's
conception that language constitutes our sense of reality is indeed in harmony with that of
people like Rorty and Derrida Rorty says, there is no way to evaluate '"Ianguage-as-a-whole
in relation to something else to which it applies.....7 Derrida holds, 'There is nothing outside
of the text." However, Heidegger's unique understanding of language is still different from
various trends that belong to the same generation, This can be made plain by discerning the
connection between Heidegger's thought and the German philosophical·linguistic tradition.
To be sure, Heidegger's conception of language is prompted by the German linguist
Wilhelm von Humboldt, whoproompted by the very idea that language is the outer
expression of the inner thought was taken for granted, declared that language is a world and
"''arid view. Heidegger comments, "Humboldt puts language into language as one kind and
form of the world view worked out in human subjectivity." (OWL, p.l19) In fact, Kant's
transcendental philosophy is already at work in Humboldt's linguistics in that language is
viewed not only as the activity of the subject, but also as something like the Kantian
transcendental categories through which the world is constituted and experienced, that is,
that it has a certain resemblance to a possibility or a condition of thinking and knowing. It
is this aspect of Humboldt's theory of language that became one of the major sources of
Heidegger's conception of language and still exerts its invisible influence on Heidegger's
sometimes elusive though unwilling inclination towards transcendentalism. But
29
Humboldt's theory of language, especially his comparative study ofworld languages, has
a twofold significance. On one hand, if language is like a transcendental category for
human thinking, we are led to the conclusion that different languages result in different
thoughts which are at bottom incommensurable. Obviously, it anticipates what is called
"linguistic relativism" in our century:" On the other hand, Humboldt's comparative study
of languages aims to find the possibilities of man's language. (For example, Indo-European
language and Chinese are seen by him as two extreme realizations ofhuman possibilities.)
Language seems to be subordinate to some other more general forms which determine their
possibility. Thus, as Heidegger points OUl, Humboldt conceives of language as a particular
"intellectual effort", "Yet the intellect -- in Humboldt's sense, too --lives in other activities
and achievements as well. If, however, language is counted as one of these, the speaking
is not experienced in its own terms, in terms oflanguage, but rather is refened to something
else." (OWL, p.1 17) Thus Humboldt's conception of language is still confined by
metaphysical thinking. It fails to work out a new conception of language insofar as he
defines the nature of language as energeia, as the activity of the subject. (OWL, p.J 19)
It seems to me that Humboldt's linguistic quasi-transcendentalism leads inevitably
to a linguistic relativism which betrays its initiative. He is forced to take the step back to
the traditional conception of language. Heidegger, presumably well aware of this inner
tension and unsolvable contradiction, tries to think language as neither a facuhy which
human beings possess nor as the transcendental category, though his remarks on language,
especially his claim that "a dialogue from house to house remains nearly impossible", are
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often identified as linguistic transcendentalism and linguistic relativism. However, for
Heidegger, language is the house of Being. Here the image "house" plays a subtle and
important role. Clearly, a house is neither a prison which jails whoever is thrown into it,
nor a simple motel which as a mere tool of accommodation is indifferent to those who stay
there. It is rather a shelter that protects and more importantly raises those who live there.
Language is the field in which our sense of what it is to be is articulated and disclosed; it
is a "Saying"(Gennan Sage, cp English Saga) "the soundless gathering call" of Being
itself. (OWL, p.108) Language and Being interpenetrate and form a unity, such that any
designation of language as a transparent vehicle to convey meanings still takes language
in derivative sense. If we keep in mind the image "house" as different from "prison", which
seems to be implied by linguistic relativism, we can avoid such an identification of
Heidegger's conception of language with linguistic transcendentalism and linguistic
relativism. However, this difference is neglected by Rorty.
For Rorty, linguistic relativism must be abandoned because of its transcendentalist
nature. He says the linguistic turn "was an attempt to find a substitute for Kant's
'transcendental standpoint"'.49 Following the later Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson,
Rorty announces the end of the attempt to make language the transcendental topic. To clear
up any metaphysical remnant in the conception of language is to "deconstruct" language
itself. Rorty wholeheartedly accepts Davidson's claim that "there is no such thing as
language, not if a language is anything like what philosophers ... have supposed.... We
must give up the idea ofa clearly defined shared structure which language users master and
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apply to cases.mo Accordingly, Heidegger's conception of language is still trapped in
linguistic relativism. For RoTty there is no difference between house and prison, both of
which are constraints on our liberty. By following Wittgenstein, Rorty sees "language as
referring simply to exchange of marks and noises among human beings for particular
purpose, as no more denoting a real essence than does <game"'.SI
Rorty sees language as a game people play, a language game devised by men, a
tribute to the resourcefulness and inventiveness of the beings which we are.'2 Language is
nothing more than we put into it. Thus scrcalled "language" in Ronycorresponds to
Davidson's "human behavior" or Derrida's "text". To be sure, there is no need to retain the
word "language" which, viewed by Davidson, has too much metaphysical implication. For
Rony, the word "language", if meaningful, can only refer to the act of speech. The
distinction between language and speech, like the ontological difference between Being and
beings, must be abandoned. It is worth noting, however, that when Heidegger speaks of
language as "Saying" (Sage) he is not trying to reduce language to speech as a kind of
human behavior in the Davidsonian sense. He says, "Language is not a work of human
beings: language speaks. Humans speak insofar they co-respond to language:' (PT, p.25)
It is language that endows the capacity ofspeech on human beings. Only in the response
to the call of Being in language, that is, "to mark an effort to live properly with language"
and to learn "to hear what language really says when it speaks" (WeT, pp.118-119) do
people speak properly and authentically. The difference between authentic and inauthentic
speech is crucial to Heidegger's conception of language. In Being and Time Heidegger
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presents "idle talk" (Gerede) as one of the manners (along with "curiosity" and
"ambiguity" in which the inauthentic they·self takes the place ofand hides genuine speech
which can disclose things as what they are to be. Insofar as we are trapped in this
inauthentic talk of the "they" we are alienated from our most authentic possibilities of
Wlderstanding and speech. "That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode
in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Being
towards entities has not been extinguished, but it has been uprooted." (BT, p.264) The
recognition of the falsity of the idle talk awakens our longing for a genuine conversation.
In idle talk we do not even talk to each other. Since there is no ontological difference
between language and speech and no difference between authentic conversation and "idle
talk" Rorty's language game inclines to embrace idle talk rather than authentic
conversation. Rorty mocks Heidegger's call for a tum from idle talk to genuine
conversation as another metaphysical remnant. "As I see it, they [Wittgenstein and
Heidegger] both started from a need to escape from what they both called 'chatter'
(Geschwatz), a need for purity, a need to become authentic by ceasing to speak the language
of the philosophical tribe within which they had been raised."n RoTty is right when he says
that the term language (Sprache) plays a very little role in Being and Time, and when it
does occur, in section 34, it is subordinated to talk (Rede) and thus to Dasein'· Indeed, the
anthropocentric aspect of Being and Time at times overshadows its genuine goal as
reaching the question of Being. To be sure, language as discourse or talk in Being and Time
lacks the imponance and power asserted in the "Letter on Humanism" and other later
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works. But the very distinction between genuine conversation and idle talk is very clear.
Perhaps Rorty is ready to read Being and Time in the Sartrean way.ss Derrida is well aware
that to eliminate the difference between langage and parole is at the same time to eliminate
the difference between idle talk and genuine conversation, hence also the very notion of
"fallenness", which constitutes the difference.
Now, is not the opposition of the primordial to the derivative still
metaphysical? Is not the quest for an archia in general, no matter with what
precautions one surrounds the concept, still the "essential" operation of
metaphysics? Supposing, despite powerful presumptions, that one may
eliminate it from any other provenance, is there not at least some Platonism
in the Verjallen?S6
The leveling down of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic talk results
in the tendency to privilege contemporary language-games as the ultimate locus of truth and
justification. Guignon points out that "For Heidegger, this apotheosis of idle talk and its
authority would sever us from any background of enduring meanings and values from
which we could criticize contemporary life and its language games. There would be no
longer any way to identify the symptoms of'forgetfulness ofBeing' in our current world.,,57
For Rorty, there is no question about "forgetfulness of Being", nor the difference between
genuine conversation and idle talk in such a "language-game". The notion of "language-
game" in Rorty is held to be drawn not only from Wittgenstein, but also from Gadamer. But
Rotty's pragmatist adoption of Gadamer's "play" simply ignores the real meaning of this
term in hermeneutic tradition. In Truth and Method Gadamer claims that "play" is the "clue
to the ontological explanation of the work of art and its hermeneutic significance.... Play
is really limited to representing itself. Thus its mode of being is selr-representation."~8 That
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is to say, play cannot be of any purpose, it refers to nothing else than itself. This very
character of"play" as self-referential and autonomous attests against the pragmatist notion
of language as mere instrument. Peter Harris draws our attention to the inner connection
between Gadamer's view of language as play with Kant's aesthetics:
Gadamer expresses the common characteristic of language as it occurs in
poetry and philosophy when he talks about language "coming to stand", in
its different ways, in the poem and in the philosophical text. In much the
same way that Heidegger recognizes the autonomous subsistence of the
"work of art", Gadamer recognizes that in both these instances language
emerges from the instrumental role it plays in some other forms of
conununication to have an independent and autonomous status. Both writers
here, I suspect, are attempting to draw out the implications of the celebrated
"ohne interesse" characteristic ofthe aesthetic judgment in Kant's Critique
ofJudgmem. YJ
It is this self-referential and autonomous nature of language that characterizes language as
essentially poetic and that leads us to recognize Heidegger's claim that the essence of
language is poetry. Only in the light of the recognition of language as poetry can we make
a difference between what is genuine discourse and what is idle talk, the former of which
is the "play" in the Gadamerian sense. In genuine discourse there is always "a matter for
concern" (Harris) or "something at the core" (Guignon). Human speech is the response to
language which is the gift of Being. We belong to language and this belonging is essentiaJly
the way of being toward Being and world. Rorty's "language game" is fundamentally
different from and even opposed to Gadamer's play not only in that "play" for Gadamer
characterizes the nature ofgenuine discourse whereas for Rorty it is idle talk.60 The "core"
in a text or the "matter" in idle talk is simply dissolved into nothingness. However, in
genuine discourse, the "core" or "matter" is the inner necessity which governs the play and
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keeps it going. 1be play-nature ofgenuine discourse as self-referential and autonomous lies
in the fact that we can never distinguish "what is said and words in saying it",61 as Peter
Harris points out:
The words, the language is a "matter" for concern. They must be these
words and not some others. Nor is the fact that "I wandered lonely as a
cloud..." exists in more than one version, or that Kant wrote two
introductions to the Critique ofJudgment or that Cezanne painted Mt Ste
Victoire scores of times an argument against this. This kind of repetition
and revision attests to the importance of "gening it right". In such writings
and works of art, the fonnulation is governed by an internal "necessity".
The words and the brush strokes matter for their own sake in projects ofthis
kind. What Kant had to say in his introduction to the third Critique
"mattered", not with regard to sales of the book, but because of the essential
importance of relating it to the already existent works in the project of the
critical philosophy it was essential that it should "fit".62
Since, for Rorty, there is no core or matter in any discourse and text, "writing
leading to more writing, and more and still more", nothing could be privileged as "fitter"
than anything else. RaTty says. [a strong textua1ist} "is in it for what he can get out of it, not
for the satisfaction of gelting something right.'>6l Rorty adopts Derrida's view on writing
to serve his pragmatist purpose, namely, to clear off what he calls the metaphysical
remnant, the subject matter (die Sache) in the Heideggerian and Gadamerian conception
of language. He writes:
For Derrida, writing always leads to more writing, and more, and still more
-- just as history does not lead to Absolute Knowledge or to the Final
Struggle, but to more history, and more, and still more. The
phenomenology's vision of truth as what you get by reinterpreting all the
previous reinterpretations of reinterpretations still embodies the Platonic
ideal of the Last Reinterpretation. the right interpretation at last. Derrida
wants to keep the horizontal character of Hegel's notion of philosophy
without its teleology, its sense of direction, its seriousness.64
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However, Rony's Sartrean illusion of ultimate directionless freedom leads him not
only to dissolve any subject matter (Sache) in our disco~but also to deny "background
codes" which, as "mighty inhuman forces", regulate our play and master our discourse.
Rorty not only rejects the Heideggerian-Gadamerian insistence on the "matter" of speech,
but also distances himself from the view of the post-structuralists' (Derrida and Foucault)
on the "background codes" as the indispensable factors in any discourse, although they also
deny the "core" or "matter". This is what Rorty calls another difference between textuaJism
and pragmatism. The dream ofachieving ultimate freedom is still trapped in the will to will
which Rony accepts as the destiny of human being, yet criticized by both Heidegger and
Derrida as the end-stage of metaphysics. But Ron-y, in order to free discourse from being
the substitute for "the transcendental" language must be viewed as a tool, or an instrument
humans use and use up in their human disposal. Thus 10 restate his notion of language as
"tool", Rorty criticizes both Heidegger and Derrida,
Heidegger and Derrida share a tendency to think of language as something
more than just a set ohaols. The later Heidegger persistently, and Derrida
occasionally, treat language as if it were a quasi-agent, a brooding presence,
something that stands over and against human beings.6s
This view, for Heidegger, is obviously a metaphysical conception of language. In
the constant, unbroken and unlimited continuation of discourse, idle talk -- words leading
to words and more and still more, ... there is no rift (Riss), no noise-free and speechless
interruption which could allow us to listen, listen to the language that addresses us. A
genuine discourse is at the same time a listening. Yet only in the silence are we capable of
a genuine listening. The "stillness of silence", as Gadamer points out. is the center of
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Heidegger's theory of the relationship between language and Being.
Everything spoken stems in a variety of ways from the unspoken, whether
this be something not yet spoken, or whether it be what must remain
unspoken in the sense that it beyond the reach of speaking. (OWL, p.12)
Rorty sees this as contradictory to what is asserted in Being and Time thal Dasein
is linguistic through and lhroUgh; he takes Heidegger's claim that "conscience discourses
solely and constantly in the work of keeping silent" to be not a doctrine of inexpressibility
bUl rather the doclrine that the realization that one must change one's life cannot be backed
up with reasons -- for such reasons could only be voices from one's past life.'''' The
"unspoken" for I-Ieidegger is not simply the opposite of language, or beyond language, but
rather the otherside, the constitutive of language, like the voidness of the jug described in
"The Thing", The "WlSpoken" is the echo of the "slillness of silence", which as the source
of language moves language from its ground and supports it. It is the "original
announcement" of the world reality which can exist only inside the silence which is not in
itself"something linguistic", It is above all in the soundless "saying" which precedes every
utterance that Heidegger sees the non-human occurrence. The true nature of language is
"not saying, and at the same time saying or silent indication," (N, 471 f) Man who speaks
must listen to the sound of silence which constantly emanates from the depths of the
inexpressible. It is this silence that constitutes the nature ofianguage which is adequate not
only for Western language but for Eastern language, and could offer some asswance to the
East-West dialogue. In this silence, arise all languages. However linguistically different or
incommensurable they may be, they all belong to this original silence, as the single source
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that gives birth to them and sustains them. It is the common ground where various language
houses are built. The capacity of listening to the call of Being in this silence conditions our
listening to each other, it makes possible any translation not only betvreen, for example
English and German, but also brtween Western languages and Eastern languages which are
alleged to have no tJaceable common historical origin; it makes possible a dialogue from
house to house, the dialogue that can disclose the inexhaustible possibilities of language
engaged in the dialogue.
To be sure, thinking is bound up with its tradition, its historical language world.
Yet, the regress to its earliest gennination, and taking from there a leap, might convert
"this land of the evening, away beyond Occident and Orient and cutting straight through
the European, into a place from which there may emanate a new historical destiny, (a
history governed by the mutuality of man and Being rather than by the withdrawal of the
laner, as thus far) in the time to come." 61 In listening to the voice ofsilence, the thinker can
take the task ofbuilding a home for humanity. This building is a construction of planetary
thinking. In this sense, Heidegger's dialogue with the East is the first pioneering step
toward such building.
Here too no prophetic talents and demeanor are needed to realize that there
are in store for planetary building encounters to which participants are by
no means equal today. This is equally true of the European and of the East
Asiatic languages and, above all, for the area of a possible conversation
between them. Neither of the two is able by itself to open up this area and
to establish it. (Q8, p.1 07)
The above remarks clearly show lhat Heidegger's strategy of the destruction of
metaphysics is aimed at such ultimate building. The end of philosophy is followed by the
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task of thinking. However, as Caputo points out, "Rorty is interested in the destruction of
the history of ontology in its negative sense; its positive sense [for RoTty] is Heidegger's
final illusion.'>61 Rorty follows Heidegger in declaring "the end of philosophy" but he
rejects the "task of thinking". In the essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", Heidegger
attempts to uncover the inner relationship between building, dwelling and Being.69 For
Heidegger, the truth of Being must not be understood as presence as in traditional
metaphysics, nor does it refer to the endless "wandering" in the sense ofdeconstruction. It
is building for the sake of dwelling, the belonging together of Dasein and Being, it is
Ereignis.
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Notes:
1 German philosophy has a long tradition ofengagement with Eastern thought, begiMing
with Leibniz and continuing through Nietzsche and Jaspers. But it is remarkable that
Heidegger. distancing himself from all of them, who are at limes eloquent in addressing
alien thought with true insight, left little in print about Eastern thought which he
engaged in through various ways (personal conversations, interviews, seminar
discussions, and cooperation with others in lranSlating philosophicalliteratuJ'e) over fifty
years. Gadamer gives an answer to the question raised by Graham Parkes regarding why
Heidegger through his over fifty year engagement with Eastern thought left so little in
print, "You have to understand a scholar of the generation to which he belongs would
be very reluctant to say anything in print about a philosophy ifhe were himself unable
to read and understand the relevant texts in the original language". (See Heidegger and
Asian Thought, University of Hawaii Press, 1987, p.5.) This seeming over-caution is not
due to the kind ofacademic or scientific rigorism which should be more properly called
"exactness" icon ntrast to Sirenge (rigor) which, he claims, is only adequate for
thinking. The rigorousness presented in Heidegger"s reluctance to talk about Eastern
thought directly is based on an assumption that it is difficuh and almost impossible to
hear in translation what the words could possibly signify in the original language, as
Heidegger does in reading Greek philosophy. In this cOMection Heidegger is often
charged as violating the original meaning of Grteek words in the name of"exactness".
2 Rorty criticizes Heidegger's dialogue with Eastern thought as an attempt to escape from
the West in order to look at it with detachment. See Richard Rofty: "Heidegger,
Kundera, and Dickens", in Essays on Heidegger and Others, Cambridge University
Press,Cambridge. ewYork.I99I.
J It is worth noting that Heidegger left only two dialogues C'A Dialogue on Language
between a Japanese and an Inquirer", and "Dialogue on Releasement") among his huge
number of philosophical writings. But the dialogical nature is apparent in many other
writings, especially those of his later period. Professor Harris pointed out in a seminar
that the procedure of argument in ''The Origin of the Work of Art" is in the distinctively
Platonic dialogical form. Furthermore, Heideggcr's thinking as a whole could be seen
as a series ofdialogues with the history of Western philosophy. When he said in the Der
Spiegel interview that his whole work in the past 30 years had been in the main only an
interpretation ofWestem philosophy, he was not pretentious, but rather honest and right,
given interpretation in the hermeneutic sense is dialogue. The history of Being can also
be seen as a constant dialogue between Dasein and Being, whose mutual appropriation
is well expressed in a single word Ereignis. It, though as destiny, is still open to "tum"
(Kehre).
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Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1976, pA80n.
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and the origin of things is nothing, emptiness, the altogether undetermined, the abstract
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Chapter Two
Ontological Difference and Languages
In this chapter, I will undertake a brief survey of the major characteristics of Eastern
(Chinese) and Western languages in regard to their relations to the respective philosophical
traditions. The metaphysical nature of Western languages and the non-metaphysical nature
of Chinese will be made plain when the comparison of their major grammatical features is
worked out. The linguistic investigation of both Eastern (Chinese) and Western languages
is meant to show how the primordial meaning of ontological difference as Heidegger
understands it is either concealed in Western languages and or dissolved in Eastern
languages. It may help to prove my central contention in this thesis, namely, that
Heidegger's dialogue with the East, which is deeply concerned with the nature oflanguage
and its relation to Being, is not an attempt to find an alternative to Western tradition, but
a way of revealing the origin, or what Heidegger calls "the single source", that gives rise
to different traditions.
Let us start with an interesting passage from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil,
The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek and German
philosophizing is easily enough explained. In fact, where there is affinity of
language, owing to the common philosophy of grammar -I mean owing to
the unconscious domination and guidance ofsimilar grammatical function -
it cannot but be that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar
development and succession of philosophical systems: just as the way
seems barred against certain other possibiliLies of world interpretation. It is
highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic
languages (where the conception of the subject is least developed) look
otherwise into the world and will be found on paths of thought different
46
from those of the Indo-Europeans and Musulmans. 1
Nietzsche wrote these words in the 1880's when Humboldt's monumental work on
comparative linguistics was already available,2 What sounded as an insightful conjecture
had in fact been taken to be a basic hypothesis formulated in a rather systematic way and
demonstrated through extensive empirical studies by Humboldt. The thesis that every
language possesses a distinctive inner form that shapes subjective experiences, worldview
and culture was carried on and further developed by Sapir and Whorf, who ultimately put
forward the doctrine of"linguislic relativity": that different thoughts are determined by the
structures ofdifferent languages. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Nietzsche offered
nothing new, Instead, what he tried to focus our attention on is the relation between
language and a particular mode of thinking, philosophy, whose alleged destiny of striving
toward universality includes at the same time an effort to transcend any panicular
linguistic constraints. Thus a linguistic question with philosophical significance becomes
a question concerning the philosophy of language. In this sense, Nietzsche is the first
philosopher who announces "Iinguistic relativity" in the philosophical context, with which
the present study is concerned.}
Although by now the intrinsic relationship between language and thinking has been
accepted as almost common knowledge, the answers to the question in what way language
and thinking are related to each other diverge among both linguists and philosophers.
Linguistic relativism simply reverses the traditional statement that thinking determines
language in the sense that language functions merely as a tool in service of the presentation
of thinking. But the reversal of this charncteristically metaphysical statement remains
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metaphysical in essence; it still fails to think the nature oflanguage. The failure results in
the new pragmatist return to the instrumentalist conception of language.4 Linguistic
relativism, in setting up the fonnula that language shapes thought, presupposes a separation
oflanguage and thinking in the sense that there must be language (at least logically) prior
to thinking, especially prior to philosophical thinking. Furthennore, the pre-thinking
language detennines thinking to such an extent that every thought aspect (e.g. philosophical
notions) could be reduced to linguistic factors. In his remarkable essay "Categories of
Thought and Language", Benveniste shows the striking parallel between Aristotle's ten
metaphysical categories and the grammatical categories in Greek and concludes that the
former are simply the projection of the latter. This study which has inspired the further
explorations undertaken by Kahn, Graham and others is truly illuminating for our account
ofHeidegger's dialogue with the East inasmuch as the central concern in this dialogue is
the nature oflanguage. However, as I have claimed, Heidegger is not a linguistic relativist.
His notion of language as "the house of Being" is not simply a modification of the
linguistic relativist tenet "language shapes thought". It is certainly true that language and
thinking are essentially related and thus penetrate each other to the effect that it is
impossible to find a pre-thinking or non-thinking language. Language is not merely a
complex of structures governed by various grammatical rules and thinking is not simply
reducible to the exercise of abstract concepts. It is only for our theoretical investigations
that there arises the separation of language and thinking. In this sense, linguistics as a
positive science cannot break through its technological understanding of language as an
object. For Heidegger, the relation between language and thinking must be thought in their
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relation to the question of Being.
Given that the equiprimordiality of language and thinking has been historically
displaced by their outer relation through the separate development of both, linguistic
relativism, though under the basically metaphysical assumption, establishes in various ways
the parallels belWeen language and philosophical thinking, which helps to retrieve their
original inner relation. For example, the parallel between Aristotle's ten metaphysical
categories and the grammatical categories in Greek shown by Benveniste can certainly lead
to the linguistic relativist conclusion (as in Benveniste himself). But the idea of the
derivation of philosophical thinking from language still implies the existence of pre-
philosophical thinking, the original world experience of the early Greeks, which can never
be regarded as derivative. Heidegger's regress to the pre-Socratic thinkers is an attempt to
retrieve such an equiprimordiality of language and thinking.
Chinese may be the most perfect antithesis to Western languages; it may consist
of all the "East", would mean to Heidegger.i No doubt. Heidegger's conviction that
Western languages are fundamentally metaphysical prompted him to see how very
different a language can be from western languages, yet nevertheless possesses a great
power of thinking . For this reason Heidegger "deliberately steers clear of the tradition of
Indian thought.'>6 Certainly, Sanskrit and Bali, belonging to Indo-European language
family, are close to Greek in many aspects and thus, potentially. are equally metaphysical
in nature. In fact, Indian philosophy, though entirely independent of Western philosophy,
still has a great number of family resemblances to it. One may allude the striking similarity
between the Indian '·Brahman" and the Greek "One".
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It could well be assumed that Humboldt's influence on Heidegger lies not only in
his notion of language in general, but also in his concrete comparative studies of various
languages. According to Humboldt, all languages hitherto known could be classified into
four types: (1) the "isolating" type; (2) the "inflecting type"; (3) the "agglutinating type";
(4) the "incorporating type".7 From his transcendentalist perspective, Humboldt contrasts
Indo-European languages (Sanskrit as its typical representative) with Chinese as two
extreme realizations of the possibilities ofhuman language structure "in a state of greatest
antithesis"
The Chinese and Sanskrit8 languages constitute in the entire linguistic area
familiar to us two extremes, unequal to each other in fitness for intellectual
development, but certainly equal in inner consistency and thorough
application of their system. The Semitic languages cannot be regarded as
lying between them. They belong, in accordance with their definite
inflectional bent, in one and the same class with the Sanskritic dialects.
However, all of the remaining languages may be considered as occupying
a medial position between the foregoing extremes, inasmuch as all must
approach either the Chinese isolation of words from their grammatical
relationships or the fixed association of phonemes designating such
grammatical functions.9
Though each language is unique in its expression of thought, it may be more or less
imperfect according to the principle of mental development. For Humboldt, the inflecting
type exemplified by Greek and Sanskrit is the most perfect one standing at the top of the
language scale with regard to the organic nature of its grammatical structure which is the
most adequate to the development of the mind. From this it follows that the extent of the
development of thinking depends on the degree of inflection. In other words, the
development of a language is a long-term striving toward inflection. Since Sanskrit and
(ancient) Greek which were the most inflected had become the dead languages, German
50
turned out to be the most philosophically powerful language in comparison with any other
modem language. This contention, though never explicated, is implicit in Humboldt's
theory of language types, and it has readily joined the stream of various claims for the
philosophical superiority of the German language. Even before Humboldt, Hegel, for
example, exalted German for having "an abundance of logical expressions" and "many
advantages over other modem languages."10 This notorious remark has its even magnified
resonances in Heidegger. In An Introduction to Metaphysics he declares that German and
Greek are "the most powerful and most spiritual ofall languages." (1M, p.57) Indeed, there
is clearly an ethnocentric inclination in this claim
"
, but it would be mistaken to reject it as
merely an ethnocentric view with no justification. To be sure, in An Introduction to
Metaphysics, Heidegger was still committed to the task of the reconstruction of
metaphysics, which he believed at that moment is universal and central to all human
beings. Thus it is not impossible that his exaltation of German is also based on the
assumption of the intrinsic relalion between metaphysical thinking and inflected language. '2
Admittedly, a highly inflected language easily attains a state of articulation with
great clarity, accuracy and strictness and thus has the least possibilities of being bogged
down in vague, ambiguous expressions. The following comparative observation ofa highly
inflected language, German, and a much less inflected Asian language, Japanese, brings
their respective characteristics to the fore.
It (Japanese) is ofa loosely related, agglomerative natlUe, admirably suited
to the expression of ambiguous, infmitely suggestive nuance of feeling·
tone, and frustratingly indeterminate to a Westerner. Contrast this with
German, for example, with its ordered grammatical structures in which each
words is strictly held in its proper place in a sentence so that it may deliver
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its bit of meaning clearly and accurately to its hearer. ll
The major characteristics of Japanese described above are also shared by most Far
Eastern languages, and more are distinctive in Chinese, especially in classical Chinese
whose flexible grammar and undetectable syntactic structures perfectly fit understatements
with subtle indirectness and allusiveness which, as pregnant play of multiple meanings,
have been regarded as the only adequate way to renect reality.14 h is remarkable that
although Humboldt ranks Greek and Sanskrit at the top of the language scale he does not
place Chinese at the bollom as the most inferior in regard to its total lack of inflections. He
writes:
... at the first glance, the Chinese language ought to be deemed the one most
greatly digressing from the natural requirement of language, that is, the
most imperfect of all. This viewpoint vanishes, however, upon closer
inspection, for Chinese possesses a high degree ofexcellence and exerts a
mighty·· even if one-sided -- effect upon intellectual capacity.11
For Humboldt, Chinese, unlike all other languages which are on the way, though
at different stages, toward inflection, completely abandons this course and develops under
an entirely different principle. Its great intellectual capacity is proved by the fact that
Chinese is the only language outside the Indo·European family with a rich philosophical
tradition entirely independent of Europe. For Heidegger, Chinese could exemplify perfCi;tly
the fundamentally non-metaphysical language. In what follows I attempt to compare
Chinese with Western languages in respect to their distinctive features and to show how
linguistic characteristics of Chinese function in every aspect as a contrast to the way
metaphysical thinking takes its shape in Western languages.
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J. Ontological Difference and IndQ-European Langyages
I should like to take Lohmann's remarkable essay "M. Heidegger and Ontological
Difference"l' as a point of depanUte for my funher discussion. In lhis essay, Lohmann.
from his Heideggerian perspective, takes lhe issue of the linguistic opposition between
Indo-European languages and non-Indo-European languages, mainly Chinese, in tenns of
the question of"ontological difference" to see how Western thinking would possibly meet
its limitations. His cenlral contention is that in the Indo-European languages the ontological
difference is made explicit in their linguistic structures; while in Chinese it is suppressed
or wom away.
a. An Interpretation of Ontological Difference
It is of great significance to start with this vantage point because the question of
ontological difference, for Heidegger, is central to understanding Western metaphysics,
which is repeatedly characterized by Heidegger as the "forgetfulness of Being", namely,
the "forgetfulness of the ontological difference between Being and beings". The
"ontological difference" is mentioned for the first time in Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics, but the interpretation of its meaning is in fact already fully developed in
Being and Time, though not under the tenn thai is explicitly used in The Essence of
Reasons, to which Lohmann makes substantial references. It must be pointed out in
advance that the tenn "ontological difference" used by Lohmann may cause considerable
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confusion. For Lohmann, ontological difference is a difference between "the Being of a
being" and "a being in its Being". It seems in agreement with Heidegger's understanding
of the tenn in his critique of metaphysics for its forgetfulness of Being. In the "Letter on
Humanism" Heidegger states: "Metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their Being,
and so it thinks the Being of beings. But it does not think the difference of both." (BW,
pp.202-203) By this Heidegger does not mean that metaphysics draws no distinction ofany
kind between Being and beings. Quite the contrary, the fundamental distinction between
Being and beings is the central concern of metaphysics from Plato onward. The point is,
metaphysics does not think the difference in the primordial sense that guided the pre-
Socratic thinkers. It is this primordial sense of the difference that metaphysics has covered
and forgotten. In this sense, the distinction that metaphysics persistently strives to work out
fails to differentiate Being from beings insofar as Being is understood either as Beingness
or as the highest being. Thus what Lohmann really means by the statement that in the Indo-
European languages the ontological difference is made explicit is that the ontological
difference between beings and Being in the primordial sense is transfonned into an
opposition of beings as ontic reality and their mode of Being. Understood this way, the
Indo-European languages bring forth this transformation and actualize the forgetfulness of
Being. Accordingly, Lohmann's "ontological difference" must be translated as the
"modified or secondary ontological difference" in contrast with the "primordial ontological
difference" on the ground that the former is derived from the latter which is rooted in
Dasein's existence.
The central concern of the fundamental ontology in Being and Time is to lay bare
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the possibility of our access to the meaning of Being which lies exclusively in Dasein
whose nature is to transcend beings toward Being. Heidegger argues that the existential
analytic can show how the manifestation of beings is conditioned by Dasein's prior
understanding of Being. The disclosure of Being in Dasein makes possible the
manifestation ofbeings. It is Heidegger's contention that Dasein's understanding of Being
is pre-ontological in the sense that before any fonnulation is worked out we are already to
a certain extent within an understanding of Being. "The question of the meaning of Being
becomes possible at all only if there is something like an understanding of Being.
Understanding of Being belongs to the kind of being which we call' Dasein'." (BT, p.200)
The fact that we are already in a certain state of understanding of Being assures us of the
possibility of undertaking an inquiry into the meaning of Being in various ways. This pre·
ontological understanding is described in tenns of the "as-strueture". As the basic mode of
Dasein's Being-in-the·world which is prior to and underlies any inquiry into the meaning
of Being, such understanding is not a grasping of Being. In The Essence of Reason,
Heidegger states clearly:
To address something as something does not necessarily mean to grasp that
which is addressed in its essence. The IIndersranding of Being (logos in
very broad sense), which from the outset clarifies and guides every way of
behaving toward some being, is neither a grasping of Being as such nor
even a comprehending of that which is grasped (logos in the narrowest
sense = "ontological" concept). The sort of understanding of Being thaI has
not yet been conceptualized we call "preontological" or "ontological in the
broader sense." (ER, p.22)
The pre-ontological understanding ofBeing shows that the ability ofdifferentiating
Being and beings has its roots in the essence of Dasein. This is what Heidegger takes as a
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presupposition that guides his philosophical investigation in his early period, especially in
Being and Time. 17 Guignon argues that Heidegger in Being and Time is seeking the
transcendental conditions for the possibility of any interpreting or understanding
whatsoever. In other words, the goal of Being and Time "is in fact to find transhislOrical
and Iranscultural structures that underlie any possible interpretation."n Thus, Chinese
thinking, however fundamentally different from and even opposite to Western thinking,
arises from the same ground, that is, the pre·ontological understanding of Being. BUI,
according to Guignon, the result of Heidegger's "description of everydayness seems to
Wldennine the prospect of finding any sort of transcendental essential structures underlying
interpretation in general."19 The intention of resolving the tension in the "existential
analytic"of Being and Time presumably gives rise to Heidegger's tum. But the question of
ontological difference is not simply given up, instead it is addressed in a rather radical way.
In "Time and Being", for example, Heidegger states that he wishes to think about Being
without any reference to beings. Moreover, if all the effort of finding transcendental
structures in Being and Time were abandoned it is still hard to see that the maintaining of
the conception of pre-ontological understanding of Being is simply impossible. The
question for Lohmann is how this preontological Wlderstanding of Being or the awareness
of the ontological difference is realized in different languages, or how Being is
conceptualized in different languages.
b. Ontological Difference and the Nature of Language
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According to Heidegger, the ontological difference is well expressed in the
bifurcation of two types of truth, primordial truth and propositional truth, the latter of
which is elaborated by Leibniz under the term of "first principle". Heidegger argues that
this "first principle" is in fact derivative and is rooted in a more primordial truth. But when
propositional truth is derived from primordial truth, there is a fundan1ental shift, a shift of
the as·structure from the world of the ready-to-hand to the world ofthe present-at-hand, a
change from seeing something as it is used or available to seeing something as it is known
theoretically. They are called by J-1eidegger the henneneutic "as-structure" and the
apophantical "as-structure" respectively. (ST, p.196)
... a predicate, or consequent, is always contained in a subject, or
antecedent, and in this fact consists the universal nature of truth, or the
connection between the terms of the assertion, as Aristotle has also
observed.20
It should be well noted that the tenn "predication", which is interpreted in a new
way in Being and Time, is used in The Essence of Reason in the old sense which is
equivalent to "proposition" as opposed to non-propositional "unconcealment".
... as the possible "subject" of a predicative definition, being must already
be manifest both prior to andfor our predications. Predication, to become
possible, must be able to establish itself in the sort of manifesting which
does not have apredicalive character. Propositional truth is rooted in a more
primordial truth (unconcealdness); it is rooted in that prepredicative
manifestness afbeing which we call ontical truth. (ER,pp.19-21)
The conception of supposition as purely logical and grammatical construction is
derived from the original meaning of supposition which all languages possess as a
necessary property. In this sense, all languages could be seen as "supposing", for all
languages must in one way or another represent the henneneutic as-structure. "Insofar as
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each speaking, seen from the viewpoint of language, is a speaking in concepts, whereas,
nonetheless, the 'thing itself is meant, one can say that alllanguages taken as speech must
be 'supposing', that they must contain the 'ontological difference' as structure moment."21
This is, according to Being and Time, precisely what "assertion" originally means.
Heidegger's analysis of assertion clearly shows how assertion understood in the
metaphysical sense as proposition is derived from its primordial meaning. The three
elements of assertion, namely, (I) pointing out (2) predication (3) communication, show
that assertion is primarily within the primordial realm of ready-to-hand. Here predication
means to give something a definite character, thus, it still means "pointing out", but in a
more specific way. What is detennined by the predicate is not a representation of the thing,
but the thing in its primary meaning as ready-to-hand. By this, however, Heidegger is not
trying to claim that the apophantical, or theoretical, understanding of assertion is simply
wrong or useless; quite the contrary, it is rather important for scientific investigation. The
point is, it can never be regarded legitimately as primary or as isolated from its henneneutic
source. Thus predication understood in this fashion is nOI only universaJ but also necessary
to all languages, insofar as it seems impossible to conceive of a language without
predication. Heidegger says:
Let us suppose that this indetenninate meaning of Being does not exist and
that we also do not understand what this meaning means. What then?
Would there merely be a noun and a verb less in our languages? No. There
would be no language at all. No being as such would disclose itself in
words, it would no longer be possible to invoke it and speak about it in
words. For to speak ofa being as such includes: to undersland it in advance
as a being, that is, to understand its Being. Assuming that we did not
understand Being at all, assuming that the word "Being" did not even have
its vaporous meaning, there would not be a single word. (lM, p.82i2
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The essential detennination of language as "supposing" or "predication" - which
is prior to or is more primordial than any particular grammatical construction that diverges
among various languages - illustrates the very meaning of "the house of Being"
Nevertheless, the intrinsic relation between language and Being in Being and Time is
mediated by Dasein's existence, or more precisely, is determined by Dasein's
transcendence. (This, ofcourse, is abandoned in favor of the priority of Being itself in the
later Heidegger. This prepredicative "predication", or pregrammatical construction of
language, though not identical with the henneneutic as-structure, is nevertheless in the
structure of understanding as something, ofunderstanding something under something, or
of meaning something with something.
c. Ontological Difference and the Indo-European InfllXtion
It is precisely the Indo-European languages that actualize a fundamental shift from
the supposition shared by all languages to the purely logical, conceptual supposition. For
Lohmann, the subjlXt-predicate relation as inesse of predicate in subject and this, in tum,
as idem esse, articulates the logical fonn of the assertion as found in the grammatical
structures of the Indo-European proposition; the logical inherence of the predicate concept
in the subject concept is expressed as objective identification. But this structure of the
assertion is nlXessary only ifit presupposes a continuous "supposition", which, according
to Lohmann, is "the transfonnation of the merely conceptual meaning of words (for
instance, "mortal") into a meaning that is objectively founded ("a mortal [man]", ''the
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monal [manTl2J
Here "supposition" is crucial in that it detennines the metaphysical character of
Western thinking through linguistic construction. Supposition, in establishing the relation
between the conceptual meaning of words and a meaning objectively founded, at the same
time presupposes the continuous "ontological difference" in the sense that each word in
the sentence is taken to signify explicitly a being in its Being, or the Being of a being. This
is successfully realized in the grammatical fonn of Indo-European languages. namely, the
morphological inflection. Lohmann points out that the stem suggests "conceptual
expression" and the ending suggests expressions of the relation of the concept in regard to
an "object" which is given in the context of the sentence. Thus he concludes,
Each ancient Indo-European nominal or verbal fonn as such therefore
contains as expression of the relation ofa "Being" (the "Being horse" or the
"Being white") to a "being" (a detenninate "horse" or "white thing", or
determinate "horse" or "white things"). Indo-European speech thus, from
the beginning moves exclusively within the realm of the "absolute
ontological difference".... it is, rather, a fundamental, specific characteristic
of the Indo-European language structure, a characteristic which determines
in a very fundamental way not only the position of the Indo-European
languages within the totality of the types of language structures which are
either factically available or apriorically possible, but also the Indo-
European language taken in and for itself. The Indo-European language is
primarily a language that makes use of supposition.2~
Here supposition should be understood as a function of the individual word, the
subject ofthe sentence, which "lays" its "significations" (instead of the really meant object)
"under" the predicate of the proposition. Although Indo-European languages are not the
only inflecting languages - the Bantoid Semitic or Hamito-Semitic (which are defmed as
"string" and "root inflecting", respectively) are also inflecting at different degrees and in
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a different mode only Indo-European languages stand out as the extreme realization of
inflection and in a distinctive way, namely, stem inflection, which is intrinsically related
to the "supposition". The bifurcation of stem and ending in Indo-European languages
suggests the relation between concept and object.
The Indo-European stem is logically the expression ofa concept, which is
referred to the "object" that the word signifies within the context of the
sentence by means of the "ending",lhat is to say, by means of the inflection.
The Indo-European word form, which is thus divided into two parts, was
described above as the reflection of the logico-ontological difference of
Being and being.15
But how is innection in Indo-European languages necessarily related to the logical-
ontological difference of Being and being? Here we should take into account Heidegger's
view on inflection. According to Heidegger, inflection originally had two different modes,
namely, enkJisis and ptosis. They are the inflection of the verb and the inflection of the
noun. yet both of them mean falling, tipping, inclining. "This implies a derivation from
standing upright and straight. But this erect standing-there, coming up <zum Stande
Kommen, coming to stand> and enduring <im Stand bleiben, remaining in standing> is
what the Greeks understood by being." (1M, pp.59-60) Thus the stem represents what is
erect standing-there, coming up and enduring, yet it tends inevitably to inclining by means
of the ending. This inevitability is to be understood as the necessity of its own limit.
"Coming to stand accordingly means: to achieve a limit for itself, to limit itselC" (Ibid.,
p.60) To add the ending to the stem is to achieve such a limit. In this sense Heidegger
describes the fundamental characteristic of the being (essent) as to telos, which means not
aim or purpose but end. "End is ending in the sense of fulfilment <Vollendung>." (Ibid.,
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p.60) Inflection is a linguistic form, as far as form here is understood in its original sense:
morphe, that is, that which places itself in its limit.
Comparing stem inflection with root inflection, the intrinsic relation between stem
inflection and "ontological difference" may be made more apparent. The root, unlike the
stem, is "nothing intuitively imaginable, but something purely conceptual."26 As Fink puts
it:
Just as difficult as it is to imagine clearly and distinctly a triangle which is
neither rectangle nor oblique-angled, neither equilateral nor nonequilateral,
and at the same time is nonetheless all of this and even more, so difficult is
it for an Arab to make intuitively present to himself a k-t-b which signifies
neither the representation indicated by katib nor that indicated by kitab, and
nonetheless implies both and even more.27
That is to say, the stem inflection tends to differentiate Being from beings much more
easily and directly than root inflection. The Indo-European inflection is in fact the
modification of a concept which is already available.
Beginning with Greek grammar, "inflecting" (klisis) has been used as the
expression of the morphological declensions whose purpose is to express
the grammatical propositional relations.21
Inflection thus reflects the grammatical congruence or correspondence serving as the
principle for the structure of the sentence; as the indication of the syntax, it makes manifest
the inner form of the sentence. In other words, the structure of the sentence is in one way
or another marked out by words, or more precisely by morphemes. In so doing, the
"congruence" or "correspondence" between subject and predicate is established such that
proppositional truth in terms of the inherence of the predicate in the subject is guaranteed
and is made explicit. To be sure, all inflecting languages share this features, yet Indo-
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European languages show it most distinctively.
d. The Verbalized Nominal Sentence and the Nominalzed Verbal Sentence
The distinctness of inflection in the Indo-European languages is further
strengthened by another grammatical characteristic, according to Lohmann: the nominal
sentence and verbal sentence are built into one another. Generally speaking, a nominal
sentence is a sentence that contains no verb, but mainly nouns, while a verbal sentence
must have a verb. The distinctive use of"be" in Indo-European languages brought about
a mutual effect on the structure of both nominal and verbal sentences. Accordingly, as
Lohmann says, "The nominal sentence (with the verbum ;s as copula) in a sense assumes
verbal character, while the verbal sentence adapts itself in its structure to the nominal
sentence."29 The nominal sentence is the mold of a purely logical and conceptual relation,
and. therefore, the expression ofa merely "subjective" movement and relation, a movement
of thought itself, while the verbal sentence expresses the "objective" movement and
relation. What is the significance of this union of nominal and verbal sentences? On one
hand, the verbal sentence, in its approximation to the nominal sentence, obtains the subject-
predicate scheme such that the outer and "objective" relations in some sense become irmer,
and logical. On the other hand, the nominal sentence obtains the character of the verbal
sentence by making use ofthe verb ''1.0 be" as the copula which functions in the similar ",..ay
as any other verb in the verbal sentence. But it does not follow that the nominal sentence
would be reduced to a verbal sentence since it is still easy to differentiate "to be", though
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treated as a verb, from any other verb in a verbal sentence. This is true particularly in
highly inflected languages like Greek and Latin, in which case plays the role of such a
differentiation.:lO Nevertheless all of this cannot eliminate the analogy of "to be" with real
verbs. We may bener call "to be" a copulative verb as different from non-copulative verbs
(i.e., real verbs) insofar as what functions as a copula could be anything other than "to be"
which could be devoid ofany verbal character or analogy as in the case of many languages.
Benveniste points out:
The creation of a "to be" which is used to predicate that two terms are
identical was not a linguistic inevitability. In a number of languages at
different periods of history, the junctive function, usually established by a
pause between the terms, as in Russian, has tended to be realized in a
positive sign, in a morpheme. But this is not the sole and necessary
solution. Several other processes have been employed; the creation or
adaption of a verbal form is only one of these processes.)l
Obviously what is linguistically inevitable is the function of the copula. Even in
Russian and Hungarian, the pause, the "zero morpheme", is still a minimum element ofa
sentence which has the same value as any other copula, serving the sign of assertion. This
linguistic inevitability indicates the equiprimordiality of language and the henneneutic "as-
structure" in the sense that any language inevitably makes assertions. The question we are
concerned with here is how the "verbalized" nominal sentence detennines the way Indo-
European makes assertions. More particularly, how does it give rise to the structure of
propositional truth, or, as Benveniste puts it, "how is it that there is a verb 'to be' which
gives verbal expression and lexical consistency to a logical relationship in an assertive
utterance?"n As Lohmann observes, this approximation of the nominal sentence to the
verbal sentence results in an identification of the subject in the subject-predicate structure
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with the subject in the relational struetwe, the latter ofwhich is virtually the agent and the
ego. Lohmann goes on to point out, '''this identification characterizes the modem European
way of thinking, in which 'subjective' immediately becomes identical with 'related to an
ego."'ll The hUler, subjective relations of the subject-predicate scheme in the nominal
sentence are not only marked out but also guaranteed by the outer, objective relations, and
it, therefore, factually becomes objective. Furthermore, the subject of the nominal sentence
is assigned the character of an agent or an ego as the subject in the verbal sentence.
Consequently, the propositional truth assertion connates the relational scheme of the verbal
sentence and the subject·predicate scheme of the nominal sentence.
2· "OntQIQgical Indifference" -- Chjnese).f
Assuming that the metaphysical understanding of the ontological difference is
intrinsically related to inflection, and particularly the Indo·European inflection, the total
lack of inflection in Chinese makes any allusion to such an ontological difference
impossible. This is clearly shown in the following aspects: (a) Noun and verb, (b) Universal
and Particular, Ontological Indifference and Differance
a. Noun and Verb
The distinction between noun and verb is so fundamental to Indo-European
languages that it would be impossible to construct a sentence without it. As Heidegger says,
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"verb and substantive, are among those which were first recognized at the beginnings of
Western grammar, and which today are still regarded as the fundamental forms of words
and grammar." (1M, pp.55-56.) According to the genemlly proposed definitions, noun
indicates an object while the verb indicates a process, and thus involves time which is
represented in the tense inflection. Such definitions of noun and verb are taken for granted
and underlie the understanding of the origin and the nature oflanguage. Certainly, these
definitions are derived from what the Greeks understood by the terms onoma and rhima.
..... the crucial differentiation of the fundamental forms of words (noun and verb) in the
Greek fonn ofonoma and rhima was worked out and first established in close connection
with an exegesis and interpretation of being, which was to exert a detennining influence
on the whole West." (1M, p.57) But, according to Heidegger, these two tenns originally
covered an equally broad field, and they were intrinsically related to each other.
Onomameant the linguistic appellation in distinction to the named person
or thing, and took in the utterance of a word which was later designated
grammatically as rhana. And rhima in tum meant speech, discourse; rhat;
was the speaker, the orator, who employed not only verbs but also onomata
in the restricted sense of substantive. (1M, p.57)
That is to say. both onoma and rhana originally designated all speech in the sense
ofnaming. Their difference could be drawn only in terms of the different aspects ofspeech
in respect to the named and in respect to the speaker, respectively. The fundamental
differentiation of these two terms into two main classes of words was carried out through
a digression from, or a misinterpretation of, the original reflection of the Greeks on the
Greek language. According to Heidegger, it was Plato in the Sophist who first gave an
interpretation and explanation of this differentiation. The differentiation between onoma
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and rhm,acorresponded to the differentiation betweenpragma and praxis. "Pragmata are
the things with which we have to do, with which we are always concerned. Praxis is action
and activity in the broadest sense, which also includespoiesis."' (lM, p.58) Thus onoma and
rihma are di10ma pragmatos, revelation of things, and di16ma praxeiir, revelation ofan
action. Even so, the inner bond ofpragmata and praxis is not entirely concealed in their
differentiation.3S It was only through Aristotle's interpretation that the current definitions
of noun and verb were ultimately established. Aristotle "differentiates between onoma as
semanlikon aneu chronou and rhifma as prossemainon chronon (De lnterpretatione, c.2-4).
This interpretation of the essence of logos was taken as a model in the subsequent
development of logic and grammar." (1M, p.58) However the definitions of noun and verb
were embedded at the very outset in the Indo-European languages. Benveniste argues:
An opposition between "process" and "object" cannot have a universal
validity, a fixed criterion, or even a clear meaning in linguistics. 1be reason
for this is that notions like process or object do not reproduce objective
characteristics of reality but result from an expression of reality which is
itself linguistic, and this expression can only have a limited validity. These
notions are not intrinsic properties ofnature recorded in language; they are
categories that have been formed in certain languages and projected onto
nature. The distinction between process and object is recognized only by
someone who starts with the classifications of his native language and then
transposes them into universals; and this person himself, when questioned
about the basis of this distinction, will quickly come to see that if "horse"
is an object and "to run" is a process, it is because one is a noun and the
other a verb. A definition that seeks a "natural" justification for the manner
in which a particular idiom organizes its notions is condemned to
circularity.36
The correspondences between noun and object, and verb and process belong to
Indo-European linguistic construction, they are not necessary and universal. But such
changes ofcorrespondences constantly presuppose the distinction between noun and verb,
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which cannot be applied to Chinese since Chinese has no grammatical fonns (like verbal
fonn and nominal fonn) as the ground for any such changes of correspondence. In other
words. the difference between Chinese and Indo-European languages is radical in the sense
that not only the definitions ofnoun and verb, but also their differentiation in tenns ofword
c1assification,are invalid. Strictly speaking, to identify noWlS and verbs in Chinese is in fact
to project the framework of Westem languages (morphology, syntax, etc.) onto Chinese by
means ofsemantic parallels in translation. If the Western system of grammatical categories
is taken as the reference, we may regard all Chinese words as either nouns or verbs. Thus
what paral1els the verb in Indo~European languages could be understood as the name of a
process (which is pretty much like the substantive verb or gerund in English regardless of
its clearly grammatical function as opposed to the real verb from which it derives), hence
a noun. In this regard, Hall and Ames are right in claiming the dominance of the noun in
Chinese as far as Western grammatical categories are employed to describe Chinese. The
advantage ofsuch a claim is to show the lack ofverbal function in Chinese, which is crucial
for the Indo~European languages for propositional assertions.
The dominance of the noun function predudes limiting meaningful
statements to those possessing the sentential, subject~predicate fonn. The
tendency of classical Chinese philosophers to be concerned with the
ordering of names is a consequence of the dominance of the noun function.
The striking claim that classical Chinese doesn't depend upon sentences and
propositions for the expression of semantic content entails the consequence
that all Chinese words are names and that compound terms, phrases and
sentences are strings of names. This consequence, in tum, requires that one
appreciate the lack of interest on the part of the early Chinese in questions
of "truth" and "falsity". Words, as names, may be judged appropriate or
inappropriate; only propositions may. in the tnle sense, be tnle or false.J1
But the "Chinese noun" can never be the same as what represents an object as in
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Western languages; it should be treated as the name of a process rather than the name of
an object, for, to the Chinese mind, nothing is but process, which can be named but can
never be defined. Thus, we are also tempted to treat all Chinese words as more like verbs
than noWlS, or to ret:ognize the dominance of verb rather than that ofnoun, insofar as that
which can be named for the Chinese are processes which are devoid of substantial cores.
In this regard, Graham suggests, the thesis of Hall and Ames that the noun function is
dominant in Chinese contradicts their major contention that Chinese thinking assumes a
"process" rather than a "substance" ontology. According 10 Graham, the dominance of
noun function is greater in Indo-European languages than in Chinese. "The Indo-European
sentence is noun-centered in that the main verb has to be predicated of a noun, its subject,
from which it takes person and number, in the Classical Chinese verbal sentence the subject
is an optional element and the minimal form is the verb by itself:')1
Tense inflection is so crucial to the verb form in Indo-European languages that even
English, which has lost many other inflections, still remains rich in its tense inflection. The
inborn relation between verb and time in Indo-European languages determines the way
Western thinking moves. (But, as we have seen, in some languages tense inflection belongs
to nouns rather than verbs.) Tense inflection, unlike other inflections such as number and
person, belongs exclusively to verbs. It seems to have nothing to do with syntactic
congruence. In other words, the tense form of the verb is not taken from its subject-noun,
as in the case of number or person. rather, it is determined by itself. In other words, the
noun is excluded from time and becomes atemporal, or at most it is in an outer relation to
time. In this sense, Lohmann describes the verbal sentence as in an outer relation.
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Accordingly the fundamental separation of object and process is fulfilled. As Lohmann
points out, in Indo-European languages the verbal sentence is built into the nominal
sentence. It means also that tense is brought into the nominal sentence which is originally
atemporal. However, it is remarkable that in propositional sentences (truth assenions) only
the present tense is admitted. It seems to me that the tense function in the nominal sentence
plays a role that underlies the formation of the metaphysical understanding of time and
Being. The priority of the present is built into the nominal sentence and time is thus
understood as a series of presents. Being gains the meaning of presence inasmuch as the
verb "to be", used as a copula in truth assertion, is exclusively used in that favored present
tense. However, the fact lhal in Chinese there is no tense infleclion at all)9 suggests a
distinctive tense indifference in any assertion. It might be inconceivable for Western
thinking that process could be free of tense determination and thus atemporal. But if there
is nothing static and unchanging why should process necessarily be marked out by tense?
The absence of tense inflection in Chinese should not be understood as an expression of
atemporality such as might be ascribed to the Platonic Ideas. It only represents the
fundamental temporal indetermination of the process, because any tense involved would
introduce temporal determination.
The thesis that Chinese is a verb-centered language is acceptable inasmuch as the
Chinese counterpart of the subject-noun of the Indo-European languages is basically devoid
of the power of determining the verb (in respect to its number and person inflections). In
other words, the subject should not be understood as the determinate factor, the agent or
the ego. As Lohmann points out, "The 'subject' concept. if we wish to employ it in the
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Chinese manner, is to be conceived of in a broader sense than we are accustomed to
doing.»40 The elasticity of the "subject" function in Chinese lies in the fact that what
occupies the subject position~l is not necessarily the agent or an ego.~2 Cheng's remarkable
comments on the status of "subject" in Chinese remain unsurpassed:
Since activity, change, or relation are regarded as self-contained as well as
natural or spontaneous, there is no need to attribute a change or activity to
an object itself. ... Of course, one can always assign a subject to such
sentences, but any assignment need not be uniquely detenninable; therefore,
the virtual subjects of such subjectless sentences are basically or essentially
indetenninate.43
The fact that the special meaning of "subject" as agent or ego in Indo·European
languages is lacking in Chinese gives rise to the fundamental rejection of the philosophical
notion of "subject" or "subjectivity" as a necessary presupposition, as in Western
metaphysics. The indetenninacy of"subject" conditioned. so to speak, Zhuangzi's radical
skepticism. The question he asked about his butterfly dream could never be fonnulated
properly in Western languages without a certain modification. The sentence"Am I sure that
I am the man who had a dream ort>ecoming a butterfly, not a butterfly that is dreaming of
becoming me?" must have a single grammatical subject. This is inadequate and even
contradictory to what is meant by the original Chinese sentence. However, in classical
Chinese the subjectless structure can easily avoid this bothersome problem. The striking
contrast between Zhuangzi's dream allegory and Descartes' dream argument seems to
exemplify the fundamentally different treatments of "subject" in Chinese and Western
languages.'" Indeed, the self or the ego that is questioned in the Western postmodern
movement has never arisen in the Eastern world due to the absence of its linguistic
7\
detennination, as Nietzsche anticipated in that interesting passage.4' The assignment of a
subject to Chinese sentences is possible only when it understood differently. Lohmann
suggests:
[I]fwe conceive of "subject" (hypokeimenon) in its original meaning as the
"substratum", or the "fundament", of the relationship expressed in the
sentence, then the subject concept can also be applied to the Chinese
sentence, in which one finds first and foremost, in addition to the / subject,
the place and time detennination.46
In this regard, Lohmann seems to come close to Graham in contending the verb·centered
character ofChinese sentence, especially when the question of the proposition is concerned.
The copula "to be", used as an indispensable element in the propositional form has the
character of a verb, but a very special verb; as different from any other verb, it marks out
an inner, not an outer, relation. But in Chinese what corresponds to this copula is
sometimes the word "to have".47 Thus according to Lohmann, the relation of ontological
difference in Indo-European languages becomes the relation of ontological indifference,
or, purely ontic relation, for the verb "to have" indicates a relation of "coexistence", i.e.,
outer relation, rather than of "inherence" in the sense of "inesse" of predicate in subject.
Thus the Indo-European "selfsameness" or "cor·respondence" of the subject-predicate
proposition cannot be established in Chinese. Lohmann concludes, "The 'truth' taken as
the 'unity of what belongs together' is ... 'intramundane' (inesse qua coexis/ere) and not,
as in Indo·European, 'transcendental", transcending the 'world of things present·at·hand'
(inesse qua ideinesse).''>.\s
We seem to have arrived at a paradox. On the one hand, the description of the
Chinese sentence as verb-centered is due to the lack of the subject in the strict sense (as in
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Western languages); on the other hand. a verb without its detenninator would no longer be
a verb. Thus the verb-centered sentence could at the same time be understood as a noun·
centered sentence. In this regard, Hall and Ames' thesis about the dominance of the noun
function in Chinese is proved to be right. But if we admit that the distinction between noun
and verb is not necessary but merely arbitrary in regard to the reference to the Indo-
European languages the paradox would become of great significance. Indeed, the
realization of the absence of any fundamental distinction between noun and verb would
make the character of the Chinese sentence as "ontological indifference" clearly. In other
words, the absence of such a distinction hinders the fonnation ofsupposition which makes
possible the ontological difference as in Indo-European languages.
b. The Universal and the Particular
The metaphysical conception of the ontological difference is presented most clearly
in the thinking of Being as the most universal concept. In other words, metaphysics thinks
the ontological difference between Being and beings in teons of the difference bel\\'een the
universal and the particular. In the very beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger attacks
this traditional understanding of Being. (BT, p.22) In contrast to this Western metaphysical
thought on the universal and the particular, the Chinese has never posed such a bifurcation.
For the traditional Chinese mind it is almost inconceivable that what is universal or general
can be totally separated from the concrete, or the particular.49 This distinctive "Chinese
thinking" is indeed already reflected in the Chinese language. Since in Chinese articles are
13
rarely used, and there is nonumber inflection, what could be identified as nouns are often
seen as more like the mass noun (such as "water", "wind"l rather than thenumerable noun
(for example."a man". "trees'') of Indo-European languages. In this regard, Hansen claims
that Chinese thought tends to think in terms of whole/part rather than class/member.
The mind is not regarded as an internal picturing mechanism which
represents the individual objects in the world, but as a faculty that
discriminates the boundaries of the substances or stuffs referred to by
names. lltis "cutting up things" view contrasts strongly with the traditional
Platonic philosophical picture of objects which are understood as
individuals or particulars which instantiate or "have" properties
(universals).50
From this Hall and Ames draw a radical conclusion that "in the absence of classes
of particulars to be picked out by index words, language will be non-referential, no
ontological referencing serves to discipline the act of naming," "names 'reference'
functions or roles which are themselves other names", "there can be neimer connotative nor
denotative definition in the strict sense.'~l Obviously since the fundamental distinction
between the abstract or the general and the concrete or the particular is lacking in Chinese
thinking, the quantified individual which is the starting point ofabstraction is inadequate.
Here we may consider the quantificational theory of existence to see how it would be
conceived in Chinese. According to James Bradley, the quantificational theory ofexistence,
which he calls the weak theory ofexistence, claims that "statements of the form 'X exists'
are not statements about X, i.e., not predicates of X but rather quantificational statements
about the term X, namely that X refers to a class which is not empty but has instances or
examples. '"Sl But it seems that the weak theory of existence is irrelevant, or at most trivial
in Chinese insofar as the quantificational statements which are based on the presupposition
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of individuals or instances cannot be articulated naturally and unequivocally in Chinese.
Unlike the weak theory of existence, the Chinese would treat the term X not as a class
which has members, but as a whole, the whole that is made of parts. For example, the word
"horse" in the sentence "[a] white horse is not [a] horse" can refer to either a single horse.
or some horses, or all horses; yet it can still refer to "horseness", which from the Western
perspective would be regarded as a pure concept. Lohmann claims:
The ancient Chinese monosyllable word is ... purely conceptual expression;
but this expression is taken in "ontological indifference", so that it is not in
need of a formal "objectification" in the sense ("supposition''). It thus
stands in absolute opposition to the "word" of the three "supposing" typeS,
particularly to the ancient Indo-European "word", which shows in its form
an explicit obligatory supposition (by means of the "ending") and usually
a complex articulation of the conceptual expression represented by the
"stem" (or also, an articulation through "roots" and deriving elements).Sl
The so-<:alled "purely conceptual expression" should not be understood in tenns of
universality and abstractness, in the way that the West conceives a concept. In fact, as
Cheng points out, Chinese words in general have the feature of combining universality and
particularity, abstractness and concreteness, activity and the result of activity. The basic
lexicon (e.g. ying-yang, rOi-p, wu) of Chinese philosophy, therefore, "denotes neither the
universal abstract nor concrete particulars".~
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c. OntologicallndifTercnce and Diffirance
The opposition between Indo-Ewupean languages and Chinese as two extreme
realizations of possible human languages is in every aspect an opposition between
"ontological difference" and "ontological indifference"'. To put it in another way, from the
hermeneutic "as-structure", the common ground for making linguistic assertion ofany kind,
Chinese apparently took the road opposite to that of Indo-European languages which have
carried out a transformation from Ihe hermeneutic "as-structure" to the apophantic "as-
structure", namely the transformation from primordial trulh 10 propositional truth.
For Derrida, it is the "ontological difference" ofWestern languages that determines
Ihe fundamental character of Western philosophy, which he calls the "metaphysics of
presence" or "logocentrism", The fact that each Indo-European word (nominal or verbal)
as such contains an expression of the relation of a "Being" to a "being" by means of
inflection gives rise to or reinforces the tendency of thinking beings as referring to Being,
the final referent, which can be fully present, be il Form, ousia, essentia, eIC.. Derrida's
strategy of overcoming the metaphysics of presence is to make a shift, the shift from
ontological difference to differance, Differance, according to him, "is the systematic play
of difference, of the spacing [espacement] by which elements relate to one another."H It
con nates difference and deferral, and alludes 10 fundamental undecidability and
indeterminacy such that the full presence ofBeing can never occur. But in order to practice
diffirance, it is necessary to deconstruct Western languages themselves, that is, to eliminate
the natural tendency of their grammar to generate the "ontological difference",
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But all this seems to lack importance when it is applied to Chinese thought, for, as
Hall and Ames point out, "there is no need to overcome the 'Iogocentrism' of a
'metaphysics of presence' grounded in 'ontological difference' if no distinction between
Being and beings is urged by the classical Chinese language."S6 The "ontological
indifference" of Chinese indeed hindered at the very outset the formation of the
"metaphysics of presence". All the grammatical characteristics of Chinese, e.g. lack of
inflection, no essential distinction between word classes, no strict subject-predicate
"sentencehood", etc.leave its referential function as basically one of deferral. As Hall and
Ames put it:
Language which does not lead one to posit ontological difference between
Being and beings, but only a difference between one being and another,
suggests a decentered world whose centers and circumstances are always
defined in an ad hoc manner. The mass of classical Chinese philosophical
discourse, then, is already deconstructed.~1
The so-called ''transcendental signifie"" is irrelevant to the Chinese language insofar
as the "string of Chinese words" is wholly contextual without reference to structures that
are constantly established in Western languages by inflection. For inflection is essentially
constructive, it sustains the reluctance of Western languages to be submitted to endless
deferral.
The "ontological indifference" of Chinese is still attested by its being free from
phonocentrism, the "debasement of writing", which is seen by Derrida as the major aspect
oflogocentrism. It is certainly true that Chinese nonphonetic writing differs from Western
alphabetical writing in such a significant way that it can never fit the characterization of
writing as a recording of speech. Derrida, while insisting that logocentrism is a property of
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the West, sees in the nonphonetic Chinese writing "the testimony of a powerful movement
ofcivilization developing outside alllogocentrism."5B Although it is still arguable whether
Chinese, as Derrida conceives it, can totally suppress or choke off the desire to posit a
"central" presence, the non·logocentrist tendency was from the very start inherent in the
Chinese language. Zhang Longxi, for example, while suspecting Derrida's conception of
Chinese as no more than another "European hallucination" Gust as that of Leibniz),
contends that Chinese may overturn the metaphysical hierarchy more easily and efficiently
than Western phonetic writing does, and there is something in the Chinese scripts that does
appeal to the Derridean grammatology. S9 He explains:
In the Chinese tradition, therefore, the power of writing as such avenged
itself the very moment it was debased; the metaphysical hierarchy was thus
already undetermined when it was established.... it hardly needed to wait
until the twentieth century for the dismantling of phonetic writing, for the
Derridean sleight of hand, the strategy of deconstruction.60
What the present study is more concerned with is whether Heidegger, when
attempting to engage in a dialogue with the East, would possibly appeal to Chinese as
exemplifying the non·metaphysicallanguage just as Derrida does. It can be assumed at this
point that the particular form of deferral in Chinese, though different from sheer
postmodem deconstruction, would certainly draw Heidegger's attention. The Chinese
deferral, according to Hall and Ames, "involves a yielding to the appropriate models ofthe
received tradition, and to the behaviors of those who resonate with those models.'>61 Or as
Zhang explains, "While a deconstructive intertext is a trace without origin, a Chinese
intertext is always a trace leading back to the origin, to the fountainhead of tradition
If the question of ontological difference is to be retained and explained in a rather radical
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way as Heidegger attempts, "origin" may be the adequate substitute for the "transcendental
signifl.e'" or the "final reference", although such a substitution has been suspected by Rorty
as making no difference. But it is still hard to see how the "ontological indifference" of
Chinese can possibly yield the ontological difference between Being and beings in its
primordial sense which Western metaphysics, due to the languages in which it is couched,
has forgotten and covered. In other words, whereas Being has become obscured in oblivion
in the West, it simply has not arisen in Eastern thought whose essentially other "other"
characteristics could not suggest the ontological difference in the first place. The question
I now raise is whether the relics and debris of Western metaphysical thinking which are
preserved in technological culture will suggest such a difference to contemporary Eastern
thought.
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Chapter Three
The Nothing
Based on the preliminary linguistic·philosophic investigations of both Western and Eastern
(Chinese) languages undertaken in the previous chapter, which is meant to bring about an
open space for a meaningful dialogue between Heidegger and Eastern thought, the present
chapter will focus on a single philosophical idea, "nothing", as a vantage point from which
such a dialogue can be developed. The main reasons for this option are: (I) Given the basic
claim asserted in the previous chapter that the lack of those linguistic detenninations that
give rise to the idea of"ontological difference" and the concept ofBeing are the reason why
Eastern thought keeps itself far from the question of Being as raised in Western philosophy,
"nothing" is introduced to play the role of breaking the language barrier, for "nothing" is
a common idea which is available in both Eastern and Western philosophical discourses.
After all, "nothing", it would seem, is not Being, which belongs solely to Western ontology.
(2) The notion of"nothing" is highly esteemed in Eastern thought, notably in Taoism and
Buddhism. Much philosophical literature has been devoted to contemplation of this awe-
inspiring "concept".! Its predominance in Eastern philosophy is comparable with thai of
Being in Western metaphysical philosophy. The view that the pursuit ofBeing is the central
theme of Western philosophy while the inquiry into Nothingness is the primary task of
Eastern philosophy has been widely accepted as a basic observation on the issue of East-
West comparative study.1 Thus the relation between the question of Being and the question
of nothing still invokes the question concerning the so-called duality of East and West. (3)
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Heidegger's innovative interpretation of "nothing" belongs to his task of rethinking the
Western philosophical tradition. The discussion of "the nothing" plays an important role
in his attempt to step out of Western metaphysics.J
"Nothing" as a Metaphysical Question
As a Western philosopher par excellence, Heidegger describes his whole work as
"in the main an interpretation of Westem philosophy.'>4 To be sure, such an interpretation
does not merely add a footnote to the history of Western philosophy; rather, as a part of the
history it aims to unfold, it brings to light what is still unthought in that tradition. Given the
fundamental philosophical question for Heidegger is the question of Being (Seinsfrage),
his interpretation of Westem philosophy focuses on the interpretation of the question of
Being. The question of Being, according to Heidegger, constitutes the essence of Western
philosophy and at the same time marks its limitation. Thus, we must first ask how Western
philosophy raises the question of Being, i.e., in what way Being becomes thematized.
It is Leibniz who for the first time formulates in a rather succinct way the very
thrust of Western philosophy which gives rise to the various contemplations on Being:
"Why are there beings, rather than nothing."s In both "What Is Metaphysics?", and An
Introduction 10 Metaphysics, which are meant to clarify the nature of metaphysics in a
positive and constructive manner, Heidegger takes Leibniz' formulation as the fundamental
question of metaphysics. In agreement with Leibniz, Heidegger asserts that it is the first of
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all questions in the sense that it is the most far-reaching, deepest and most fundamental of
all questions. (1M, pp.I-2) The "why" in the question asks about the ground of beings. The
"first question", for Leibniz, is asked according to the "first principle", "Nothing is without
grolll1d (reason)". Only in light of this principle can we ask the question. It is worth noting
that the interpretation of the "first question" is somehow intrinsically related to the
interpretation of the "first principle", each of which plays a significant role in Heidegger's
tum, although Heidegger treats them separately as different themes -- the former is mainly
addressed in "What Is Metaphysics?" and An Introduction to Metaphysics, while the latter
in The Essence ofReason. The first principle concerns the ontological difference in the
sense that the grolll1d of that which is must be understood as the Being ofbeings. However
the relation between the ground of what is grounded in Leibniz, and in traditional
metaphysics in general, is essentially a causal relation. That is, Being as ground is
lll1derstood as a cause, the first cause of beings. Insofar as Being is the first cause, it is still
treated as a being although the highest being, because the relation between a cause and what
is caused is thought as a relation between one being and another.6 The first principle seems
to pre-determine the answer to the "why" in the first question, and thus marks forgetfulness
of Being. Heidegger says:
This question inquires into the first cause and highest existent ground of
beings. It is the question of the theion, a question that had already arisen at
the beginning ofmeraphysics in Plato and Aristotle; that is to say, arisen
from the essence of metaphysics. Because metaphysics, thinking the being
as such, is approached by Being but thinks it on the basis of and with
reference to beings, metaphysics must therefore say (legein) the theion in
the sense of the highest existent ground. (N, volA, p.209)
But how can we get away from this seemingly unavoidable way of thinking Being
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as a being? How can we really differentiate Being from beings? Heidegger thinks that the
possibility of getting away from the metaphysical treatment of Being is still contained in
the first question, "Why are there beings, rather than nothing?" First of all, the question is
concerned with all beings. Thus it pushes the frontiers ofour thinking to the verge, the limit
that is found only in nothing. But the nothing which first enters the scope of metaphysics
by means of the "first question" is merely functional in the sense that it is meant to present
beings as a whole, namely, all that is not nothing. As Heidegger puts it:
What follows in the interrogative sentence, "rather than nothing", is only an
appendage, which may be said to tum up of its own accord if for purpose of
introduction we pennit ourselves to speak loosely, a tum ofphrase that says
nothing further about the question or the object of questioning, an
ornamental flourish. Actually the question is far more unambiguous and
definite without such an appendage, which springs only from the prolixity
of loose discourse. "Why are there beings?" The addition "rather than
nothing" is dropped not only because it says nothing. For why should we go
on to ask about nothing? Nothing is simply nothing. Here there is nothing
more to inquire about. And above all, in talking about nothing or
nothingness, we are not making the slightest advance toward the knowledge
of the being. (1M, pp 22-23)
The above observation shows how the metaphysical question, "Why are there
beings, rather than nothing?", introduces "the nothing" Metaphysics as the foundation of
sciences seeks the ground of beings which sciences deal with in various ways. Thus
metaphysics in this context is prohibited from talking about nothing, for to talk about
nothing simply means to cease to talk. No doubt, only something rather than nothing can
keep talking going. "In speaking of nothing he makes it into a something. In speaking he
speaks against what he intended. He contradicts himself. But discourse that contradicts
itself offends against the fundamental rule of discourse (logos), against 'logic', To speak
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of nothing is illogical". (1M, p.23) If metaphysics goes so far as to speak of nothing, it
would immediately undermine its status as the foundation of sciences. But Heidegger
attempts to have metaphysics speak of nothing. In "What Is Metaphysics?" "nothing" is
"metaphysically" thematized; it is taken as a particular metaphysical question that concerns
the nature of metaphysics itself.
2 Nothing and Negation
Heidegger, in "What Is Metaphysics?", claims that "the nothing is more original
than the 'not' and negation." (BW, p.99) How is this possible? It seems that we cannot
eliminate the "natural" tendency of thinking of the "nothing" as "no-thing" or "non-thing",
namely, the negation of "thing". As far as affirmation is considered to be more original
than negation, the "no·" of the nothing indicates its derivative nature from the "not", i.e.
the negation. Can we get rid of this "no" and encounter the nothing itself without a "via
nega/iva"? Heidegger's claim seems to counter the main stream of Western philosophy and
even Western languages, which treat the nothing as a result of the negation of Being.
"Nothing is the negation of the totality of beings." This defmition indicates: (1) the
primacy of Being over nothing; (2) the priority of the act of negation to nothing as its result.
The Greeks understood "nothing" or non-being as stcresis, (Latin, privatio), namely, the
privation of being, me on. The first attempt to address nothing was made by Pannenides,
''the thinker of Being", who, in doing so, actually broke his own rule that it is impossible
to speak of nothing. He asserted: "What is, is; what is not, is not. . Plato modifies this
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position by insisting that Nothing is conceivable only interms of a privation of Being.
Otherwise, anything that can be talked aoout must "be there" in some sense. Tillich points
out, "Being precedes nonbeing in ontological validity, as the word 'nonbeing' itself
indicates.,,7 "Nonbeing is dependent on the being it negates. 'Dependent' points first of all
to the ontological priority ofbeing over nonbeing:" What Tillich seems to be saying here
represents, in Heidegger's view, a basic assumption which has been taken for granted by
many Western philosophers.9
Since the nothing is thought to be fundamentally parasitic on Being, the meaning
of the nothing is delermined by the meaning of Being which must be given in advance.
Western ontology is based on the peculiar use of the verb "to be" which envelops various
senses that may be roughly divided into the existential and the copulative. 1o In
correspondence with the various senses of "to be", there must be, so to speak, various
senses of "not to be" insofar as any negation is dependent on what it negates. But in
Western philosophy, the nothing is thought as the negation of the totality of beings in the
sense of the totality of all things, and also the totality of all the senses of "to be". The
logical problem arises from the contradiction between "is" and "is not"; To think the
nOlhing as the negation of the totality of beings is to think nothing as derived from the
negation of the totality of the various senses of "to be". It is illogical in that it contains
inevitably an assertion "nothing (non-existence and not·is) is". That is, in such a stating of
nothing, nothing still is, is so and so, namely, the negation of the totality of beings. But
nothing is not! Nothing can not be articulated in an "x is y" sentence, simply because
nothing is not only the negation of the existential "to be" but also of the copulative ''10 be".
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Is there any possibility for us to avoid violating logic? Yes, but only by distinguishing
between the existential and the copulative senses of "to be". That is to say, if the "is" in
question is treated only as a copula with no allusion to existence, we can still say that
"nothing is such and such". This can be made clear when we look to the East where
"nothing" does not constitute a dilemma, not because the East has a different "logic''. but
because assertion or the use ofcopula does not contradict "nothing"in so far as this nothing
is not derivative from "is not" -- actually it is not derivative at all.
The attempt to avoid logical difficulty in thinking of nothing was first made by
Plato, who distinguished "what is not" into me on as the relative negation of being and Ollie
on as the absolute negation ofbeing,11 It seems that he tried to distinguish the negation of
the copulative "to be" from the negation of the totality of"to be", According to Plato, eidos
or fonn, which determines an actual existence, is "being", whereas hufe or malter, which
is informed by eidos, is "non-being", because it is undetermined and fonnJess in itself. Hufe
or matter is nothing only in the sense that it is not anything -- anything (with form), "It is
nothing" equals "It is", for "nothing" here should be literally understood as pure absence:
"It is _." (the lack of predicate) 1be absolute construction of''to be" in Greek, from which
the modern sense of existence expressed in this archaic expression "x is" is derived,12 is
paradoxically identical with nothing -- the relative nothing in the Platonic sense. This
identity of Being and nothing is, in fact, the linguistic basis for Hegel's opening assertion
in the &ience ofLogic, "pure being and pure nothing are the same",1l But the Being in this
identity only concerns the copulative sense of"to be" and avoids the totality of the various
sense 0£'10 be", the negation ofwhichyields Plato's ouk on, The Christian doctrine crealio
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eX" nihi/o, on the other hand, holds that God did not create the universe out of some given
maner, but created everything including matter itself. Christianity understands nothing as
absolute nothing, not relative nothing in the sense of the formless maner.ln this regard, the
Christian understanding ofnothing (ouk on) presupposes the unified "to be". As Tillich puts
it, "The me-ontic matter of Platonism represents the dualistic element which underlies all
paganism •• Christianity has rejected the concept of me-ontic matter on the basis of the
doctrine of Crealio ex nihi/o. Matter is not a second principle in addition to God.,,'4
Undoubtedly, Heidegger does not want to think nothing in Plato's way which
implies the distinction of various senses of "'to be" as unrelated, for such a distinction
would undermine the legitimacy of the question of Being. 's The nothing for Heidegger is
not the relative nothing, me on, but absolute nothing ouk on, the nothing as in crealio ex
nihilo. It is this absolute nothing that causes the logical problem, so that theology often
keeps silent about this nothing. Heidegger says, ..... no one is bothered by the difficulty that
ifGod creates out ofnothing precisely He must be able to relate Himself to the nothing. But
if God is God he cannot know the nothing, assuming that the <Absolute' excludes all
nothingness." (BW, p.IIO) Thus Heidegger feels it necessary to "tamper with" logic. (BW,
p.99) But certainly what Heidegger is doing here is not to go against logic, but rather to go
beyond logic, that is, go beyond the region of propositional truth, for, as Heidegger
maintains, logic is concerned with propositional truth which is derived from a primordial,
non·propositional, truth. Nothing can not be formulated in a proposition like "nothing is
the negation of the totality of beings". Heidegger asks, "Is the nothing given only because
the 'nol', i.e. negation, is given?" (BW, p.99) Obviously, if we contend that nothing is a
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result of the negation ofbeing, the result of a particular act of intellect (BW, p.99), we are
still trapped in the sphere ofpropositions, and can never get away from self-contradiction.
Nothing must be thought in a non-propositional way, that is, not in terms of the "not" The
nothing understood as the complete negation of the totality of beings, according to
Heidegger, is merely the formal concept of the imagined nothing but never the nothing
itself. The nothing itself, or the "genuine" nothing must be prior to negation, to the "not".
The negation and the "not" are given only because the nothing is given. Thus Heidegger
states, "the nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa." (BW, p.107) By this,
Heidegger undoubtedly moves close to the East. In Eastern thought the nothing is never
regarded as the negation of being, but as the complement of being. As Abe Masao puts it,
Unlike Western ideas of being and non-being,yu [being] and wu [nothing]
are of completely equal force in relation to one another. They are entirely
relative, complementary and reciprocal, one being impossible without the
other. In other words, wu is not one-sidedly derived through negation ofyu.
.. One has no logical or ontological priority to the other. '6
The distinction between East and West with regard to their respective treatment of
nothing is from the outset indicated by the different languages themselves. In Western
languages, all terms that express "nothing" are in the derivative fonn indicating the
privation ofbeing: me on, non*being, non-eire, Nichlsein, etc.. 17 The one-sided dependence
of nothing on Being is somehow deternlined by the morphological construction, namely,
the negative prefix, such as me, no-, non-, and Nicht-, which in turn alludes to a particular
propositional structure, i.e., negation. In other words, the sentence with "not" is always
viewed as the prototype of the word with "no-". This exemplifies the fact that in highly
inflected languages words are constructed syntactically. However, in Eastern languages,
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Chinese for example, the wordsyu [being] and wu [nothing] are only semantically contrary,
and have no morphological link indicating that one derives from the other. It is remarkable
that aJthough Indian languages (Sanskrit and Bali), belonging to the same Indo-European
family, have the same way ofexpressing "nothing" in negative fonn (abhava or asa/: bhiva
or sat) as Greek and other Western languages; the negative form is conceived not only
negative but also positive and affinnative. According to Hajime Nakamura, "in Indian logic
the universal negative judgment (E) is not used, and it is discussed after being changed into
the universal positive judgment (A); e.g. 'All the speeches are non-eternal' (anityah
abah)."18Insofar as the morphologically negative form of the nothing alludes to negation
expressed in propositional structure, the West perceives the nothing as "naturally"
derivative from the negation of being. But in India, the negative nature of the "nothing"
(asar or abhava) seems to be diminished or weakened, because the negation to which the
"nothing" is supposed to allude is nevertheless expressed in the fonn ofaffinnation instead
of negation. In other words, the "nothing" cannot find in propositional structure the "not"
as its prototype, as in the West. Accordingly, sat and asat, bhava and abhava are treated
as mutually dependent in a way strikingly similar to the Chinese understanding of the
relation betweenyu and wu rather than the Western treatment of Being and nothing. '9 The
intimate relation between indigenous Chinese thinking and Indian Buddhism lies in the
similar treatment of "nothing' which had become the basis for the development of the
Indian Buddhism in the Chinese context.
Heidegger's thinking of nothing without any reference to negation indeed finds a
rather congenial source in the Eastern world. But the question is whether the Eastern
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understanding ofnothing can be fmally identical with, or integrated into Heidegger's own
thought. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to answer this question.
3 Nothing Emptiness Clearing Way
How can the non-derivative and non-negative nothing be "given"? It seems that
Heidegger has two related meanings ofnothing: existential and ontological. When he says
that "anxiety reveals the nothing", he is referring to the existential nothing which is already
disclosed in Being and Time. According to Heidegger, in an average, everyday mode of
existence, one is preoccupied exclusively with beings. Only through anxiety can one be tom
out ofone's everydayness. Anxiety reveals beings to be fundamentally meaningless in the
face of radical mortality and finitude. The nature of nothing reveals itself to Dasein in the
anxiety of Dasein's being toward death, in which "Dasein finds itself face to face with the
'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence." (BT, p.331) In "What Is
MetaphysicsT' Heidegger continues his existential analysis ofanxiety as the disclosure of
the nothing. He says: "Anxiety robs us ofspeech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so
that just the nothing crowds round, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the 'is' falls
silent." (BW, p.I03) To be sure, the existential nothing is not derived from logical negation,
but is given directly through a particular state of mind, i.e. anxiety. By facing nothing,
Dasein is forced to deal with an entirely foreign realm which eludes Dasein's ordinary
relation to beings, which is detennined exclusively by "the they". Dasein's experience of.
or encounter with, nothing conditions Dasein's liberation from the hegemony of''the they"
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and hence his turning from inauthenticity ofeverydayness to authenticity. Thus the nothing
can be understood as an entrance through which Dasein becomes capable of his own
transcendence toward Being. However, in existential nothing one does not see the
belonging together of Being and nothing which the later Heidegger explicates. The
ontological nothing in the sense of its intrinsic relation to Being itself, as I-Ieidegger himself
admits, is still obscure in his discussion of the existential nothing in Being and Time.
Although Heidegger holds that "the Being of being 'is' not itselfa being", (BT, p.26) he
maintains that "Being is always the Being of a being." (BT, p.29) In other words,
Heidegger, in Being and Time, emphasizes the relation of Being and beings, rather than
Being and nothing. It is Being not nothing that determines what is. In "What Is
Metaphysics", Heidegger continues his existential analysis of nothing; but he moves from
the phenomenological description ofanxiety as the horizon of the appearance ofthe nothing
to the nothing itself, namely, the ontological meaning of the nothing, which, as Heidegger
himself admits, is still obscure in Being and Time. (BT, p.310) The ontological meaning of
the nothing that underlies the existential meaning of the nothing is disclosed in Dasein's
grasping itself as opening to its potentiality, and finally to Being itself, which is the
ontological state ofDasein's freedom. This is most clearly expressed in the following:
In the clear night of the nothing ofanxiety the original openness of beings
as such arises: that they are beings -- and not nothing. BUI this "and not
nothing" we add in our talk is not some kind of appended clarification.
Rather it makes possible in advance the revelation ofbeings in general. The
essence of the originally nihilating nothing lies in this, that it brings Oa-scin
for the first time before beings as such. (BW, p.1 05)
Heidegger goes on to state that "Nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of
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beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings." (BW, p.IIO) Obviously
nothing's nihilation is ontologically prior to and makes ontologically possible the ek·
sistential transcendence of Dasein as the "seat-holder for the nothing" (BW, p.l08).20
The ontological meaning of the nothing shows that the nothing belongs to Being
itself. The question of the nothing is precisely the question of Being. In other words, to
think. the ontological meaning of the nothing is in fact to think. the nothing as an ontological
issue, and hence to think its relation to Being. It is a basic view that Heidegger holds from
the very start: "The Being ofbeings 'is' not itself a being." (BT, p.26i ' In Being and Time,
Being is always expressed in negative way, that is, in the fonn of "is not". For example,
"Being is not a universal concept", "Being is not indefinable", "Being is not self-evident".
(BT, pp.22-23) But what is Being? The direct answer to this question that Heidegger gives
in an affinnative form are: "It [Being] is It itself." (BW, p.2IO) and ''Nothing is ... Being
itself." (QCT, p.154) Referring to the lecture "What Is Metaphysics?", Heidegger says,
The Nothing that is talked about there refers to that which in relation to
what·is [das Seiende] is never any kind of being, and "is" thus Nothing, but
which nevertheless detennines what-is as such and is thus called Being.22
The nothing that detennines what is is prior to what is. Such a view on the nothing
is strikingly close to Laozi's idea of nothing. Laozi says,
Ten thousand things in the universe are created from being (yu)
Being (yu) is created from non-being (wu).n
For both thinkers, it is the nothing rather than being (something) that gives rise to
various beings (things). The nothing is the source of beings (things). The emphasis on the
primacy of the nothing can be further illustrated by two jugs described respectively by
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Heidegger in "The Thing" and Laozi in Dao De Jing. Heidegger writes,
The emptiness, the void, is what does the vessel's holding. The empty
space, this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel. (PLT,
p.169)
Here Heidegger shows that what is important in a jug is not its being as traditionally
understood as "form" or "essence" that can be abstracted from the jug, but rather the
"emptiness" or "the nothing" by virtue of which the jug has all fonn, from which arises the
usefulness of the jug. This description of the jug is almost a paraphrase or a translation of
what Laozi wrote more than two thousand years ago:
Lumps of clay are shaped into a vessel Gug),
From their non-being arises the function of the vesse1.24
Laozi sees the usefulness of the jug in the appropriateness of its serviceable
emptiness. The "hidden source" ofHeidegger's thought on the nothing is almost completely
revealed in this archaic vessel. Cho comments, "Heidegger's description of the 'emptiness'
of the container seems to echo, both in the choice ofmotif as well as in the choice ofwords,
Laozi's lines in Chapter 11 of the Dao De Jing."z, Like Laozi, Heidegger reverses the
customary way of thinking nothing in terms of something and thus posits nothing as more
primary than something.26 The voidness or the emptiness of the jug is the open place that
gathers beings. It is intrinsically related to Heidegger's interpretation of the German word
Lichtung (clearing). Heidegger's notion of nothing, whether in its existential sense as
defined in terms of Dasein's existence in Being and Time or in its ontological sense as
Being itself, has the meaning of "openness" and "clearing". The nothing is the clearing in
which beings appear. In fact, in Being and Time, Heidegger already uses the word
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"clearing" (Lichlung) to elucidate the existential meaning of nothing. "To say that it is
'iIIwninated' [erleuchtet] means that as Being·in·the-world, it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself,
not lhrough any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing [Lichlungl" (BT,
p.171) The shift from the existential meaning of the nothing to the ontological meaning of
the nothing is also reflected in the account ofclearing. In "The Origin of the Work of Art"
Heidegger asserts:
In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing,
a lighting.... This open center is therefore not surrendered by what is;
rather, the lighting center itself encircles all that is, like the Nothing which
we scarcely know. (PLT, p.53)
Now there is much to say aoout this clearing, especially in respect to the similarity
between Heidegger and Eastern thought. Reinhard May draws our attention to the Chinese
graph (written character) wu ( ~ ), in which he has found "a rich staning point for the
identification of the dearing and nothing".21 He writes, "wu refers to a place that was
originally covered in luxuriant vegetation, as in a thicket in a wood, but where trees have
been felled so that there is now an open space, a clearing. Wu thus means 'there, where
there is nothing', a place where formerly there were trees.',21 ln 'The End of Philosophy and
the Task ofThinking" there is a passage which is rather like an etymological interpretation
of the Chinese character wu.29
The forest clearing (opening) is experienced in contrast to dense forest,
called "density" (Dickung) in older language. The substantive "opening"
goes back to the verb "to open". The adjective licht "open" is the same
word as "light". To open something means: To make something light, free
and open, e.g., to make the forest free of trees at one place. The openness
thus originating is the clearing. What is light in the sense of being free and
open has nothing in common with the adjective "light", meaning "bright" -
neither linguistically nor factually. This is to be obscured for the difference
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between openness and light. Still, it is possible that a factual relation
between the two exists. Light can stream into the clearing, into its openness,
and let brightness play with darkness in it. But light never first creates
openness. Rather, light presupposes openness. (OTB, p.65)
The nothing as clearing or the open place, is Being itself. But the nothing which is
Being itself, though analogous to the nothing the medievaJs referred to as God, is different
from the "darkness of ignorance"; for as clearing, the nothing is beyond "brightness" and
"darkness". From this point of departure, Heidegger comes to see the paradoxical nature
of Being itself. In other words, Being is nothing not only in the sense of "no-thing", Le.,
other than beings, but aJso no-Being, in the sense of Being's selfnegation. In The Question
of Being, Heidegger introduces the strategy of crossing out Being, (Betns), (a strategy
Derrida will further develop to elucidate the "notion" of "trace", i.e., writing sous ralure.)
Heidegger says:
It is no longer "Being" at all if we try to think fully and completely of
"Being" as it is fated to hold sway, namely as being present, in which way
alone we refer to its destined essence. (QB, p.77)
This crossing out of Being can not be explained in terms of the Hegelian dialectic of self-
negation; yet it does not involve "becoming" as the synthesis. It is certainly true that
Heidegger at this point comes close to the Eastern thinkers. In Taosim and Zen, although
the nothing is often treated as prior to beings. Its priority is in fact functional and
pedagogical in the sense that such priority is to be ultimately transformed into the identity
of "something" and "nothing".ln fact, the affirmation ofofthe priority of nothing already
implies the negation of this priority because the affirmation of the priority of nothing can
be understood as (1) the negation of the priority of being (something), or (2) the negation
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of priority of any kind. ("nothing prior to others"). The nothing in Laozi and Taoism in
general is sometimes identical with Tao itself, which is said to be beyond dualisms and
distinctions, and thus is absolute nothing, not the nothing relative to something as merely
an absence. As the culminating representation of the Chinese "logic", namely ying-yang
dynamic, Tao is an interplay ofnothing and something; it is beyond nothing and something
insofar as it is the primordial nothing-which-is*something that grounds both nothing and
something. The Tao as absolute nothing is itself a paradox, which Zhuangzi expresses in
a rather distinctive way,
There is heing. There is nonheing. There is a not yet beginning to be being.
There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonheing.
Suddenly there is nonheing. But I do not know, when it comes to nonheing,
which is really heing and which is nonbeing. Now I have just said
something. But I don't know whether what I have said has really said
something or whether it hasn't said something.)O
This passage refers to t\.\'O kind of nothing (non*being). The flrst is a pure absence;
it is relative nothing as opposed to something (being): "There is being, there is non*being."
The second is not opposed to being: "There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning
to be non*being."1t is absolute nothing in the sense that it is neither being nor non-being;
but originates both. However, absolute nothing is not a synthesis ofbeing and nothing (non-
being), but the identical relation ofboth, and hence a true paradox. We can see in the above
passage that Zhuangzi tries to convey such a paradox --- the Tao as absolute nothing is
neither being nor non-being, but is paradoxically both. In a similar way, Heidegger's
crossing out of Being is also an attempt to show the paradoxical nature of Being.
The Black Forest granted Heidegger not only the image of Lichlung ("clearing')
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which he employs (0 express lhe nothingness of Being, but also the image of Holzwege
(woodpaths). Certainly, lhese two images are related to each other and in fact refer to the
same "matter of thinking", namely, Being itself as nothing, or as Being.
Wood is an old name for forest. In the wood are paths that mostly wind
along until they end quite suddenly in an impenetrable thicket.
They are called "woodpaths".
Each goes its peculiar way, but in lhe same forest. Often it seems as though
one were identical to another. Yet it only seems so. Woodcutters and
foresters are familiar with these paths. They know what it means "to be on
a path". (BIY, p.34)
As the "clearing", which has a far-Eastern counterpart, the ''woodpath'' or the "way"
echoes the Tao (Way) in Laozi's enigmatic lines. This time Heidegger makes a direct
reference to Laozi,
The word "way" probably is an ancient primary word that speaks to the
reflective mind of man. The key word in Laozi's poetic lhinking is Tao,
which "properly speaking" means way. But because we are prone to think
of"way" superficially, as a stretch connecting two places, our word way has
all too rashly been considered unfit to name what Tao says. Tao is then
translated as reason, raison, meaning, logos.
Yet Tao could be the way that gives all ways, lhe very source ofour power
to think what reason, mind, meaning, logos properly mean to say --
properly, by their proper nature. Perhaps the mystery of mysteries of
thoughtful Saying conceals itselfin the word "way," Tao, if only we will let
these names return to what they leave unspoken, if only we are capable of
this, to allow them to do so. Perhaps the enigmatic power oftoday's reign
of method also, and indeed pre-eminently, stems from the fact that the
methods, notwithstanding their efficiency, are after all merely the runoff of
a great hidden stream which moves all things along and makes way for
everything. All is way. (OWL, p.92)
The function of woodpaths, which the woodcutters leave behind, is not to lead
someone from one point to another, rather, the path is almost a necessary by·product of the
woodcutters' activity. The French translation, "Chemins qui ne menen( nulle part" (ways
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that lead nowhere) catches perfectly what the German HolzH'ege implies. The woodpaths
are not given in advance so that those who walk on them can follow. As "by·products",
they are "traces" of walking. Those who walk on the way should have given up their
primary aim to arrive at some definite destination -- there is no destination, or more
precisely, the way and the destination are identical. But Heidegger's woodpath is not simply
a reiteration ofaquasi-aesthetic anitude. Tao or way is not reason, mind, raison and the like
because it leads to nowhere -. the "nowhere" that is described in Being and Time as what
Dasein experiences as the uncanny and homelessness. Accordingly, the way or the Tao is
like the Derridean "trace". In this respect, we can see that the crossed Being tends to be
identical with the Tao or absolute nothing. For Zen, nothing or emptiness (sii1yata) not
only transcends but also embraces both nothing and something (being), emptiness and
fullness. Nothing is something (being). It is certainly true that Heidegger's Being, to some
extent, is of the similar paradoxical nature as the Tao or the absolute nothing. Magliola
maintains that "Heidegger does much more than approximate the law ofcomplementary
contraries, as found in most Eastern philosophy and indeed some Western philosophy..
he approximates a more radical Taoist and centric Buddhist principle, called by Laozi 'the
unification of affirmalion and negation,' and illustrated by Laozi's phrase, 'Great white is
as if it is black. "')1 The Tao or emptiness (siinyatR) indeed is not merely the principle of
complementary contraries (the yin-yang dynamics), it is rather the principle of
contradiction, which means that, for example, "x is y" and "x is not y" are both valid not
in the sense that they are asserted in different ways, but in the sense ofbeing asserted in the
same way. In other "'lOrds, two contradictory assertions can be simultaneously valid. This
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is what Zen refers to as the "logic" of siinyata: "is/is not" ("affinnationlnegation"). Thus
we can see that Taoist and Buddhist accentuation of the primacy of nothing (wu) over
something (yu) is a strategy for the final affinnation of the non-differentiation and
equalization of something and nothing, "the sameness of all". One may legitimately ask,
with Derrida, "why does Heidegger still retain the doctrine of ontological difference since
Being seems to have dissolved altogether after its being crossed?" The Taoist and Zen
disciple might ask the same question. For the Taoist or Zen follower, since Tao is nothing
other than an interplay of being (something) and nothing, it is precisely both being
(something) and nothing, there is no need to posit the capital Being as "other than beings"
and ontological difference between Being and beings. In what follows we can see that the
elaboration of the meaning of "otherness", which constitutes the most pre-eminent aspect
of Heidegger's notion of the nothing, is entirely missing in both Taoism and Zen.
4 Nothjng Ontologjcal Difference and Otherness
In the postscript to "What Is Metaphysics?" which Heidegger added in 1943, 14
years after the inaugural address was delivered, Heidegger states, "Nothingness as the
'other' than beings is the veil of Being." (EB, p.360) This is made more explicit in the
preface to the third edition of The Essence ofReason,
The nothing is the Not of being and thus is Being experienced from the
point of view of being. The Ontological Difference is the Not between
being and Being. Yet Being, as the Not to being, is no more a nothingness
in the sense of a nihil negativum than the Difference, as the Not between
being and Being, is merely a distinction of the intellect (ens rationis). (ER,3)
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Thus the relation between Being and nothing is understood in terms of "ontological
difference": Nothing as the veil of Being is no more than the withdrawal from appearing
or presencing of Being itself, which temporo-historically manifests and conceals itself,
yields and withdraws itselfat the san1e time. In 1949, the same year when Heidegger added
a preface to The Essence of Reason, an introduction was also added to "What Is
Metaphysics?" in which Heidegger interprets Leibniz' question "why are there beings,
rather than nothing?" in a different manner.
How did it come about that beings take precedence everywhere and lay
claim to every "is" while that which is not a being is understood as Nothing,
though it is Being itself, and remains forgotten? How did it come about that
with Being It really is nothing and that Nothing really is not? Is it perhaps
from this that the as yet unshaken presumption has entered into all
metaphysics that Being may simply be taken for granted and that Nothing
is therefore made more easily than beings? That is indeed the situation
regarding Being and Nothing.J2
The ontological indifference of the belonging together ofbeings and nothing which
underlies the essential understanding of nothing or emptiness in Eastern thoughl in general
is certainly the final step toward non-metaphysical thinking which Heidegger could never
take, because to take such a step is at same time to exclude the ontological difference.
Heidegger's introducing nothing is his painstaking endeavour to make explicit the
ontological difference. In the "Letter on Humanism", Heidegger asserts, "Being nihilales--
as Being.... The nihilating in Being is the essence ofwhat I call the nothing. Hence because
it thinks Being, thinking thinks the nothing." (BW, p.238) Being nihilates itself in the sense
that it is none other than the withdrawal from presencing of Being, instead of nothing's
nihilating itself in and through anxiety·· let alone anxiety's revealing nothing. Thus the
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analysis of me existential meaning of nothing which may lead to an account of nothing in
terms ofontological indifference is ultimately transformed into me thinking on Being itself.
The nothing is the veil of Being, but Being is not the veil of nothing. As many
commentators have contended, Heidegger's elaboration of the mutual relation ofBeing and
nothing has much in common wil.h the Eastern thought onyu and WU, yet the priority of
Being over nothing is never weakened.ll When Heidegger says that "Being and nothing do
belong together", (BW, p.lIO) he is struggling to convey that Being is not a being. He
emphasises the "Not", the "Not" that marks the ontological difference between Being and
beings. It becomes clear at this point that Heidegger's introduction of the nothing is meant
to destroy the metaphysical conception of Being which is always thought in terms of
beings. As the veil of Being, the nothing in Heidegger is ultimately assimilated into Being.
Thus Heidegger's nothing, from the view of Eastern thought, particularly that of
Zen, is still a "relative" nothing. lbe "'Not" which marks the ontological difference between
Being and beings makes Heidegger's nothing opposed or relative to beings. Thus it is
different from Zen Buddhist absolute nothing, or emptiness (sliry.i'a), which is said to
embrace both beings and nothing. The identification ofyu and wu in Zen leads to the non-
differentiation of nirmna (the final cessation) and san/sara (the endless circulation ofbin.h
and death). Thus by absolute nothing or emptiness, Zen means not only a radical negation
ofeverything, but also a radical affirmation of everything. Nothing or emptiness is at the
same time beings (YU), or more precisely, as Suzuki renders it, "suchness".:W Following
Suzuki, Abe says, " ... I think that 'everything is empty' may be more adequately rendered
in this way: 'Everything is just as it is.' A pine tree is a pine tree; a bamboo is a bamboo;
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a dog is a dog; a cat is a cat; you are you; I am I; she is she,"JS Zen must speak in
tautologies so that the "be" can be diminished to nothing, for the copula "be" as reflecting
the hermeneutic "as-structure", implies the ontological difference. The famous Zen story
about the stages of enlightenment depicts quite accurately how "suchness" can be finally
reached: Before one learns to practice Zen, mountains are mountains; at the moment of
enlightenment., mountains cease to be mountains; after one is enlightened, mountains
become mountains once again. The difference between the first stage and the last stage is
that at the first stage, "mountains are mountains" indicates a predication (i.e. "mountains
are so and so'') -- the second "mountains" in the sentence is a substitute ofvarious possible
predicates of the subject "mountains". At the final stage, "mountains are mountains" is a
pure tautology, the "be" ("are") in the sentence has no allusion to the assertion of "beings
in Being". It means that things appear by themselves and in themselves without involving
the real "be", which as a "rift" (Riss) would break the simplicity of the "suchness", which
must not allude to "the (wholly) other", The "suchness" of things is well presented in Zen
poems, especially the Japanese haiku. For example,
A branch shorn of leaves
A crow perching on it --
This autumn eve.36
One may find a typical "Zen poem" in Heidegger's writings.
Forests spread
Brooks plunge
Rocks persist
Mist diffuses
Meadows wait
Springs well
106
Winds dwell
Blessing muses (PLT, p.14)
These lines seem to suggest a tendency in Heidegger's thinking toward Zen's
"naturalism". The "natural" things (forests, brooks, rocks, mist, meadows, springs, winds,
etc.) presented in this poem are simply there; they are "just as they are". This tendency
culminates in Heidegger's phrases, "the world worlds" or "the thing things".37 But his
ultimate commitment to the question of Being makes the "Zen enlightenment" impossible.
For Heidegger, there is no being without Being; that is, the mountains can never be
mountains without the light of Being. Thus the seeming "Zen poem" is still "Being's poem"
(PLT, pA); there must be the light of Being shining above the mountains,
When the early morning light quietly
grows above the mountains ... (PLT, pA)
In his explication of the way of attaining suchness, Abe remarks:
Plants and animals are living in their suchness. But we human beings are
separated from our suchness, are never '1ust as-we-are". So far as we are
moving between here and there, between inside and outside looking at
ourselves from the outside, we are always restless. This restlessness or
anxiety is not accidental to man, that is, peculiar to some individuals and
not others. lB
The above passage suggests that only when man lives in the way plants and animals live
can he attain his suchness. The idea ofsuchness not only counters the objectification of the
self, but also rejects what Heidegger calls Dasein's transcendence and ek-sistence
("standing out"). For Heidegger, Dasein's intrinsic relation to Being endowshuman being
with priority to other beings (including plants and animals). This priority is also shown in
Dasein's capability of death insofar as death is "the shelter of Being". (BW, p.178) In "The
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Thing" Heidegger claims that only human beings can be called mortals because "Only man
dies. The animal perishes." (BW, p.178) However, it is precisely this priority that Zen
means to undennine. The anxiety which in Heidegger is the possible way ofDasein's being
toward authenticity is for Zen simply a block to one's self-enlightenment.
Ifby nihilism Heidegger refers to the forgetfulness of Being, Zen's total negation
and total affinnation, or the identification of beings (somethingness) and nothingness
without any reference to ontological difference, from Heidegger's point of view, is
undoubtly a kind of nihilism and perhaps in the most radical form. The Japanese reading
Zen's emptiness into Heidegger's nothing in "What Is Metaphysics?" in the name of
defending Heidegger's thought against the charge of nihilism in effect imports sheer
nihilism into Heidegger's account of the nothing.39 Certainly, there are abundant
dissimilarities between Zen Buddhism and European nihilism, the latter of which is
characterised by Nietzsche as the devaluation of the highest value. Zen Buddhism is more
profound than European nihilism in that its primary concern is not value, but being and
non-being. But Zen's fundamental rejection ofontological difference by means of the ontic
indifference of beings and nothing, does inevitably yield an extreme version of nihilism.
It seems that there is no ground to support the argument proposed by many contemporary
Eastern philosophers (notably Japanese professors40) that Zen's view of the nothing has
nothing to do with nihilism, because it is not solely concerned with nothing as the relative
nothing, but the absolute nothing as the negation of the bifurcation of nothing and beings.41
Nevertheless, this absolute nothing is definitely not "the veil of Being". Heidegger says,
"To forget Being and pursue only beings -- that is nihilism. Nihilism thus understood is the
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ground of the nihilism which Nietzseheexposed in the first book of The Will 10 Power. By
conlrQSI. to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of nothingness, to draw
nothingness into the question of Being - this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true
transcending of nihilism," (1M, p.203) Of course, unlike European nihilism, Zen never
pursues beings, for such a pursuit presupposes the difference between beings and nothing.
which must be negated in the absolute nothing, namely, silnyal8. But Zen rejects the
ontological difference.. The total freedom that Zen strives to bring about through various
koan42 is the forgetfulness of any kind of differences -- not only ontic difference, but also
ontologicaJ difJerence,4l This forgetfulness or abandonment of any difference whatsoever
is at the same time the acceptance of the parity ofauthenticity and inauthenticity, suffering
and salvation, enlightenment and ignorance, samsara and nirvana, emptiness and fullness,
nothingness and suchness. Thus for Zen, any attempt to transcend the phenomenal world
in order to become "enlightened" is profoundly misguided. The longed-for nirvana is no
other than the world ofeveryday life, which is precisely what Heidegger describes as the
average everydayness, that is, Dasein's fallenness. In the Zen classics, we can find many
examples that il1ustrate such everydayness: "carrying water and chopping wood"
(pangyun), "when tired, go to bed" (Linji), "walking or staying, sitting or lying: all these
are nothing but Tao" (Huihai).44 Of course, the everydayness described by Zen is not
exactly what Heidegger means by AlIUiglichkeit. The average everydayness is defined by
Heidegger in tenns of the hegemony of the "they" (das Man). For Zen, the "they" is simply
an illusion. But the same can also be said for Being. Dasein's authenticity in the sense of
its transcendence toward Being is meaningless because Being or ontological difference is
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also an illusion. In short, Zen's "self-enlightenment" is to shatter all these illusions and thus
to attain absolute indifference. Heidegger would never accept such a claim. The difference
between authenticity and inauthenticity in Being and Time, and the difference between the
forgetfulness of Being and the thinking of Being in the later Heidegger cannot be erased,
or transformed into the interplay of yu and wu in Taoism and Zen Buddhism. Even his
claim to abandon the attempt to overcome metaphysics in "Time and Being" is not a step
toward Zen's enlightenment, although it sounds really like a Zen stance, espetially when
it is related to his notion of"reIeasement" Such a claim aims at the truth of Being, al the
thinking ofSeing in a radical way. It is undeniable that Heidegger still gives priority to
Being in the sense of letting beings be. Heidegger's nothing, despite its primordial
ontological status, despite its radicality compared with traditional metaphysics, is still a
relative nothing, not the Taoist Tao or Zen's absolute nothing. As Steffney puts it,
"Although Heidegger's thought is often referred to as paradoxical in the light of traditional
metaphysics, one could not refer to Heidegger's thought as paradoxical in the light of
Zen.oM' From Zen's point of view, Heidegger has never been enlightened because his
inquiry into the question of Being and his insistence on the ontological difference block the
way to becoming the "true man of Tao"
If we remove the Taoist and Zen clouds from Heidegger's nothing, which is indeed
amenable to Taoism and Zen, an important aspett of his thought on the nothing would
become clear. This aspect is the meaning of "otherness". The nothing is basically an
expression of the otherness of Being. It is the meaning ofotherness that is totally lacking
in Zen or Taoist accounts of the nothing or emptiness. "This wholly other to every being
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is a non-being. But this nothing has Being as its essence." (EB, p.353) The ontological
meaning ofnothing as the "Not" between Being and beings refers to the otherness ofBeing.
Here we can see that this account ofthe nothing in terms of the "wholly other" is close to
the medieval mystical characterisation of God via negat;\-·a. For example, in Eckhart,
nothing refers to God Himself, to "He who is". As Caputo puts it. "What is essential about
God for Eckhart, and Being for Heidegger, is that each differentiates itself from beings, is
other than beings.'>46 Eckhart's characterisation of God as nothing is in fact an auempt to
bring about a true understanding of the "other" that can convey the infinite distance
between man and God.(7 To be sure, the notion of the wholly other is rooted in a long
theological tradition. Since the time of pseudo-Dionysius, theologians (mainly neo·
Platonists) had been teaching the doctrine that God is hyperousia, "beyond being". Even
thinkers who belonged to the camp ofThomas Aquinas also acknowledged the "otherness"
of God - although God is still understood as Being. For Aquinas, the terms ens used to
refer to God must be defined in such a way as to indicate that it is not another ens in
addition to all worldly entia, but an entirely different ens that must be regarded as "wholly
other" to finite beings. The distinction between the neo-Platonic and Thomistic
conceptions ofGod lies in whether God's "otherness" can be fully expressed in terms of His
being, that is, whether God as the "wholly other" can still be thought ontologically. The
fundamental abandonment of natural theology announced by some contemporary
theologians, notably Karl Barth and his followers is, to some extent, rather an attempt to
return to this history of the conception of the "wholly other"; it results in a rejection of the
question of Being and the ontological difference as "foolishness". The influence of such a
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new theology is strongly reflected in Heidegger's thought, especially in his sometimes
radical way of speaking about the sharp distinction between thinking and faith.d Insofar as
the task of thinking is an inquiry into the question ofBeing, it must from the outset suspend
the question of God, keep the theological issue at a distance and confine itself to the
ontological difference. But the way of characterising God as "the wholly other" is taken by
Heidegger as a "conceptual scheme" to apply to the thinking of Being. Being is "the wholly
other" to beings in the same sense that God is ''the wholly other" to His creatures. Thus the
nothing in Heidegger, as in Eckhart, functions as the radical expression of "otherness" If
negative theology is a name to express the right way of speaking about God, Heidegger's
approach to the question of Being through nothing can by analogy be called "negative
ontology", -- it is still an ontology, not a "meontology". It is the meaning of nothing as the
otherness of Being to beings that has no parallel in the Eastern understanding of the
nothing.
The ontological difference and the "otherness" of Being correspond to Heidegger's
understanding of time and temporality as essentially eschatological. The history of Being
as the epochal sending of Being itself is described as a stretching between the oblivion of
Being and recollection of Being, which parallels the flight of gods and their return. The
double negation in Taoism or Zen, in fact, from the outset has already deconstructed time
itself. The selfsame or identity of something and nothing excludes any temporal structure
in the Heideggerian sense. For Heidegger, Beingmust be lhought together. But Zen's
conception of time is not to think Being as time since there is no question of Being at all,
but to think. beings (something) as time. Thus Zen's "deconstruction" of time parallels its
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rejection of the question of Being. The well-known Japanese Zen master DOgen claims,
"The time we call spring blossoms directly as an existence called flowers. The flowers, in
turn, express the time called spring: This is not something with time; something itself is
time."49 Dogen talks about the "absolute present" not in the sense of what the medievals
understood by nunc stans, a standing now, which is timeless, but in the sense that there is
never the flying away or passing by of time for anything that exists is time itself. The nunc
stans is timeless in that it excludes past and future, whereas Zen's "absolute present"
includes all time _. past, present and future. Dogan writes:
... Similarly, when human beings die, they cannot return to life; but in
Buddhist teaching we say life changes into death .... Likewise, death Carul0t
change into life.... Life and death have absolute existence, like the
relationship of winter and spring. But do not think of winter changing into
spring or spring into summer. so
The "absolute present" as the unity ofpast, present and future can be realized only
in the identity of being (something) and time. Because being (something) is time, it cannot
change or perish. For Zen, Heidegger's understanding ofDasein's existence as ek-s;stence,
"standing out" is still dualistic, for such an understanding presupposes the difference
between inside and outside and the difference between past, present and future. Zen's
"absolute present" is the non-differentiation of past, present and future. But for Heidegger,
time can only be said to be identical with Being, rather than beings (something) on the
ground of the ontological difference. Heidegger would never accept the identity of
emptiness and suchness simply because such an identity is a fundamental rejection of the
eschatological notion of time, which is essential to Heidegger's thinking of Being
(Seinsdenken). If Being is understood as "clearing", an open space, it is a preparation for
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the fulfillment, for the light that will shine through the forest. Although Heidegger rarely
talks about the light itself he does have two kinds of light in mind when he refers to the
light as that which "rests upon something open": the "light of reason" (lumen naturale)
(OTB, p.66) and the "divine radiance" (lumen gratiae): "How could there ever be for the
god an abode fit for a god, if a divine radiance did not first begin to shine in everything that
is?" (PLT, p.92) Thus "waiting" and "expectation" become the final words for Heidegger
to elucidate Being and time. The crossed (-out) Being, if understood as "trace", is
eschatologically temporal, it implies the "traces of the fugitive gods" or "the track of the
fugitive gods". (PLT, p.93, and p.94)
5 Being Nothing the Holy
The paradoxical nature of Being does not lead to the dissolution of Being itselfand
the ontological difference. Heidegger's crossed-(out) Being is different from Laozi's Tao
in that the temporal structure of the crossed(-out) Being shows its essence as "letting",
understood as "sending" and "giving" which are totally alien to Tao's interplay ofyll and
wu. Moreover, in Being's "letting" beings be lies its capacityto "gather", the gathering of
earth, sky, mortals and immortals. Heidegger himself explains:
The symbol of crossed lines can, to be sure, according to what has been
said, not be a merely negative symbol ofcrossing out. Rather it points into
the four areas of the fourfold and of their gathering at the point of
intersection. (QB, p.83)~'
David Krell visualises Heidegger's own interpretation by a pictogram:S2
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Sky
Earth
c><J~
Mortals
Clearly, this crossing out of Being is not to dissolve Being, and thus to transform it into
Zen's absolute nothing; rather it gathers the "four areas" and ultimately lets beings be. The
direct reference Heidegger himself makes to "The Thing" leads us back to the juxtaposition
of two jugs. The utility that arises from the void, the emptiness oflhe Chinese jug is what
Laozi understands the way the vessel "is", the fullness orlhe vessel-- this illustrates the
Chinese mode of thinking the conlrar)' ofnothing (wu) nOl as Being, but as "having" (yu.
"on hand", "usefulness"). the usefulness that is fundamentally contextual, relative and
indetenninate, like a pragmatic "'trace". But the usefulness of the vessel and the readiness-
to--hand of the hammer described in Being and Time lie in the absence of the "care" in the
former, the "care" from which the later Heidegger develops a new attitude toward things.
In "The Origin of the Work of Art", Heidegger further asks about the usefulness of things.
Usefulness, according to Heidegger, rests in the reliability of things. The notion of
reliability is crucial in our comparison ofHeidegger's nothing as the "clearing" and Tao or
siinyali. Reliability is more primordial than usefulness in that it sustains the crossing
through of Being, and in fact it is the gathering of the fourfold itself The utility ofLaozi's
jug does not need to be accounted for because it is devoid ofany particular end (Ie/os) in
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favour of the radical flexibility. Nor does it have allusion to any kind ofgathering like the
fourfold. Heidegger's jug, on me other hand, is a sacrificial vessel; it is not just pouring
wine but specifically pouring a libation, that iS,celebrating gods. The gods in the interplay
of the four, if not privileged, are indispensable in that they are what the jug is tocelebrate,
the fe/os of the jug. It remains open what "the gods" really means to Heidegger. Heidegger
uses the word "gods" in many different ways. But here, in the "fourfold", it most probably
stands for what might be called the divine dimension in all reality, something holy in which
everything participates. Why does Heidegger introduce the fourfold to "define" Being? For
the Taoist or Zen follower doing so inevitably substantiates the Tao (way) as "trace", or
the emptiness. Why should the crossed Being have such dimensions, especially the
dimension of the divine?
The conception of the divine dimension is intrinsically related to one of the most
intriguing and fascinating issues in Heidegger's thought, that is, the question ofGod. The
divine dimension is essentially the abode of the gods (the messengers of God) and God. It
is the dimension in which gods and God can appear. It is this divine dimension that the
question of Being and the question of God are related. Heidegger explicitly asserts in the
"Letter on Hwnanism" that Being is not God, but he never speaks about how Being can be
different from God. Of course, he does time and again elaborate how Being is different
from the onto-thea-logical God, the "God of philosophers", but he never explicates how
Being is different from the non-onto·theo·logical God, the "God of Abraham, Isaac and
Jacob", since both are considered as "the wholly other". Metaphysics as "onto·theo-logy"
gave birth to the supreme idea of Being·God (causa SUE), and it has. thus, marked the
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forgetfulness ofBeing and the withdrawal ofGod. However, for Heidegger, the overcoming
metaphysics which can bring us face to face with Being itselfdoes not necessarily lead to
an encounter with the truly divine God. Cenainly, Being is described by Heidegger with
most of the attributes that have been traditionally assigned to God. Consider, for example,
Dasein's "surrender" as a "sacrifice" (Opfer) of ilS being to the simple necessity. the
"thanking" (Danken) of Being, the "grace" (Gunst) and the "favour (Huld) of Being. (£8,
p.J58)
All this quasi·religious phraseology cannot be explained as mere stylistic or poetic
wordings. It would be really strange and inconceivable that a Taoist wiseman can thank
Tao's favour, that a Zen master would listen with piety to siityatii,n or that a Derridean
deconstructionist can surrender himself as a sacrifice to "trace". The deification of Being
seems to suggest that Being itself already contains something which is not purely
ontological. But Heidegger's radical negative attitude toward philosophical theology
fundamentally rejeclS the question of God in the ontological context. The question of God
must be suspended _. a quasi-phenomenological epoche, or "indifference" in any
ontological inquiry into the meaning of Being. Heidegger's neutrality in regard to the
affirmation as well as the negation of God is further asserted in the following celebrated
passage:
Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only
from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only
in the light of the essence ofdivinity can it be thought or said what the word
"God" is to signify. (BIV, p.230)
This really soWlds like a phenomenological reduction, the reduction from the meaning of
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"God" to the meaning of Being. In other words, to speak about God in respect to His
existence and essence in a meaningful manner, one must be able to understand what the
word "God" really means, which presupposes me understanding of the essence of divinity
which in tum presupposes the understanding of the essence of the holy.S4
However, "the gods" that appear in the fourfold, on the other hand, seems to suggest
a different approach to the relation between Being and God. "The gods", which refer to the
divine dimension ofBeing, are an indispensable element that constitutes the truth of Being.
Thus the phenomenological reduction seems to shift to a hermeneutic circle between Being,
"the holy", "divinity" and "God" For Heidegger, the recollection of Being is the
precondition of the thinking of God in a meaningful way, it is still a preparation and cannot
decide whether God will possibly reappear. However, Heidegger seems to suggest that such
a preparation is not equal to the concern of a transcendental condition. Poggeler is keenly
aware of this subtlety in Heidegger's thought. He points out, "Being or its truth can be not
only a neutral structural openness, but possibly also that which brings Dasein into salvation
and thereby shows itself through the unapproachable mystery as the Holy."s, It is this divine
dimension that makes Heidegger's Being fundamentally different from various Eastern
ideas which tend to omit any allusion to what can be called "holy". Heidegger himself
contends that the difficulty in his conversation with Eastern thinkers lies in the total lack
of the idea of "the Holy" in the East.'I>
As we have seen, Heidegger's thought on the nothing is a radical way of re-raising
the question of Being and of bringing into light the ontological difference in its primordial
sense whichhas been covered overby Western metaphysics. In this regard, it certainly
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moves very close to Easlem, non·metaphysical, way of thinking of nothing. However, the
distinctiveness of Heidegger's notion of nothing as different from both Western
metaphysical conception of nothing and the Eastern idea of nothing becomes apparent
when its intrinsical relation to the ideas of"divine dimension" and "the holy" is uncovered.
We will see in the next chapter that Heidegger's fundamental perspective which underlies
his unique understanding of nothing is shown even more clearly in another related notion:
"releasement".
Notes:
I "The Nothing" (wu) entered philosophical discussion in the East as early as the history
of Eastern philosophy itself. Ever since Laozi, almost every thinker has touched upon
this "concept". It became the most favored notion in 3th·5th centuries, and thereafter
was integrated into the Buddhist conception of"emptiness" (sinyata).
2 This observation is held originally by the members of the Kyoto School. Nishida Kitaro,
the founder of Kyoto School, writes, '1 think we can distinguish the West to have
considered being (yu] as the groWKl. of reality, the East to have taken nothing [wu] as its
ground. I will call them reality as form and reality as the formless, respectively." See
Nishida Kitaro: Fundamental Problems ofPhilosophy: the World ofAction and the
Dialectical World. trans. David A. Dilworth, Sophia University, Tokyo, 1970. The
Japanese interlocutor in "A Dialogue on Language" says: "For us emptiness is the
highest name for that which you would like to speak ofwith the word 'Being'''. The fact
that Heidegger's philosophy has received an extraordinary sympathy and unprecedented
enthusiasm in the East, particularly among those Taoist and Buddhist oriented thinkers,
is 10 a large extent due to his extensive dealing with "nothing" in a way that reflects
Western philosophical tradition and at the same time has many affinities to Eastern
thinking.
J This question remains open insofar as the Christian doctrine of "Creation ex nihilo"
thinks Being and nothing in a way which metaphysical thought did not.
• Heidegger: "Only a God can Save Us", in Richard Wolin, ed., The Heidegger
Controversy: A Critical Reader, Cambridge Mass. and London, 1993, p.109.
5 It appears in section 7 of the Principles ofNature and ofGrace, Founded on Reason
(1714).
6 Medieval Christian thought was aware that "cause" and the Being of the highest being
are viewed analogically and that causality must be completed with emanation. I am
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indebted to Professor Harris for pointing this out to me.
7 Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology, YoU, p.189.
I Paul Tillich: The Courage to Be, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957, p.34.
9 There is certainly a tendency in Christian theology which thinks nothing as prior to
Being for God Himself as the creator is beyond Being and nothing, or is nothing, as the
mystics bluntly put it. But in the form ofonto·theo·logy, the radical difference between
the Greek and the Christian conceptions of Being and nOlhing has somehow been
covered. Ex nihilo, nihilfit still holds true for the Christian doctrine Creatio ex nihilo,
for God as a supernatural cause, is the Being of beings. "Creation ex nihilo is God's
production of the world without any natural and material cause, but involves a
supernatural cause, and so it would not violate the principle [nihil ex nihilo fit]."·- The
Cambridge Dictionary to Philosophy, 1995, "Nothing".
10 See Appendix "'To Be' in Indo·European Languages and Its Parallels in Chinese",
p.169.
II Cf. Plato: Parmenides, 160b, and Sophest, 237-238. Tillich suggests that Plato's ouk
on, namely, the absolute nothing, is what "nihilo" means in the Christian doctrine
"Creation ex nihilo". See Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology, YoU, University of
Chicago Press, 1951, p.188.
12 See Appendix, p.152.
13 W. F. Hegel: Hegel's Science ofLogic, trans. W. H. Johnston, and L. G. Struthers,
Humanities Press, London. New York, 1966.
14 Paul Tillich: Systematic Theology, YoU, p.188.
I~ Cf Appendix, section 2.
16 Abe Masno: Zen and Western Thought, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1985,
p.127. I have changed u and mu in the original text quoted here to yu and Wll in
accordance with the general translation in this thesis.
17 The same can be said form the Latin word "nihif' (nothing). It seems to be derived from
"ne·" "hilum" where "hilum" appears to mean "a tiny bit" hence "nihir' means "not even
a tiny bit" hence "nothing". I am indebted to Professor Harris for pointing this out to me.
II Hajime Nakamura: The Ways ofThinking ofEastern People, Honolulu, East·West Press,
1964, p.24.
19 It is a distinctively Indian way of approaching the notion of nothing.
20 No doubt, it is the existential sense of nothing that constitutes the starting point of the
Sartrean existentialist interpretation of nothing (or nothingness) as the precondition of
human freedom. However, what is missed or deliberately cancelled by Sartre is the
ontological sense of nothing.
21 I have changed "entity" and "entities" in Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of
Being and Time to "being" and "beings".
22 Heidegger: Begegnllng: Zeitschrifi fUr Literarur, Bildende, Kunst, Musik und
Wissenschaft. (1965): 2·7,6 Quoted by Reinhart May in Heidegger's Hidden Source,
p.25.
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2l Translated by Chung-yuan Chang in Tao: A New Way o/Thinking, Harper and Row,
NY, 1975, chapter 40, p.112.
l( loozi also takes "wheel", "chamber" to illustrate the "emptiness" of things. The whole
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Chapter Four
Releasement
Apart from ''the nothing", there is another tenn in the laler Heidegger which shows even greater
affinity to Eastern thought: ''rcleasement'' (Gelassenheit). Heidegger borrows this term directly
from the medievaJ mystics, particularly Meister Eckhart, but applies it analogically to his
account of Being and Dasein. That is, Heidegger takes it out of the theological context and
deprives it of its god-<:entered features and deals with it as a theme of the aJleged "god-Iess"
thinking, in much the same way as his treatment of"the nothing". In downplaying the "god·
centered" implication the tenn originally carries, Heidegger's thought on "releasemenr' seems
to approximate strikingly the Eastern idea of WII u'ei (non·action), which is certainly devoid of
any theological significance. However, what I want to show is that the undeniable
approximation of Heidegger's releasement to the Eastern Wlderstanding of"'U Hoe;, which in
fact carries out Heidegger's call for "god-less" thinking is Wlderlain by his implicit, yet never
weakened tendency to eschatological expectation. Such a tendency becomes apparent when
Heidegger's thought on releasement is compared with the Eastern idea of wu wei.
Releasemenlllod Wu We;
Releasement (Gelassenheit) ordinarily means "self-possession", "calmness',
"composure", and ''resignation'', referring to an attitudeofnot being concerned about anything.
Il was originally used by Meister Eckhart inlerChangeably with other related terms, mainly
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detachment (Abgescheidenheit), in the sense of letting go of things and giving oneself to God.!
For Eckhart, releasement makes the soul receptive of nothing other than God. In his Gennan
sennons, we read:
You should know this: to be empty of all creatures is to be full of God; and to
be full ofcreatures is to be empty ofGC)(t!
Thus releasement comprises two aspects, negative and positive: (1) detachment from
things; (2) submission to God. The comparability between Heidegger and Eckhart lies in that
Dasein is to Being as the soul is to God. For Heidegger, releasement concerns how Dasein as
the Da ofSein can be the real place of the revelation of Being itself. However, the switch from
the relation of the soul to God to that of Dasein to Being marks a fundamental difference
between these two thinkers inasmuch as Being, for Heidegger, can never reveal itselfexcept in
Dasein. Dasein and Being mutually appropriate to the extent that Being can no longer be said
to be the "wholly other" of Dasein as it is to beings in generaL The self-sufficiency and
transcendence ofGod in respect of His relation to the soul is greatly different from the mutual
appropriation of Being and Dasein. Being appropriates Dasein because the Da is the "right
place" ofBeing itself, and Dasein appropriates Being in that Being is Dasein's own Being. In
contrast, Eckhart would never say that God needs the soul to reveal Himself. If the negative
aspect of Heidegger's releasement is the releasing from beings, its positive aspect is not
submission (to Being), but appropriation (with Being). As Reiner Schilnnann thoughtfully puts
it: ''Thus we have seen releasement tum into its contrary: appropriation.... Releasement and
appropriation, now, are names for one and the same event." I This fundamental difference is
decisive in giving an account ofHeidegger's claim that Being is not God. As far as Heidegger's
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releasement concerns how Dasein is related to Being, it remains essentially ontological. Unlike
Eckhart, Heidegger defines releasement as neither an ethical nor a religious category, but
exclusively or primarily as a matter of thinking. In Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger makes
this much clearly:
... what we have called releasement evidently does not mean casting off sinful
selfishness and letting self-will go in favor of the divine will. (DT, p.62)
Apparently, Heidegger takes releasement from its original theological context and yet
deprives it of its theological implicalions. For Heidegger, its ontological meaning is more
primordial than, or prior to, any religious and ethical meanings. In this regard, Heidegger's
releasement indeed in some sense approximates the Eastern idea of wu wei. As one of the
principle tenns, wu wei is conceived primarily not in any religious or ethical sense, but in the
ontological or quasi-ontological sense.· Wu wei is a contraction of wei wu wei, which literally
means "the act of non-act", or "the action of non-action". Although it is usually translated as
''taking no action" as it might originally and literally designate, it does not refer to act or action
as opJXlsed to thinking or meditation; rather it is a state ofmind that is prior to any distinction
between theory and practice as Wlderstood in Western philosophical tradition. As a state of
mind, it is still not in the psychological sense, but is more like what Heidegger Wlderstands by
the word "Befirullichkeit". The locus classicus of the interpretation ofwu wei is fOWld in chapter
two of Laozi's Dao De Jing,
... Thus, the wise deals with things through non-interference [wu wei] and
teaches through no-words.
All things flourish without interruption.
They grow by themselves, and no one possesses them.'
As non-interference, wu wei means the fundamental giving up ofall anthropocentric
126
effectiveness, strategic rationality, and forred representationalism; in short, ceasing to intervene
in things, such that we no longer will, legislate, or constitute, possess, or control things. His
non-violent in the sense that it does not forget that "each present thing, modestly compliant, fits
into its own being." 6 Similarly, Heidegger's "releasement", as opposed to the technological
attitude toward the \':orld, is basically a withdrawal from humanistic dominance of things and
letting things be as they are. As Heidegger puts it, "In the sowing ofgrain, [the farmer] places
the seed in the keeping ofthe forces ofgrowth and watches over its increase." (QCT, pp.14-15)
The difference between taking care of and maintaining, on one hand, and challenging, on the
other, is the difference between releasement and the technological relationship between man and
things. As such, releasement only follows things as they emerge into their world, lets them be
in their own world, leaves them an open field in which to be themselves. In this regard, it is
almost in the same sense as wu wei, which is mainly considered as the precondition on the side
of human beings for the reali:mtion of the "suchness" of things. If the negative aspect of
"releasement" and wu wei is non-attachment in the sense that in releasement and wu wei one
gives up all humanistic claims -- whether ideational, representational, or willful-- on things, the
positive aspect is that both, unlike Eckhart's submission to God, imply "letting things appear
by themselves". The comparability between Heidegger's releasement and the Eastern wu wei
is often taken as the common ground for the development of the global deep ecology.7
However, for Heidegger, the positive aspect of releasement as "letting be" must be understood
in tenus of the revelation ofBeing itself in beings, while in wu wei the spontaneous appearance
of things in the sense of"suchness" has no allusion to Being or ontological difference.1
Insofar as Heidegger defines releasement as belonging to thinking, it is necessary at
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first to clarify what thinking means and what it has to do with releasement.
2 Philosophy and Thinking
Heidegger's central thesis is that releasement is the nature of thinking which underlies
any human activity whatsoever, whether practical or theoretical. He explains this near the
beginning of the conversation in Discourse on Thinking:
Scientist: What has releasement to do with thinking?
Teacher: Nothing if we conceive thinking in the traditional way as re-
presenting. Yet perhaps the nature of thinking 'we are seeking is ftxed in
releasement [in die Gelassenheit eingelassen). (DT, p.62)
Here the non-traditional way of thinking is considered as an immediate encounter with
things, without conceptualization and categorizationor any mediation. In this regard, it is more
like mystical experience than philosophical thinking. Heidegger says,
Everything that might interpose itself between the thing and us in
apprehending and talking about it must first be set aside. Only then we yield
ourselves to the tmdisguised presence oflbe thing. (PLT, p.25)
The traditional way of thinking which Heidegger characterizes as "re-presenting" is
exactly what philosophy means to him when he announces "the end of philosophy". Thinking,
according to Heidegger, arises out of"the end ofphilosophy". However, Heidegger tells us that
by "the end of philosophy" he does not mean to say that the history of philosophical
speculation is over, rather, the end is not "mere stopping", but the "completion" of philosophy
in the sense that philosophy has realized all of the possibilities which inhere in its essence.
Philosophy, for Heidegger, is a mode of thinking which began with Socrates and was passed
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on to Plato and Aristotle and to the subsequent Western tradition. Thus Heidegger insists on the
basically Greek character of Western European philosophy and hence there is no other
philosophy, either Chinese or Indian philosophy. (wcr, p.224) Philosophy is an essentially
Western plx:nomenon, as distinguished from the "thinking" of the East and from the "thinking"
which has found expression outside the central "philosophical" mainstream, in, for example,
poetic and mystical domains. As Heidegger puts it, "The often heard expression 'Western
European philosophy' is, in tJ\nh, a tautology." (WP, pp.29-31) No doubt, this philosophy
which is essentially Western is what Heidegger more often calls metaphysics. In What Is
Philosophy, Heidegger interprets "philosophy" as a striving (philia) towards the sophon which
is the Being ofbeings. (WP, pp.45f1) In other words. philosophy is an anempt to think beings
in their Being understood as Beingness and thus marks the forgetfulness of Being. It follows,
then, that the end of philosophy or the overcoming of metaphysics entails stepping out of
Western philosophy itself, to encoWlter the non-Western, hence non-metaphysical thinking
which is certainly outside all possible philosophizing. ToYJaJ'd the end of the "Lener on
Humanism", Heidegger asserts,
It is time to break the habit ofoverestimating philosophy and of thereby asking
too much of it. What is needed in the present world crisis is less philosophy,
but more anentiveness in thinking. ... The thinking that is to come is no longer
philosophy, because it thinks more originally than metaphysics - a name
identical to philosophy. (BW. pp.24l-242)
Philosophy or metaphysics is what Heidegger calls in Discourse on Thinking
calculative thinking (rechnendes Denken)9, as opposed to meditative thinking (besinnliches
Denken), which as the "essential thinking" is thinking proper. Calculative thinking obtains its
name from the fact that it is the thinking of technology, which is the culmination of
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metaphysics. Calculative thinking is essentially re-presenting, hence it is also called "re-
presentational thinking" (das vorsteflende Denken). According to Heidegger, representational
thinking arosethrough the transition from the Greek understanding of legein and neein (which
mean "Ietting-Iie-before-us" and "taking-into-heed", respectively) to the Roman sense of
proposition and reason. (WeT, p.203) Things are re-presented,liternlly, set before us, through
being conceptUalized and categorized. Representational thinking places before itselfwhat is to
be known; as such it is a proposing, a representation. It is a way for the knower to fit the
"subject" of the proposition into one of his own categories. Technology simply affirms the
world as existing on its behalf, a place in which it can assert its domination. Thus it has come
about that all beings are submitted to hwnan calculation and controlled by the fact that they are
regarded as objects. Heidegger, therefore, sees technology as the final step of that subjectivism
which originates in Plato. Philosophy is, then, penneated with subjectivism. According to him,
even Kant is not excluded from subjectivism since he takes over WlCritically from Descartes the
subject/object dichotomy. In Being aruJ Time Heidegger criticizes Kant for following Descartes
and for his failure to provide a ''preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the
subject". This critique seems to be made even more radical in Discourse on Thinking, in which
Heidegger not only opposes meditative thinking to calculative thinking, but funher
distinguishes calculative thinking into two different types. The first and the most ordinary kind
of thinking is subject-object thinking, the kind of thinking represented most eminently by
Descartes. But this presupposes a second, a transcendental, preconditional thinking which sets
the horizon for subject-object thinking, ''the horizon which encircles the view ofa thing [object]
- the field of vision." (DT, p.63) This is the Kantian apriori, the transcendental precondition
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for the experience of objects. The Kantian transcendental thinking influenced Heidegger so
greatly that when he started his ambitious program of constructing fundamental ontology he
seemed to take for granted that the main task of the "'Ork was to find the transcendental
strUcturesof hwnan existence. Charles Guingon, in his book Heidegger and the Problem of
Knowledge, a systematic examination of Heidegger's transcendentalism in Being and Time,
points out:
It seems that Being and Time fails because it is sliD caught in the kind of
'"representational-calculative thinking" that characterizes the tradition. It
anempts to free us from our myopic understanding of Being as that which is
representable for a subject by offering a new and bener model ofour situation
in the world. But it is precisely the preoccupation with fmding a "correct
model" or "correct representation" which is at fault. IO
To a certain extent, Heidegger's celebrated tum could be seen as an anempt to go
beyond the transcendental kind of thinking towards a third type. With regard to this third type
of thinking, Heidegger emphasizes its relation to the second as that of the second to the first.
He says:
Teacher: Horizon and transcendence, thus, are experienced and determined
only relative to objects and our re-presenting them.
Scholar: Why do you stress this?
Teacher: To suggest that in this way what lets the horizon be what it is has not
yet been encountered at all. (DT, p.64)
The question may be put this way: the horizon lets objects be; then what lets the
horizon be? Thus, thinking about objects means relating objects in tenus ofcausality. Thinking
ahout the horizon means relating the horizon to objects as transcendental precondition. And
thinking in the third sense thinks the relation between what is beyond the horizon and the
horizon in neither causal nor transcendental tenns but in tenns of"letting be". Apparently, the
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analysis of the transcendental structures ofDasein's existence in Being and Time is replaced by
an analysis of the higher activity ofmeditative thinking which involves Being directly. In this
regard, Heidegger's critique ofKant in Being and Time is still valid for his self critique which
Heidegger tries to work out in his later works. The later Heidegger wants to get neither
objectively nor subjectively to the Being which transcends both beings (objects) and Dasein .
To the question, "what lets the horizon be?" he answers, "It strikes me as something like a
region, an enchanted region where everything belonging there returns to that in which it rests."
(DT, p.64) This enigmatic and intriguing explanation still invokes further questioning, yet it
seems to resist any penetrating Wlderstanding. Heidegger himself admits, "I don't Wlderstand
it either, ifby 'Wlderstanding' you mean the capacity to represent what is put before us as if
sheltered amid the familiar and so secured; for I, too, lack the familiar in which to place what
I tried to say about openness as a region." (DT, p.65) In other words, whatever is
representationally intelligible is so by being placed in an intelligible place, region, field; but the
region of all regions is not itself in a region; therefore it cannot be intelligible in the way
everything else is. It remains open whether this region ofall regions is not transcendental, and
whether the "meditative thinking" as Heidegger underslands it is not transcendental thinking.
Indeed, the later Heidegger sometimes shows an even stronger tendency toward the kind of
thinking which, as Peter Harris points out, can be seen as a return from the fonna1ism ofKant's
concern with transcendental conditions ofpossibility to the greater realism of medieval view
of transcendental attributes of Being. 11 His characterization or description of the region ofall
regions seems to bear an inescapably transcendental character. But the question here is whether
any articulation of this region is possible if articulation refers to the certain way of
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philosophizing understood in the Western manner. Heidegger as an essentially Western thinker
who inherits the great tradition of Western metaphysics can oot simply cast offall metaphysical
remnant without any possible return to the core ofmetaphysics. In fact, Heidegger admits that
thinking in «the mode ofconceptUa1 representation insinuates itselfall too easily into every kind
of human experience.... the metaphysical manner of fonning ideas is in a certain respect
unavoidable." (OWL, p.25) Nevertheless, Heidegger insists on the necessity of overcoming
metaphysics in the sense of a call for the meditative thinking which is an awareness of the
limitation ofmetaphysics, or an awareness of the horizon of the knowing ofobjects. Meditative
thinking is an opening to what is beyond the horizon of such knowing.
For Heidegger, to be open to what is beyond the horizon, to what "gives" the horizon
is to overcome the subjectivism which Lies in the core ofmetaphysical thinking. He therefore
construes metaphysics in terms of "willing", or the "will to power," whose most extreme
expression is the contemporary technologizing of man and world, as the culmination of the
history of the forgetfulness of Being. "But thinking, understood in the traditional way, as
representing, is a kind ofwilling." (Dr, p.58) Why? Because it is my thinking: my ego does it.
The primary act ofego is will, desire. But will is more than this. For Heidegger, will is not only
to do with hwnan being, but rather the Being of beings itself. The task of thinking was now
identified as not willing. Here ''willing'' was taken in a general sense to mean not only choosing
and willing in the detenninate sense but all conceptual or "representational" thinking, which is
the very essence of the Western metaphysical tradition. Thus to overcome metaphysics is to
overcome the will. Nevertheless, the difficulty of such an overcoming becomes apparent
immediately.
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Teacher: ... I want non-willing.
Scientist: Meanwhile this formulation has proved ambiguous.
Scholar: Non-willing for one thing, means a willing in such a way as to
involve negation, be it even in the sense of a negation which is directed at
willing and renounces it.
Teacher: Non-willing means, therefore: willingly to renounce willing. And the
term non-willing means, further, what renounces absolutely outside any
kind ofwill.
Scientist: So that it can never be carried out or reached by any willing. (DT,
p.SS-59)
Apparently, what Heidegger seeks does not reside in the realm of willing (or seeking)
at aJl. That is why "releasement lies -- if we may use the word lie -- beyond the distinction
between activity and passivity ... because releasement does not belong to the domain of the
will." (DT, p.61) Thus Heidegger, like Zen, does not teach quietism or non-willing in the sense
of passivity: something still in the realm of will. This could well explain why Heidegger,
toward the end of ''Time and Being", claims to cease overcoming metaphysics and leave it
alone, because to overcome metaphysics is to overcome the will, hence it still remains in the
realm ofwill. lfwe are not to will, we cannot will willcssness; if we are not to do, we cannot
do non-doing. What can we will or do? What is the way to non~willing? It is obviously a self-
contradiction that "1 want non-willing." "Wanting" and "getting" both entail willing: how can
I get not-willing if not by willing? "The transition from willing to releasement is what seems
difficult to me." (DT, p.61) Here, indeed, Heidegger confronts the paradox which has been one
of the major theses in various trends ofEastem thought, which to a large extent could be seen
as responses to this paradox, though not always in the same fashion.
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3 Dllsejn and No-Self
By stressing the inevitability of the metaphysical mode of representation, Heidegger
seems to suggest that the origin of representational thinking does not exclusively lie in the
Western tradition. Man as man, regardless whether he is Occidental or Oriental, has the
inherent tendency toward interpreting Being in tenns of beings by representing and
conceptualizing it Certainly, this view does not counter Heidegger's basic observation that ''the
style of all Western·EW'Opean philosophy -- and there is neither Chinese nor an Indian
philosophy - is detennined by this duality, 'beings in Being"'. (WeT, p.224) Assuming such
an inherent tendency in all human beings, the Orientals, however, have developed a contrary
propensity which was at work from the very beginning, due to their own languages which tend
to choke off the "natural" transfonnation from henneneutic as-structure to apophantic as-
structure that has taken place in Western languages.
In Eastern thought in generaJ, the final realization of reality (enlightenment) is said to
be conditioned by a radical rejection of the self, which is seen as the origin of all dualities and
distinctions. The experience of the nothing or emptiness of everything is primarily an
experience of the nothing or emptiness of the self which generates the illusion ofall beings. In
Taoist tradition, particularly in Zhuangzi, the so-called "forgetfulness" (or "sitting
forgetfulness'~ is the forgetfulness of the self Buddhism, on the other hand, teaches that
enlightenment occurs when we are liberated from the delusion that we are pennanent substance
(selves, ego) over against other endwing objects. Thus enlightenment is a revelation of the fact
that the true self is "no-self' or "no-mind". As the overcoming of the "metaphysics" of
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Brahmanism v.1lich insists on the pennanent self (Almon) Wlderlying all incessant changes of
inner world, Buddhism aims at a radical "deconstruction" of the self. The Buddhist doctrine of
no-self (Analman) as the opposite extreme of the substantial "self" is meant to show that the
self, if there is such a thing, can never be substantiated and become certain and Wlchanging.
This view, in fact, had already been held by Zhuangzi. His "butterfly dream" is intended to
show the fundamental indeterminacy, and elusiveness ofthe self, which is found no....nere. This
Eastem accoWlt of the self is in striking contrast to the Cartesian constilUtion of the ego. For
Descartes, to deny a substantial self involves an intrinsic contradiction. "I think, therefore, I
am". To doubt the selfisjust another way to assert its existence because there must be a doubter
(a self) who exerts the doubting. But for the Taoist or the Buddhist. this coWlter-argwnem is
invalid because "doubting'" or "'thinking" does not necessarily entail a doubter or a thinker as
a substantial self, or as an irreducible transcendental starting point, the foundation. "DoUbting"
or "thinking" is like a mere happening of something which is devoid of an agent, or a pure
predication without subjecL David Loy points out that intuition as the translation of the
Buddhist tenn prajna is always misleading in that intuition is tmderstood in Western
philosophical context is a faculty of mind apart from the intellect. But prajna for Buddhism
refers to knowing in which there is no distinction between the knower, that which is known., and
the act of knowing. 12 The tendency to substantiate the self and to make the impennanent
permanent seems so natural that it detennines any linguistic articulation (including the non-
propositional Eastern languages). The strategy that Zen employs to eliminate this "natural"
tendency is to "deconstruct" language itself through non-linguistic practices or language
paradox. A famous Zen koan reads: A monk is worried over the question of immortality, asking
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«How can I escape the boundary ofsamslUa (birth and death)'!' Replies the master, «Where are
your' II In fact, all Zen koans ask the same question. ''who and where is the self!' Self-
enlightenment is factually not an enlightenment of the self, but rather an enlightenment of no-
self. Thus releasement for Zen must not be understood as the self being released from
something else, but the dissolution of the self.
If ....'U wei as non-action is the negation ofwillfulness, it is not merely the opposite of
willfulness; rather, it is a paradoxical play ofyu wei (action, willfulness) and wu wei (non-
action, non-willfulness) which is based on the ultimate deconstruction of the self, as the subject
ofaction or oon-action. Accordingly, the fina1 detachment is a detachment from any idea about
detachment, because the latter is derived from attachment by means of the negation of the
attachmenl Zen refers to such a detachment or releasement (M'U Moel) as absolute liberation, the
boundless freedom, which arises from the realization of the absolute nothing (emptiness,
smyal8)'
1be original Buddhism attempted to attain such oon·willing through a rather
sophisticated method of demonstrations. That is, to attain thoughtlessness (r~mind).
willessness requires the greatest thoughtfulness, will and activity. This, to be sure, is full of
wiliness. Yet, with the abandonment of the speculative method in original Buddhism, early Zen
was still committed to a certain way of practicing meditation which indeed remained
illegitimate. A radical "effort" was made by the late Zen which claimed that the difficulty in
attaining non·will rather lies in the very distinction bern'Cell will and non·will (which
corresponds to the distinction between Being and nothing). As a result, non-will could be at the
same time the very will. Our attitude toward the world, then, can be both ''yes'' and "no".
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Heidegger sometimes plays a quasi·Zen paradox of will and non-will, which culminates in the
following remarks:
We can use technical devices ... and also let them alone as something which
does not affect our inner and real core ... But will not saying both yes and no
this way to technical devices make our relation to technology ambivalent and
inc;ecure? On the contrary! Our relation to technology will become wonderfully
simple and relaxed. We let technical devices enter our daily life, and at the
same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, as things wh.ich are
nothing absolute but remain dependent on something higher. I would call this
comportment toward technology which expresses ''yes'' and at the some time
"no" by an old word, releasement toward things [die Gelassenheit zu den
Ding,n]. (DT, p.54)
It seems that Heidegger's understanding of reieasement is strikingly akin to Zen's wu
wei. For Zen, the absolute liberation is to say "yes" and "no" simultaneously. "Letting be", if
understood in the Zen manner, is letting everything be, not only "good" things but "bad" things,
for there is no distinction between "good" and "bad"·· the distinction itself is an attachment.
Heidegger seems to move far from being an old fashioned romanticist who blames the
technological world for its destruction of the earth, and his ''nostalgia'' seems to fade away
altogether.
The relinquishing of distinction between will and non-will is determined by the
fundamental abandorunent of the self, or the ego. In short, egolessness is the precondition of
willessness. Thus, the state of non-will is like a predication without the subject. Like the
Eastern thinkers, Heidegger's thinking began with an attack on the metaphysical notion of the
self. The fundamental ontology addressed in Being and Time targets the Cartesian notion of the
ego cogito and the Kantian subjectivity, the latter ofwhich, for Heidegger, takes for granted the
presupposition of Cartesian subjectivism. However, as Guingon has shown, Cartesian
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foundationalism and Kantian transcendentalism still Wlderlie Heidegger's fimdamental
ontology. In his later works, Heidegger gradually abandons such an idea of pursuing the
fundament. Dasein's transcendence toward Being is replaced by the mutual appropriation of
Being and Dasein in the sense of releasement. Now releasement, which is to some extent
consistent with the early idea of resolution (Entschlossenheit) for both imply "letting be",
becomes rather impersonal and seems to exclude any volitionistic element. Heidegger comes
10 see that the will ("the will to po....er'') which characterizes the nature ofmetaphysics, does not
belong to hwnan being, or Dasein. but rather to Being itself; hence, releasement or non-will
cannot take place as Dasein's possible anairunent, but in appropriation in which, to be sure,
there is no subject, it is simply a happening or a pure predication ("letting be'') - the predication
without subject. By reaching this point, Heidegger seems to enter the core of Eastern thought,
and distances himself far away nO( only from the mainstream of Western philosophical
tradition, bul also from its deviation, the medieval m)'Slics, especially Meister Eckhart. by
whom he is strongly influenced. Thus, Heidegger reaches the conclusion that Zen masters have
reached. Even in his explanation of'\l,aiting", which, as his answer to the question, "What,
then, am I 10 do?" sounds quite foreign to the East, still has something of a Zen overtone.
Heidegger says:
Teacher: Waiting, all right; bUI never awaiting, for awaiting already links itself
with representing and what is re-presented.
Scholar: Wailing, however, lets go of that; or rather I should say thai waiting
lets re-presenting entirely alone. It really has no object.
Scientist: Yet if we wait we always wait for something.
Scholar: Certainly, hulas soon as we re-present to ourselves and fix upon that
for which we wait., we really wait DO longer. (DT, p.68)
So we are waiting for nothing, though oothing here must be literally Wlderstood as no-
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thing. We have no object to wait for, but \\1: must wail Indeed, the strong Zen flavor and rather
obscwe assertion aboUl "waiting" results in a sense of disorientation which increases in the
following statement:
Scientisl: Then what are we to wait for? And where are we to wait? I hardly
know anymore who and where I am.
Teacher: None of us knows that, as soon as we stop fooling ourselves. (DT,
p.62)
Like all Zen masters, Heidegger asks the same question, "Who and where is my self!'
But is this the [mal word ofHeidegger to the question ofwhat "waiting"means? It is certainly
true even in his later works Heideggcr never reduces Dasein into no.self in favor of Being or
claims that Dasein is nowhere.1be mutuaJ appropriation ofBeing and Dasein is possible on the
ground that Dasein is privileged among beings. Being needs Dasein and calls Dasein to think.
As far as Dasein is needed by Being, it cannot be simply dissolved like the Zen no-self
Heidegger claims, "We genuinely incline toward something which in tum inclines toward us,
toward our essential nature, by appealing to our essential nature." (Wer, p.l) Dasein's essential
nature is its intrinsic relation to Being which is described in Being and Time as Dasein's
transcendence, and in his later works as Dasein's inseparability from Being. For me Iat.er
Heidegger. Dasein is still at. the heart ofme ontological difference, it is the "place" where the
revelation of Being can occur. However, it is this "place" (Oa) that Zen means to dissolve.
Since for Zen there is no ontological difference, and to find a place (Oa) to reveaJ the difference
is fwxtamentally absurd. The self is no-self, it is nowhere - nol only is it thrown nowhere, but
also nowhere does il become openness. Zen would regard Heidegger's thought on Dasein as
still remaining in a eenain mode ofsubstantiation of the self If we discern with greal caution
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the seeming Zen spirit in Heidegger's notion of "releasement" displayed in Discourse on
71linking and never neglect the integrity of Heidegger's thought, the hallucination or fallacy of
the Eastern conclusion in Heidegger's thought will fade away.
4 Releasement and Waiting
Although the later Heidegger minimizes the volitionist character of Dasein's being
toward authenticity described in Being and Time and recognizes the "overpowering force" of
Being in the sense ofusing Dasein for its own revelation, he does not come to see that Dasein
is nothing other than the mere ''1001'' ofBeing. The mutuaJ appropriation of Being and Dasein
presupposes that neither of them can be simply dissolved in favor of the other. It is true that
Heidegger maintains that the forgetfulness and the recollection of Being are the historical
events ofBeing itself. That means, while teclmology brings danger, it also contains within itself
the possibility of rescue. Heideggcr speaks of this in a prophetic manner:
Assuming that a tum still remains open for this destitute time at all, it can come
some day only if the world turns about fundamentally -- and that now means,
unequivocally: ifit turns away from the abyss. (PLT, p.92)
However, this tum or rescue will not take place unless ''there is a tum with mortals in
their essence." (PLT, p.118) In other words, Dasein's being toward authenticity is decisive for
world history. This view echoes the following remarks which refer to Eckhart from whom
Heidegger derives his own conception of reieasement:
Unless man first establishes himself beforehand in the space proper to his
essence and there takes up his dwelling, he will not be capable of anything
essential within the destiny now holding sway. In pondering this, we pay heed
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to a word of Meister Eckhart, as we think it in keeping with what is most
fundamental to it. It reads: '1llose ",ho are not of a great essence, whatever
work they perfonn, nothing comes of it." (Reden der UnJerscheidung, no.4)
(QCT. p.39-40)
If man becomes Zen's no-self, that is, with nothing essential to himself, the
establishment of himself would be impossible and absurd. If the "great essence" refers to the
capacity to say both "yes" and "no" simultaneously in the face of the danger, there is no need
to expect a tum that will bring about the end of the destitute time. The "great essence" for
Heidegger is the capacity for the tum in man himself as the precondition for the fundamental
twn of the world history. It is first of all the capacity of experiencing the abyss. Abyss in
German isAbgrund, meaning the complete absence ofground. This reminds us what Heidegger
elaborates about the nothing in ''What Is Metaphysics". The nothing, as the veil ofBeing, is that
which we must confronl and experience through our existential anxiety in order to reach into
the Open. Thus Heidegger assens. "Tn the age ofworld's night, the abyss of the world must be
experienced and endured. But for this it is necessary that there be those who reach into the
abyss:' (PLT, p.92) Those who reach into the abyss are the poets, the overman-like chosen
ones, who will bring about the tum in the world history although they are not the creators ofthe
new destiny. But how is the "great essence" which the poets possess related to the destiny of
Being? That is. how will the poets possibly bring about the tum? Heidegger says: ''The Being
ofbeings is the will ... Every being, as a being, is in the will. It is as something willed, ... Only
by virtue ofbeing willed is each being that which, in its own way, does the willing in the will."
(PLT, p.lQO..IOI) The Being of beings as will. reveals itself in the history of Western
metaphysics.. and culminates in the will to will, wherein, with the dawn ofworld's night, man
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himself and his things are thereby exposed to the growing danger ofturning into mere material
objectification. It is the Being, the will that ventures and endangers man. The will to power, the
will to security results in unshieldness which is the greatest danger. According to Heidegger,
to see this danger and point it out, there must be mortals who reach sooner into the abyss. But
in order to reach sooner into the abyss., the poets, ''the most mortal among mortals, must be the
most daring, the most venturesome. They would be still more daring even than self-assertive
htunan nature which is already more daring than plant and beast." (PiT, p.118) That is to say,
the poets will even more than the Will (the Being of beings) does. In other words, in order to
overcome the Will, we must will more willingly. Heidegger calls this will the highest fonn of
will as beyond the nonnal dichotomy of willing and non-willing. He says:
Man is at times more venturesome than the venture, more fully (abundantly)
being than the Being of beings. But Being is the ground ofbeings. He who is
more venturesome lhan that ground ventures to where all ground breaks off -
into the abyss. But if man is the ventured being who goes with venture by
willing it, then those men who are at times more venturesome must also will
more strongly. (PLT, pp.ll8-l19)
This (quasi Rilkean) claim seems to be very different from, even opposed to,
releasement, which, as the ultimate abandonment of will in the sense of the absolute non-will,
is taken by Heidegger in Discourse on Thinking to be the fmal attitude we could have in face
of the danger. Does Heidegger suggest a kind of Hegelian doctrine of negation of negation?
That is, by negating the non-willness ofanimals and plants, man wills in accordance with the
Will, the Being of beings, hence puts himself in danger; then, by negating the willfulness and
the Will, he reaches into the nothingness, the abyss. To be sure, Heidegger, unlike the Eastern
sages who advocated a return to the non-willfulness of animals and plants by negating the
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willfulness, claims a more willing will despite the fact that he accepts the p:>int that plants and
animals, because of their Wlwillingness, are admitted into the Open. But the second negation.
as the more willing will, is not the Hegelian synthesis either, it is by no means the continuation
of the will, but rather "the other" as beyond the Will. "Those, then. who are at times more
venturesome can will more strongly only if their willing is different in natwe." (PLT, p.119)
Thus, we may conclude that the more willing will is at the same time releasement. 1be
following passage expresses the relation between these two different wills:
Modem man, however, is called the one who wills. The more venturesome will
more strongly in that they will in a different way from the purposeful self-
assertion of the objectifying of the world. Their willing wills nothing of this
kind. (PLT, p.140)
Although Heidegger often appeals to the destiny of Being to describe the history of
Western metapbysics, and defines the Being of beings as the Will which is beyond human
disposal, he still persiSlently calls for poets, the more ventwesome mortals. In this regard,
Heidegger is definitely not a determinist, as some suggest, because man's venture can transcend
the venture itself
Ifreleasement is Wlderstood as the fundamental abandonment of the self (which could
be in "a right place" and in "a right way''),such as the Eastern thinkers maintained, the claim
for the more venturesome venture would be entirely absurd. To some extent, releasement in the
late Heidegger's thinking is consistent with his early claim of resoluteness of turning to
authenticity. Zimmerman rightly observes that ''The theme ofauthcntic existence ... was vitally
important in his thinking to the very end"', although the later Heidegger apparently grew to
regard the entire issue of"selfhood" on which the notion ofauthenticity depends as intrinsically
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colored by subjectivistic thinking. He goes on to remark, "One ofhis concerns was to explain
such existence in non-subjectivistic, non-anthropocentric terms. In his effort to find such an
explanation, he pushes against, and sometimes beyond, the limits of Western thinking."14
However, Heidegger's "non-Western" thought ofthe selfdoes not ultimately lead to Zen's "no-
self'. Whenoompared with the Eastern way of radical attack on the self - not only as the ego
but also the place of"clearing" - Heidegger's insistence on the real individual existence makes
his implicit but fundamental Christian perspective more apparenL Caputo is right in pointing
out a difference between Heidegger and Eckhart on one hand., and Zen on the other, that
"Heideggerdoes not want to say that the death of the individual is ultimately unreal, nor would
Eckhart want to deny that each soul is a unique creation ofGod. Both are, on this point at least.
very Western. Zen, on the other hand, teaches that 'from the first nothing is,' that the 'being'
(ein Seietuies) is an epiphenomenon." l' This difference is crucial in Wlderstanding Heidegger's
releasement, which. indeed, has much in common with the Eastern wu wei or "no-mind", but
is still incomparable in spirit with the lauer. Even in his later year.> when he anempted to think
Being without reference to beings, Heidegger never denied the reality of Dasein and always put
emphasis on the "08" - '''the right place" - and maintains the priority ofDasein among beings
in regard to the mutual appropriation ofBeing and Dasein. This, for Zen, is still an attachment.
To be sure, Heidegger never took the ultimate Zen leap and thought his releasement as in the
same sense as the Eastern "u wei which is based on the radical abandonment of the self. What
he wanted to deny or overcome is the ego cogito, the subject as opposed to the object Quite the
opposite (0 Zen, man's will, for Heidegger. is the historical condition of the revealing of the
truth of Being, insofar as it is capable of transcending the destiny of Being. The theme of
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authentic existence, which Zimmennan considers as ''vitally important in his thinking to the
very end," is deeply influenced by Kierkegaard's Christian notion of human existence.
Heidegger wouJd never regard Kierkegaard's call for the free-will as still a kind ofmetaphysical
account of the self. The real individual existence which is meant to be denied in Eastern
thought, must, for Heidegger, be affinned.
It is remarkable that the later Heidegger, in contrast to his attempt to find transcendental
structures of Dasein's being-in·the·world which underlie the essence of all human beings in
Being and Time, appeals to poets as the chosen ones, the mOSl daring and most venturesome
mortals. The poet in the later Heidegger plays a subtly different role from the thinker (not
philosopher). In the postscript of "What Is Metaphysics?' Heidegger draws a distinction
between the thinker and the poet by saying, '1be thinker utters Being. The poet names what is
holy." (E8, p.360) Although such a distinction is often complemented by the stress on their
kinship in teons ofthe same task as overcoming the forgetfulness ofBeing both are committed
to, the poet has a Wlique relation to Being because ofhis extraordinary capacity for experiencing
the divine dimension in Being, the holy. Heidegger speaks of the poet as ''the most monal
among monals". By this, it is possible, Heidegger wants to emphasize the intrinsic relation
between the poet and the gods because the monal implies his heavenly counterpart, the
immonals, i.e., the gods which indicates the divine dimension of Being. The poet as "the most
daring" and ''the most ventured" who can reach into the abyss must be essential to the abyss,
the essence of the world's night.
The "world's night, or the destitute time, is characterized by Heidegger as the "default
of God", which means that not only have the gods and God fled, but the divine radiance has
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become extinguished in the world's history. Moreover. "the time of the world's night is the
destintte time, becau<>e it becomes ever more destitute. It has already grown so destitute, it can
no longer discern the default of God as a default" (PLT, p.91) The loss of the capacity of
discerning the default ofGod is the extreme forgetfulness of Being. Here Heidegger does not
see the forgetfulness ofBeing, the extinction of the divine radiance and the default ofgods and
God as different events; rather. they refer to the same event - the age of the destitute. the
world's night, yet described from different aspects. Heidcgger's appealing to the poet lies in his
conviction that the JXlssibility of regaining the capacity ofdiscerning the default of God is still
contained in the essence of the poet.
1lle gods who "v.'ere once there:' "return" only after the "right time" - that is.
when there has been a tum among men in the right place. in the right way.
(PLT,p'l2)
In contrast to his "/waJi' given in Discourse on Thinldng, Heidegger here unequivocally
claims "the right place" and "the right .....'3.y... which are WlCloubtedly the "08" oC"Da-Sein". But
such a "right place" and a "right way" can be CoWld nowhere except in the poet The poet's
capacity of experiencing the holy. the divine dimension of Being is at the same time the
capacity of discerning the default of God and the extinction of the divine radiance, the
unholiness. That is why Heidegger, following HOlderlin, speaks of the world's night as
paradoxically the "holy night". (PLT, p.94)
Heidegger's appealing to the poet is in fact in accordance with his Wlderstanding of
Being. As I have suggested in the previous chapter, Being. for Heidegger, involves the divine
dimension which is irreducible in thinking ofthe truth of Being. The poet is different from the
thinker in thaI he is concerned with not only the forgetfulness ofBeing in the genernl sense, but
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particularly with the loss of the divine dimension in Being, for only the poet has the capacity
of naming the divine dimension. The intrinsic relation between the poet and the divine
dimension shows clearly in the nature of the poetry, which, according to Heidegger, is a
heavenly "measuring". Poets express the nature ofpoetry, or as Heidegger puts it, "gadler in
poetry the nature ofpoeO)'". (PLT, p.94) In •... Poetically Man Dwells ...", Heidegger remarks,
"Man, as man, has always measured himself with and against something heavenly... , 'Man
measures himself against the godhead.' The godhead is the 'measW'e' with which man
measures oul his dwelling, his stay on the earth beneath !.he sky," (PLT, p.221) Ifby measuring
Heidegger means to say Dasein's standing out in Being, it points out the divine dimension of
Being which constitutes the measuring. It becomes clearer at this point that Heidegger's
appealing to the poet is a new way of thinking Dasein's being toward authenticity. However,
the ontic and ontological priority of Dasein among beings in terms of his understanding of
Being in his existence is replaced by the priority of the poet, the special kind of Dasein, ''the
most mortal among mortals" for his essential relation to the holy, the divine dimension in
Being.
The kinship of the poet and the thinker invokes and in fact is coincident with the
intriguing relation between the question of Being and the question of God in Heidegger's
thinking, which is presented most explicitly in the following locus classicus:
Only from the truth ofBeing can the essence ofholy be thoUghl Only from the
essence of the holy is the essence ofdivinity to be thought Only in the light of
the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the ",'Ord "God" is to
signify. (DIY, p.230)
Indeed, it looks like a kind of transcendental thinking. The truth of Being in question
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seems the transcendental condition for the thinking of the holy, the divinity and God. It is
consistent with the following claim which is made even more explicit in regard to Heidegger's
insistence on the primacy of the ontological question, i.e., the question of Being over the ontic
questions (including the question ofGod):
In such nearness, ifat all, a decision may be made as to whether and how God
and the gods withhold their presence and the night remains, whether and how
the day of the holy dawns, whether and how in the upsurgence of the holy an
epiphany ofGod and the godscan begin anew. But the holy, wlllch alone ~ the
essential sphere of divinity, which in tum alone affords a dimension for the
gods and for God, comes 10 ra<liate only ,,!len Being itselfbeforehand and after
extensive preparation has been illuminated and is experienced in its truth. Only
thus does the overcoming ofhomelessness begin from Being, a homelessness
in which not only man but the essence ofman stumbles aimlessly about (BW.
p.218)
However, the Wlderstanding ofsuch a claim as a transcendental schematization may not
be adequate because the question of Being for Heidegger is certainly not the scheme for our
thinking or talking of the holy and God. HeideggerwouJd not be in agreement with RuJdofOtto
who, in his discussion of the holy, claims the need for "schematization", that is, the indefinite
must be made deftnite if man is to asswne a meaningful stance toward il l6 For Heidegger,
without the preliminary experience ofthe holy which only the poet is capable of, Being remains
vacuous and obscure since the forgetfulness of Being cannot be overcome without regaining
the lost divine dimension.
The holy, as the divine dimension of Being, refers to ''The essential space of the
divinity ... the dimension of the gods and God." (BW, p.234) The holy as both the divine
dimension of Being and the abode of the gods and God makes the question of Being and the
question of God essentially inseparable because Being contains in itself the divine dimension
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which in tum alludes to the gods and God. It is the poet who points out this inseparable link.
However, the poet \\-no names the holy cannot name God. With HOlderlin, Heidegger suggests
that the question "Who is God?" is too hard for man. The only question we can ask is "What
is God?" or "What may be said about God?" (PLT, p.22S). Gadamer points out that this refers
to "the dimension ofthe hallowed and the holy".I'The poet can only sing songs without \lo'Ords,
which merely indicates the traces of the fugitive gods and God, and cannot put into language
who God is.
The thinker informed by the poet can only watch and wait, remaining open to the
possible advent of the gods and God. Thus understood, releasement is open to and attends on
what we are waiting for. Thinking, or meditative thinking, accordingly, is a watching for, a
vigilance. All of this, to be sure, determines the nature of Heidegger's thinking as
fundamentally eschatological. His account of the existential resolution of Dasein in regard to
the nuth of Being is essentially a way of preparation, and has nothing to do with
·'schematization". As a waiting, it aims at the fmal fulfillment.
Caputo claims in regard to the nature of the later Heidegger's thinking that,
"Heidegger's later writings are more suggestive ofa kind of Buddhism, a kind ofmeditative,
silent world reverencing, than of Judaism or Christianity."" Such a claim simply misses the
fundamental perspective in the depth of Heidegger's thinking which can be adequately
characterized as ''waiting'' or "expectation" which is radically different from, and even opposed
to, the Eastern idea of wu wei, or as Caputo tenns it, "a kind of meditative, silent world
reverencing." In Eastern thought, particularly in Zen Buddhism, the so-called "waiting" as an
act of "no-act"refers to "nothing at all" ; it does not involve anything that will come in the
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future. In short, it does not contain a temporal structure as in Heidegger's waiting. When
Heidegger defines his notion ofreleasement as "waiting', he cautiously differentiates ''waiting''
from "awaiting" Awaiting "already links itself with representing and what is represented,"
while waiting "really has no object." (DT, p.68) In other words, what is waited, as radically
different from what is awaited, can never be represented as an object (Gegenstand) present-at-
hand and ready to be encountered at the end of waiting. 19 As the nature of releasement,
"waiting" contains Heidegger's unique understanding of Being and time. In ''Time and Being",
Heidegger renders Parmenides' "esti gar einar' ("For Being is') as "It is capable." He goes on
to explain that ''To be capable of Being means: to yield and give Being." (OTB, p.8) The giving
of Being is also, identically and simultaneously, a giving of time, and hence is far from the
metaphysical notion of Being as pennanent presence. The identity of Being and time affirmed
by Heidegger in ''Time and Being" shows the fundamental integrity and continuity of
Heidegger's thinking, for it is a restatement in radical way ofwhat is already asserted in Being
and Time, i.e., to think Being in tenns of temporality. Being absences into future and past even
as it presences in the actual moment; it is never the metaphysical substantiated, atemporal,
presence. In the epilogue of"The Tbing", Heidegger says,
"Being" is in no way identical with reality or with a precisely detennined
actuality. Nor is Being in any way opposed to being-no-longer and being-not-
yet; these two belong themselves to the essential nature of Being. Even
metaphysics already had, to a certain extent, an intimation of this fact in its
doctrine of the modalities -- which, to be sure, has hardly been understood--
according to which possibility belongs to Being just as much as do actuality
and necessity. (PLT, p.lS3)
We can see at this point that Heidegger's nolion of "releasement" understood as
"waiting" or "expectation" is intrinsically related to his thought on the identity of Being and
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time, and particularly to his wtique wxlerstanding of the possibility of Being. The possibility
of Being in Heidegger is essentially eschatological in that it holds sway beyond Dasein's power
of determination. Gadamer points out that such an eschatological understanding of the
possibility ofBeing arose from Heidegger's fascination with the early Christian commwtity's
experience of time. He says, "Measured time, calculation') about time and the whole
background ofGreek ontology, which gOVem<i our concept of time in philosophy and science,
breaks down in the face of this experience:'20 It is this early Christian experience that
Heidegger views as something "non·Westem" for its radical difference from Greek ontology
which, for Heidegger, determines exclusively the metaphysical nature of the subsequent
Western philosophy. In '''the End of Philosophy and the Task ofThinking", Heidegger writes:
... the thinking ... remains slight because its task is only ofa preparatory, not of
a founding character. It is content with awakening a readiness in man for a
possibility whose contour remain') obscure, whose coming remains uncertain.
(OTB,p.60)
Heidegger here describes thinking in much the same way the early Christians expressed
their experience of Parousia, Kairos and wakefulness. The emphasis on the possibility in
Heidegger's thinking does not suggest the kind of Kantian transcendental condition of
schematization, because the possibility ofBeing is essentially obsctue and uncertain. It pamllels
the Christian experience of the second coming, 'like a thief in the night" (First Epistle ofS1.
Paul to the Thessalonians), and hence excludes the notion of permanent presence which
underlies the thought of uanscendental condition and ofschematization. Thus "waiting" is a
preparation without any power ofdetermination. Heidegger says:
Guardianship of Being is not fixed upon something existent. The existing
thing, taken for itself, never contains an appeal of Being. Guardianship is
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vigilance, watchfulness for the has-been and coming destiny of Being, a
vigilance that issues from a long and ever-renewed thoughtful deliberateness,
which heeds the directive that lies in the manner in which Being makes its
appeal. (PLT, p. I84)
It is this fundamental attitude as "expectation' and "waiting" in Heidegger's thinking
that Zen would mean to reject. For Zen, the eschatological understanding of the possibility of
Being is still an attachment to the certain kind ofdifferentiation: the difference between past,
present and future. Although Heidegger stresses the unity of gathering of past, present and
future, such a unity ofgathering, in Zen's view, presupposes their separation in tenns of three
different dimensions. Zen's "absolute present" precludes this difference and embraces past,
present and future as non-differentiated. All the secrets ofHeidegger's thinking lie in his unique
understanding of time and Being, in his eschatological experience of reality, from which he
laWlches the radical attack on the metaphysical notion of Being, and which keeps him from the
tendency toward. the Eastern conclusion about man and world. This underlying Christian
perspective in Heidegger's thinking is neither Eastern nor Western. it directs and sustains
Heidegger's dialogue with the East. Heidegger's final "defInition' of Being as Ereignis in the
sense ofthe appropriation of Being and time refers to the ultimate possibility of Being whose
final coming remains beyond our choice and control. It is this eschatological Wlderstanding of
Being and time thai makes possible the meaningful relationship between the question of Being
and the question ofGod. As we have seen in the previous discussion about the divine dimension
in Being and the unique task of the poet, what Heidegger does is not simply takes the Christian
experience as a specific model from which to fonnalize the notion of Being.
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Hilhnerfeld points out in regard to the difference between Heidegger and Eckhart thal
whereas Eckhart abandons himself to the loving arms ofGod, Heidegger abandons himself to
the abyss of''Nothingness'?1 However, he is mistaken in concluding that there is no God in
Heidegger.lt is certainly true that releasement in Heidegger is not a mystical leap to the anns
ofOod as in Eckhart, but the reaching into the abyss. In this regard, Heidegger's radical attitude
toward non-will is closer to and almost the same as Eastern thought. Yet this reaching to the
abyss in its nature is the preparation for the tum. For only in the abyss are there the traces ofthe
fugitive gods. ''Only within reach of this site, if anywhere, can traces of the fugitive gods still
remain for god-less men." (PLT, p.93) Heidegger must have regarded Eckhart's releasement,
the mere negation of the will, as a too easy way to attain the divine radiance in that it is still far
from the experience of the absolute nothing, the abyss, which, however, is necessary for men
in a destitute time (not for the men in Eckhart's day perhaps) to fmd the traces of the fugitive
gods and God. Thus the following statement made by Heidegger is really like a sheer
confession without any pretentiousness: "I do not deny God. I state his absence. My philosophy
is a waiting for God." 12 It is impossible that the God in such an eschatological expecration is
simply an empty word, or, as some suggest, a mere poetic god that "has virtually nothing to do
with the God whom Jesus called abba or with the religion of the cross that Heidegger found in
Luther."2l
Although Heidegger's thinking on releasement is in many aspects akin to the Eastern
idea of",u wei, his understanding of releasement as a waiting, and moreover a waiting for God,
makes the fundamental difference between his thinking and Eastern thought quite explicit.
Heidegger's thinking, in other words, has features in common, at least by analogy, with both
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Eckhartian mysticism and with Taoism and Zen Buddhism. But it is reducible to neither. The
elements of"Kairological" expectancy" ensures this independence.
Notes:
\ Eckhart used a number of Middle High Gennan terms, such as abgescheidenheit
(detachment), gelazenheit (letting-be), ane war umbe (without why), tine wise (without
way), tine mittel (without means) and tine eigenschafl (without property) to express this
basic attitude. Cf. Sonya Sikka: Forms o/Transcendence. Heidegger and Medieval Mystical
Theology, State University ofNew York Press, Albany, NY, 1997, p.127.
2 Meister &khart, trans. Raymond Blakney, Harp and Row, New York, 1941, p.I64.
1 Reiner Schilnnann: Meister &khart, Mystic and Philosopher, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington and London. 1978, p.212.
I use "ontological" loosely referring to any account ofexistence and non~xistence.
S Chang Chung-yuan: Tao: A New Way o/Thinking, p.8
6 Watson: Source Book, pp.24Q-41
7 Michael Zimmerman: "Heidegger, Buddhism and Deep Ecology", in Cambridge
Companion to Heidegger, pp.240-269.
B See chapter three of this thesis, especially part 3.
9 The German "rechnendes Denken" is usually translated as "calculative thinking" But,
as Professor Peter Harris points out, English "reckoning thinking" may better captures
its original meaning.
10 Charles Guignon: Heidegger and the Problem 0/ Knowledge, Hackett Publishing
Corporation. Indianapolis., 1983, p.241.
11 Peter Harris: ''Transcendental Thinking in 'Zeit wxl Sein': A Return to Metaphysics", in
Concerning Heidegger: Essays in Interpretation, p.169.
" David Loy: "NonduaJ Thinking", Journal o/Chinese Philosophy, 13 (1980) p.294-295.
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I). Cf. Suzuki, D. T.: Zen Buddhism, Se!e{;ted Writings of D.T. Suzuki, Doubledayand
Company, lnc. Garden City, NY, 1956, p.210.
14 Michael Zinunennan: The Eclipse ofthe Self: The Development ofHeidegger's Concepl of
Authenticiiy, Ohio University Press, Athens and London, 1981, pp.xxvii·xxviii.
l5 John Caputo: The Mystic Elemenls in Heidegger's Thought, Ohio University Press, Athens,
Ohio, 1978. p.213.
16 Cf. Ru1dofOtto: The Idea ofthe Holy. Oxford University Press, New York, 1958.
17 Gadamer: Heidegger's Ways, lrans. John W. Stanley, State University of New York
Press, Albanu, 1994, p.180.
18 Ibid., pp.283-284.
19 In other words, Heidegger's "objectless waiting" can be seen as analogous to
Schleiennacher's "feeling ofabsolute dependence", which is essentially "relational" yet
without possibility ofnaming its lenn. I am indebted to Professor Harris for pointing out
the influence of Schleiennacher in this respect to me.
21l Gadamer: Heidegger's Ways, p.169.
21 John Caputo: The Mystic Elements in Heidegger's Thought, p.219.
22 Stefan Schimanski: "On Meeting a Philosopher", Partisan, 15(1948), p.511.
2J John Caputo: "Heidegger and Theology", in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed.
Charles Guignon, Cambridge University Press, Can1bridge, New York, 1993, p.283.
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Conclusion
This thesis, as its title indicates, is an investigation into the significance of Heidegger's
engagement in a dialogue between the East and the West. However, it is not meant to
present Heidegger as simply a spokesman of Western philosophical tradition and hence a
proper interlocutor on the pan of the West. although he, as a Western thinker par
excellence, is surely qualified to play such a role as he sometimes actually did. I Nor is it
a comparative study ofHeidegger's thought and Eastern thought in the strict sense, despite
the fact that it involves a considerable amount ofcomparison in terms of their similarities
and dissimilarities. What I try to do through the whole thesis is to set up a dialogue between
the East and the West on the Heideggerian topic or the Heideggerian matter of thinking,
namely, the question of Being (Seinsfrage). I believe that the thrust of Heidegger's
rethinking of lhis awe·inspiring Western metaphysical question lies in his extraordinary
sensibility and intuition of the primordial meaning of the question itself, which is prior to
any kind of philosophizing and thinking be it "Western" or "Eastern".
Heidegger's critical reflection on Western philosophy as a whole allows him, in
some sense, to step out of Western philosophy itself to which his own thought belongs. As
Caputo claims, Heidegger's thought is far more radical than any of the previous revolutions
taking place in the history of Western philosophy. "Revolutions in philosophy in the past
have been a matter offmding a new way to give a 'rationale' for one's views - whether that
156
rationale be a priori or posteriori, pragmatic, or phenomenological. But Heidegger calls for
a leap beyond the realm of giving reasons in order to take up a non-conceptual,
non-discursive, non-representational kind of 'thinking' which is profoundly divided from
any of the traditional varieties of 'philosophy' ."2 One may discover in Heidegger's thinking
not only mystical elements but also some distinctively Oriental characteristics that are
rarely found in other Western thinkers. It is clearly possible that Heidegger's encounter with
Eastern, particularly Chinese, thought during the period of his celebrated turn exerted an
extraordinary influence on his thinking to the extent that, as Poggeler states, it "transformed
Heidegger's language in a critical situation and gave a new orientation to his thinking. tt)
However, what Heidegger draws from this unstated "hidden source" is conditioned by a
"pre·established harmony" between his radical non-metaphysical thinking and the Eastern
way of thinking, which can be uncovered in the writings that antedated his contact with
Eastern philosophicalliterature.~
Needless to say, Heidegger's affinity to Eastern thought originates in his
fundamental concern to overcome the forgetfulness of Being, which, he believes, is the
nature of Western metaphysics. The East, for Heidegger, can provide a kind of
non-metaphysical thinking which may help overturn the dominance of metaphysical
thinking. However, as I have shown in the preceding chapters, Heidegger's stepping out
of Western metaphysics is not followed by a stepping into Eastern thought, as many
commentators readily admit.5 This cautious reluctance to plunge into the Eastern world
affords the greatest indication of Heidegger's thinking on the East-West dialogue. As a
hint, it is unstated in Heidegger's writings, like his unstated affinity to Eastern thought. I
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try through the whole thesis to bring into light this Heideggerian hint: to unfold a critique
of Eastern thought in respect to its distinctively non-metaphysical way of forgetfulness of
Being. If the ultimate goal of overcoming metaphysics is to overcome the forgetfulness of
Being which is characterized by Heidegger as the essence ofnihilism, the dialogue with the
East makes it plain that non-metaphysical thinking is by no means equivalent to the
thinking of Being itself. The Heideggerian dialogue between the East and West shows us
clearly that nihilism as originally defined by Heidegger as the consequence of Western
metaphysics has another history found in the East. And Heidegger's affinity to Eastern
thought in respect 10 the non-metaphysical nature of his thinking allows us to carry out a
penetrating rethinking of the Eastern tradition.
Although Heidegger never gave a definition of "the West", he had a unique
understanding ofthe tenn which may be different from that ofmany others. For Heidegger,
"the West" is basically metaphysical and ofthe Greek nature. By lumping the varieties of
philosophy and theology together under the same name "onto-theo-logy" for their
submission to Platonism, Heidegger neglects, as some criticise, the Christian roots of
Western tradition. By this, however, Heidegger seems to preserve the primordial meaning
ofChristianity as something "non-Western", and "non-metaphysical". Heidegger's thinking
of Being which involves the divine dimension and his basically eschatological
understanding of time and history cannot be regarded as merely an analogical application
of Christian motifs to his ontological context. I suggest that Heidegger's fundamental
Christian perspective can be shown more clearly when his thinking is put in the background
of Eastern thought. For such a perspective underlines his reception of Eastern ways of
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non-metaphysical thinking as well as his refusal of a total agreement with the Eastern
conclusion about man and world. Thus, his call for the leap of thinking is ultimately a call
to think Being in a more primordial way which is neither "Western" (as the synonym of
philosophy or metaphysics), nor "Eastern" (as contrary to metaphysics), but "Christian"
(understood in a rather primordial sense). Due to the limited space of this thesis, I cannot
develop an extensive exploration of the Christian themes in Heidegger's thinking although
it is certainly within the area broached by the present study. It may ultimately prove crucial
to a full account of Heidegger's confrontalion with the East.
There are cenain aspects in Heidegger's thought on the issue of the East-West
dialogue that appear ambiguous and even contradictory. For example, his delineation of the
history ofBeing as exclusively Western without mentioning other possible way of"Being's
sending" seems to suggest that the East, due to its lack of the metaphysical notions (like
ousia, Idea, energeia, ... will to power), has found nowhere for Being's revelation and
concealment. He simply overlooks that Being could possibly reveal and conceal itself in
a way that is entirely different from the West. This brings us back to the difficult question
of the transcendental character of Heidegger's reflection on the question of Being. When
Heidegger asserts that language is the house of Being, and that the Europeans and the
Eastern Asians presumably live in different houses, he contends that there is still Being
dwelling in the Eastern house. But he might find it difficult to name the various Eastern,
non-metaphysical, "concepts", such as Tao, WU, emptiness,yin-yang, etc. Are they still the
traces of Being, since they show no allusion to ontological difference in any sense? He
sometimes admits the approximation of his Ereignis to the Chinese Tao (1D, p.36). But can
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anyone find in Tao the Being that necessarily appears in Ereignis as the counterpart of
Dasein for their mutual appropriation? This thesis nevertheless leaves these Heideggerian
ambiguities unsolved. Its primary concern has been to characterise the measure of
agreement with Eastern thought but also of fundamental and insuperable difference.
Notes:
1 Apart from the well·known dialogue with a Japanese ("A Dialogue on Language"),
Heidegger was involved in conversations with professional philosophers and religious
figures from the East in many other occasions. For example, the dialogue with a
Buddhist monk from Thailand in 1960. Cf. Petzet: Dialogue and Encounter with
Heidegger.
2 John Caputo: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, Ohio University Press,
Athens, Ohio, 1978, pA.
lOtto Paggeler: The Paths of Heidegger's Life and Thought, trans. John Bailiff,
Humanities Press, NJ, 1997, p.270.
According (0 Graham Parkes, Heidegger's early works, and Being and Time in
particular, already contain a number of Eastern (Taoist) themes. See Graham Parkes:
"Thoughts on the Way: Being and Time via Lao-Chuang", in Heidegger and Asian
Thought, pp.105-144.
S Although many commentators on the issue of Heidegger's relation to the East admit the
differences between Heidegger and Eastern thought, they fail to realize such differences
are essential to Heidegger's thinking. Cf. Heidegger and Asian Thought.
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Appendix
"To Be" in Indo-European Languages and Its Parallels in Cbinese
In what follows I will focus on a particular linguistic phenomenon in Indo-European
languages, the verb "to be", with regard to its extraordinary career in Western philosophy,
and its parallels in Chinese, which seem to make the raising ofany real ontological question
impossible within that linguistic culture. J anempt to ans\\-er the question as to whether the
question ofBeing is in any sense bound to the particularity of Indo-European languages and
thus is merely a language game played under Western grammatical rules; whether the East,
due to the confinement of its own languages, is closed a priori to any ontological concern;
and whether Heidegger's inquiry into the truth of Being makes sense only in Western
philosophical discourse and hence has no relevance to Eastern thinking and existence.
I The Pecyliarities of the Verb "To Be"
It has been generally recognized that Western ontology to large eXlent depends on
lhe peculiarities of the Indo-European verb ''to be". Benveniste wriles:
Beyond the Aristotelian tenns, above that categorization, there is the notion
of "being" which envelops everything. Without being a predicate itself,
"being" is the condition ofall predicates. All the varieties of "being-such:'
of "state," all the possible views of ''time,'' etc., depend on the notion of
"being." Now again, this concept reflects a very specific linguistic quality.
Greek not only possesses a verb "to be" (which is by no means a necessity
in every language), but it makes very peculiar uses of this verb. It gave it a
logical function, that of the copula (Aristotle himself had remarked earlier
that in that function the verb did not actually signify anything, that it
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operated simply as a synthesis), and consequently this verb received a larger
extension than any other whatever. I
Needless to say, without this special verb which embraces various senses (roughly
divided into existential and copulative senses) there could be no ontology at all. So the
question of Being is, so to speak, necessarily related to the verb "to be". Under the
influence of Benveniste's pioneering studies, which led to a sustained enthusiasm for the
investigation of the single verb "to be", an enormous research project The Verb "Be" and
lIs Synonyms was launched to find the different expressions in different languages around
the world for the various senses of "to be"? Such empirical linguistic studies were
certainly philosophically, or more precisely, ontologically motivated. They have opened the
realms for our rethinking the significance of the question of Being.
As ''the other pole of the whole realm of languages" opposite to the Indo-European
family, Chinese provides ideal examples that show how far the various senses of"to be"
can be distributed differently, but are still related to each other in one way or another. All
of these are reflected in philosophical terms. The preeminent notion of yu in Eastern
thought is comparable to Being in respect to its undeniable ontological connotation which
has attracted the attention of Western philosophers from Hegel to Heidegger. But any
identification between yu and Being is always shattered by the frustrating difficulties in
translating Western ontology into Chinese.} The difficulties arise mainly in the free move
between the existential "to be" and "to be" as copula in the philosophical texts, for the
Western philosophers usually take their consistency for granted although they are always
aware of their difference.
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Aristotle is the first philosopher who draws the distinction between the existential
and the copulative senses which are embraced by the single verb '''(0 be" (eiMl). He renders
the existential sense of"'lo be" as "being hap/os", that is, "being without qualification" or
"being loul courl". ("Whether or not it simply is, not whether it is white or not....) Thus
existence is seen in this way as an incoillplete predication. Or the difference between the
two uses of "to be" in sentences as "Socrates is wise" and "Socrates is" is merely a
difference between transitive and intransitive verbs.! Their semantic consistency is
constantly assumed. But Aristotle also remarks that "to be" as copula operates simply as
a synthesis -- apart from its synthetic function of connecting two tenns there could be no
semantic account of it. The "emptiness" of the copula is attested by the fact that in many
languages it can be simply omitted or may be totally lacking.' Aristotle seems to hesitate
on whether the copula "to be" is a part of predicate. The alternative treatments of "be" in
sentences like "Socrates is wise" can be expressed as "subject + predicate" and "subject +
to be + predicate". As far as "be" is a transitive verb, it should be regarded as a part of a
predicate jusllike any other verb. Yet when its mere synthetic function is stressed it tends
to be treated as beyond the dichotomy of subject-predicate.
However, the Indo-European copula "to be" is undoubtedly a verb; it possesses all
the features of a verb (tense, person, etc.); yet it can still be differentiated from all other
verbs. In a number of languages outside the Indo-European family, words other than verbs
are employed as copulas. It is the peculiarity oflndo-European languages that they assign
to the copula., which may be otherwise a pronoun or a particle, verbal characteristics. As
a verb, beard as a part ofa predicate, "be" constantly resists its "emptiness". But the verbal
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character of the copula ··be" seemed to be weakened after the Latin exsistere was
introduced to replace the existential use of "be". That is, with the emergence of "to exist",
the copula «to be" tended to be cut off from its connection to "existence".' One may
legitimately ask with Benveniste·, Why is it still a verb?
II "To Be" and the Copyla
It is alleged that the downplay of ontology in the Anglo-American philosophical
tradition started with John Stuart Mill's notorious remark on the contrast between the
existential and copulative functions of «to be". He argues:
The frivolous speculations concerning the nature of Being ... which have
arisen from overlooking this double meaning of the word to be; from
supposing that when it signifies to exist, and when it signifies to be some
specified thing ... it must still, at bottom, answer to the same idea, and that
a meaning must be found for it which shall suit all these cases.9
Following Mill, Russell declares that it is "a disgrace to the hwnan race" that it uses
the same word for the two entirely different senses of identity and predication. Thus,
according to Russell, there are at least four senses of "to be", each of which can be
symbolized as: (I) 3, a quantifier indicating existence, (2) f(x), predication, (3) x = y,
identity, (4) x c y, class inclusion. If there is still a philosophical account of existence, it
would not be the same as the inquiry into lhe question of Being which is a result of the
confusion ofvarious senses that happened to be gathered in the single word "be". The lack
ofa deep logical connection between these different senses is the very reason to abandon
this "pseudo" question altogether. 10
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Instead of the question of Being, analytic philosophy talks about the question of
existence. But it approaches the question in terms of quantification. Existence, expressed
by a quantifier, becomes a propositional function. The strong verbal character of
"existence" is omitted or intentionally neglected. The debate between two basic types of
theories concerning the nature of being or existence, i.e. "strong" and "weak" theories, as
James Bradley tenns them respectively, is to some extent a debate on whether or not the
nature of Being or existence should be understood in terms of its verbal character. In
contrast to "strong" theory which has been held by "speculative metaphysics" and the like,
"weak" theory, represented by various empiricism, naturalism, pragmatism, and neo-
transcendentalism, is concerned solely with the quantificational nature of existence, i.e.,
with the possibility of transforming statements with the active verb "to exist" or "to be"
in their existential sense into propositional statements. In other words, "weak" theory, in
defining existence in reference to quantification, makes allusion to the copulative sense of
"to be", This is made explicit in Frege's doctrine of existence. According to Frege,
existence is analogous to number. Affinnation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of
the number naught. Thus "Just men exist" means the same as 'The number ofjust men is
not naught." Note the verb "exist" in the first sentence is replaced by a copula "is" in the
second sentence with a modification of the subject (from ')ust men" to "the number ofjust
men"). Frege carefully draws a distinction between a property of x and the property of the
concept x in order to differentiate existential statement from predication. As Bradley puts
it, "statements of the form 'x exists' are not statements about x - i.e. not predicates ofx -
but rather quantificational statements about the term x, namely that x refers to a class which
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is not empty but has instances or examples."11 But the statement of existence as "The
number of just men is not naught" is essentially a statement of denial of identity (nltO)
which uses "be" in exactly the copulative sense. Accordingly the consistency between the
existential and the copulative senses of "be" which Mill and Russell strive to dismantle
sneaks back into the account of existence.
As an advocator of the basic tenets of "weak" theory and the forerunner of Frege,
Kant draws a distinction between "to be" as copula, i.e. the logical use of"10 be" (respectus
logicus), as in statements like "God is omnipotent", and the existential use of "to be" in
statements like "God is" (in the sense "God exists"). Yet he does not disconnect the relation
between the copulative use and the existential use of 'to be" as entirely inconsistent.
According to Kant, the copula serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject,
while the existential function of "to be" is to posit an object corresponding to a concept,
namely, to submit instances to the concept. Obviously, there is something still in common
between these two functions. Both of them add nothing to the concept and they function
as equally "positing" though in different ways. By emphasizing the strong verbal character
of "positing", Heidegger takes Kant's thesis about Being as a testimony for "strong"
theory.12 Frege, on the other hand, in asserting that "existence is analogous to number", is
committed to transform the verb "exist" into a pure copula. In this regard, we may say that
the non-verbal character of the copula "be", which became stable and explicit after it was
cut off from its existential function, is now imported into existence. The initially alleged
two incomparable functions of "be" are therefore reconciled, but under the dominance of
the copula. Existence, as Bradley points out, "is now through and through describable in
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tenns of its predicates, with no mysterious residue."\} But it becomes "a silent, featureless
pendant of the propositional function."'4 The richness of "to be" for the "strong" theory is
thus dissolved into a logical symbol which says nothing about itself.
III "To Be" and "To Exist"
Against this general tendency of reduction, Gilson sees "to be" in its existential
sense as the primary intransitive verb. the expression of the most fundamental "subjective
action", that is, an intransitive action which detennines something about the subject and
does not involve an object. IS At this point, Gilson would agree with Mill and Russell in
separating the existential sense and the copulative sense of "to be", Nevertheless, by this
he wants to protect "to be" in the existential sense from being reduced to the featureless
quantifier. which is certainly infected by the inert character of the copula. For Heidegger,
it seems necessary to take a further step, that is, the primary verbal character of "to be"
must be preserved not only in its existential use, but also in its copulative use. Unlike
Gilson, who might take Mill and Russell.as his analytic counterparts for separating the
existential and the copulative functions of''to be", Heidegger is more sympathetic to Kant
and Frege in insisting on the unified '10 be". Bul, contrary to the Fregean attempt to reduce
existence to pure propositional function, Heidegger intends to carry the strong verbal
character of "to be" in the existential sense into its copulative function. In other words,
Heidegger is more interested in how the verbal sentence is built into the nominal sentence,
rather than vice versa.
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There are devices for transfonning nominal sentences and verbal sentences into
each other. The opposite directions of logically motivated transformation form two
different schools: the "NV's" (N = noun, V = verb) school and the "s is P" (S = subject,
P = predicate) school. Inasmuch as "s is P" is the only accepted sentence fonn in the
operation of logic in the traditional syllogism, all verbal sentences ("NV's") are intended
to be transfonned into nominal sentences ("S is P").16 The interpretation of existence as
quantification belongs to this general trend, yet with a modification of the subject (from
"X" to "the number of X"). But there are still a great number of thinkers who take the
contrary option, namely, to transfonn all nominal sentences into verbal sentences.17 We
may take a brief look at the following examples which, repeatedly cited by Heidegger,
actually cover both the existential and the copulative uses of «to be" in various ways.
"God is." "The earth is." "The Lecture is in the auditorium." "This man is
from Swabia." "The cup is of silver." "The peasant is to the fields." (Der
Bauer is! allfs Feld) "The book is mine." "Red is the port side." "There is
famine in Russia." "The enemy is in retreat.·' "The plant house is in the
vineyard." "The dog is in the garden." "He is dead." (Er is! des Todes,
literally, "He is of death.")"
Heidegger transforms most of the above sentences containing the single ''to be" into
sentences in which various non-be verbs are employed.
"God is"; i.e. he is really present. ''The earth is"; i.e. we experience and
believe it to be permanently there; "the lecture is in the auditorium"; i.e. it
takes place. "The man is from Swabia"; i.e. he comes from there. "The cup
is of silver"; i.e. it is made of... "The peasant is to the field"; he has gone
to the fields and is staying there. "The book is mine"; i.e. it belongs to me.
"Red is the port side"; i.e. it stands for port. ''The dog is in the garden"; i.e.
he is running around in the garden. (1M, pp.89-90)
In this regard, Heidegger might be said to belong to the "NV's" school which claims
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to be able to transform even the sentence "James is a soldier" to "James soldiers".l' By such
a transformation. Heidegger wants to show the richness of ' 'to be". But it is worth noting
that the transformation of the first two sentences seems to take the opposite direction. For
"is" in "God is" and "The earth is" is exactly what "exists" means. that is. it is a verb par
excellence. Heidegger transforms it into a temporal copula ("is present") and a locative
copula ("is there") respectively.20 However, this is by no means the reduction of the verb
"to be" into a logical symbol, for Heidegger never regards the copula as merely a synthesis,
a featureless propositional function word. Copula for him is essentially the expression of
"pointing out" even when it is not a verb or is simply omitted, as in some languages. While
stressing the richness of "to be". Heidegger also admits its "emptiness" and
"indeterminacy", not in the sense ofa lack of semantic constant. but rather in the sense of
being '·unlimited". "That the 'is' has the character of the copula shows clearly enough the
extent to which its meaning must be characterized by emptiness and indeterminacy. For
only thus can the 'is' suffice for the various uses that are constantly demanded of it in
discourse." (Be. p.30) Thus understood, Heidegger belongs neither to the "s is P" school,
nor to the "NY's" school. Not only does he disagree with the general tendency of analytic
philosophy to reduce "to be" to the copula (as mere logical synthesis), but he also distances
himself from all existentialists who try to cut off the existential function of "to be" from its
copulative function in order to address the priority ofexistence over essence.
169
IV Beyond Existence and Copyla
Kahn's comprehensive study of the Greek einai ("to be") has shown that the
original meaning of this extraordinary verb was rather rich and beyond the simple
dichotomy of the existential and the copulative. In fact, our understandings of "to be" as
either "to exist" or as copula are derived from those original meanings which, though still
implied in modem languages, are overshadowed by the explicit existential-copulative
division. But in these original meanings we can find the deep connection between the
various uses of '''to be" that are seen otherwise as arbitrary and accidental.
According to Kahn, it might be more proper to speak of absolute and predicative
construction instead of the existential and copulative uses of "to be" in sentences like "'X
is" and "X is Y", namely, sentences with and without a predicate insofar as the Greek einoi
is concerned. Kahn focuses on three features of einai which "are largely indifferent to the
syntactic variation between absolute and predicative construction,,21: (I) the veridical, (2)
the durative, and (3) the locative, values of einai. They are the most fundamental senses of
the original ''to be" that still underlie the modem understanding of the verb. In Chinese, on
the other hand, there is no single word like "'to be" which functions in both existential and
copulative senses; the copula. for example, as a mere synthesis, seems to make no allusion
to "'existence". However, a cautious etymological study may show that there is still a
traceable connection between copula and "existence" in Chinese.
The treatment of the Indo-European verb "'to be" as a mere linguistic accident in
linguistic relativism is based on the observation of the basic existential..copulative
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dichotomy, which is certainly peculiar to the Indo-European family. But a retrieval of the
origin of language can show that various languages that diverge from one another have a
striking resemblance and similarity in respect to "to be". A brief survey of the original
meanings of "to be" and its Chinese parallels will shed light on this issue.
1. "To Be" and "To Be True"
The most general sense of einai, according to Kahn, is the sense of verity or the
veridical usage. "There is absolutely no doubt that this meaning of 'to be' (namely 'to be
so, to be true') is one of the oldest idiomatic uses of the verb in Greek, and indeed in Indo-
European.,,21 Such an intimate connection between the copulative and the veridical senses,
according to Kahn, can still be heard in English when "is" is compared with "seems" or
when the pronunciation of "is" is emphasized.23 In modem Chinese, shi,like the English
"to be", indicates identity (=), predication f(x), and class membership (c ).2. But it also
means "true", "being true", or ''"truth'' (as opposite to lei, "false", "being false, or
"falsity').ll Thus the copulative sense always suggests the veridical sense. In other words,
shi, as a copula, is not merely a neutral synthesis, it already contains certain degree ofvalue
(bUlb value). But it is remarkable that the mediator that connects these two different senses
is the sense of "this", the original use of "shi" as a pronoun. Graham translates it as
"aforementioned", or ''the thing in question",26 while Lohmann renders it as "(being)
such".27 That is to say, it also means "to be so" or "to be the case". But in regard to the
Greek einai, Kahn goes on to claim that "to be so" or "to be the case" is logically not the
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same as "to be true". "What is true or false is normally a statement made in words; what
is the case or not the case is a fact or situation in the world.,,21 Without any doubt such a
distinction drawn by Kahn is based on a presupJX>sition ofa truth norm which is exclusively
propositional. The same norm is also used by Hall and Ames in claiming the lack of interest
in questions of truth and falsity in Chinese philosophy. But, according to Heidegger, the
propositional truth is derived from a more primordial truth, which is exactly what "to be
so" expresses. A statement that is claimed to be true must be so on the ground that what the
statement is about has already been revealed. The original meaning of truth as
·'wthidenness" or "disclosedness" that Heidegger argues lies behind propositional truth is
nOl exclusively Greek, it is also relevant to the early Chinese understanding, from the
linguistic point of view.
However, the original meaning of truth in Heidegger's view has been transformed
into propositional truth with the development of metaphysics in Western thinking. Chinese,
on the other hand, took the entirely different route which led to a pragmatist and relativist
idea of truth. The usual interchangability between shi ("is") and Ice ("appropriate"), and,
moreover, the substitution of shi ("is'') with ZUD and dang (whiCh literally mean "do",
"perform", or "pretend") in many cases ofpredication29 enforce the tendency of moving
from the original meaning of "being" and "being true" as "pointing out" or "revealment"'
toward the "appropriateness" of correlations. What is (true) becomes what functions
(properly).
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2. The Durative
The second major aspect of the original Greek "be" (einat), according to Kahn, is
the durative sense, which he calls the "intrinsically stable and lasting character of Being in
Greek."JO What is or exists must have the capacity of lasting, and of duration. To be or to
exist is at the same time to sustain and to endure. In Chinese cun ("exist", "live") means
"persist", "presetve" and "save", it implies being constantly protected from perishing. But
the Greeks took the durative sense as the starting point to develop the idea of Being in
contrast to Becoming. The durative aspect ofeinai became dominant especially when einai
was nominalized. It is worth noting that the modern expression "existence" which always
suggests the dynamic and unstable character of "to be" has no Greek etymological origin.
The Latin essentia ("essence") as a derivative form of esse, the Latin translation of the
Greek einai, finally accomplished the medieval interpretation of the durative aspect ofeinai
in terms of stability and unchangingness.JI But in Chinese thought, on the other hand, the
original durative sense of cun was simply neglected and did not playa role that was
compatible to yll or shi until it emerged as a component of modem coinage cun-zai
("Being", "existence") to translate Western ontology.
3. Existence and Location
The third fundamental value of einai is its locative sense. Kahn shows that its
locative sense is closer to what is usually called the existential rather than the copulative
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sense of the verb -- in fact, the copulative use of"to be" was derived from the locative use.
The intimate connection of these two senses of "to be" conditioned Greek thought on
existence and location, which, though not identical, are at least equivalent. The locative
sense was cut ofTfrom its connection to the existential sense in philosophical contemplation
after Plato introduced non-spatial Fonus. Thus in modem European languages the locative
use of"to be" is more like a copula rather than the verb "to exist", that is, the locative use
of"be" is usually treated as merely '''copulative'' rather than existential.12 The link between
existence and location in Greek has became blurred and indirect. But in a number of oon-
Indo-European languages, it is preserved and is made more explicit, or as Kahn puts it, the
expressions which serve to translate "'there is" involve some allusions to place or location.))
This can well be illustrated by the Chinese word zai. Zai emerged in modem speech to
express "existence", but it was initially an indication of location, and is still used in this
way. It can be used in "X zai Paris" ('''X is in Paris") and "X zai" ("'X exists" or "X is
alive"). In other words, a single word embraces both existential and locative senses.
Nevertheless, even in the Indo-European languages the existential and the locative
expressions are still related to each other. "Not only is exsistere itself a spatial metaphor,
vaguely implying some local context, but expressions like "there is" and "il y a" make
explicit use of the adverb for definite place."l4
It could be assumed at this point that Heidegger's rethinking of the question of
Being intends to uncover the original connection between existence and location. In Being
and Time not only the locative sense of existence, "standing out", is emphasized; further,
spatiality is understood in terms of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. More importantly, the
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"Da" of Dasein addresses the locative sense of Being, it points out the place where Being
comes to pass. The late Heidegger emphasizes the "Da" by breaking down Dasein into two
components. "Being" and "there", and calls for a '·topology of Being". The notion of
"Ereignis" also suggests the place where Being and Time gather and appropriate each other.
The essential correlation of existence and location in many languages, whether it is
expressed explicitly in Chinese or implicitly in European languages, calls our anention to
the nature of language as essentially related to the hermeneutical "as-structure", as
"pointing out".
4. "To Be" and "To Have"
In addition to the three major senses above, the original Greek "to be" also
contained the sense of "to have", (although it is true that the Greeks also used "to have"
(echein) in this context). According to Kahn, einai used in the form of"is to" clearly meant
"to have".H This is what Kahn calls the "possessive construction" with einai. as a
supplement to the three fundamental values. The existential use of "to be" was in fact
derived from this sense of einai. Such a connection between existence and possession in
Greek has its striking parallel in Chinese. The principal term yu in Chinese philosophy
which is often translated as Being designates existence as well as ''to have". In other words,
the single word yu can be used to indicate both "there is" and "have" in sentences like
"Thereyu X" and "Oneyu X". In modem European languages, on the other hand, existence
alludes to the copula, instead of possession, but the connection between existence and
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possession does not vanish altogether, it is still implicit in the understanding of some
expressions. When Kant gives the example of his financial position for his argument about
the ontological argument, he is virtually establishing a connection between "there is" and
"to have", for 'There is a hundred thalers in my pocket" says exactly the same as "I have
a hundred thalers". But a more significant way of establishing the connection is found in
the French idiomatic expression for "there is": i/ y a.
In the French "i! y a" "have" ("a") functions as the "be" in the English "there is".
But the English "there is X" clearly indicates its derivation from "X is" or "X exists".
"There" as a dummy-subject is employed only for the reason of mitigating the oddness of
the inverted verb-subject order. That is to say, X as the real subject is constant whether in
"X is" or "There is )(".36 In the French "i/ y a )C', on the contrary. X becomes the object of
the verb "have" C"a"), while an impersonal subject "if' is introduced. This implies that
existence is somehow possessed by something outside '·X". This French idiomatic
expression has a striking German counterpart "es gibt", in which the meaning of
"possession" in the French i! y a gives way to "endowment" and "giving". Nevertheless,
both of them are usuaJly understood in the fonn of "X is" or "X exists". Graham observes:
Thus in Chinese one approaches existence from something outside, usually
undefined, which has, in which there is, the thing in question. The same is
true of ordinary English and French, in which one says "there is X" rather
than "X is". "il y a X" rather than "X est", But Western philosophy,
grounded in Greek and Latin rather than ordinary modem speech, has
generally approached the question from the opposite direction, from the
thing which "is" or "exists", The object ofyu corresponds to the subject of
"is",)7
That is. "have" in the French "i! y a" and "give" in the German "es gibt" which
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might alter the paradigmatic understanding of existence are overshadowed by the
dominance of "to be" and "to exist". It must be pointed out that Graham's observation is
still imbued by the underlying Western grammatical and philosophical norms. For in
Chinese sentences, especially in yu~sentences (affirming existence) a subject is not needed,
not in the sense ofomission (which assumes the pre-existence of that which is omined), but
in the sense of (otal absence. Thus the "something outside" which is still traceable in the
French "if y a" and the German "es gibt" is irrelevant in the Chinese yu-sentences.
Graham's claim that the object ofyu corresponds to the subject of"is" is inadequate insofar
as Chinese signals nothing outside or other than what is possessed or is given. We must
not understand ''yu X" as "something has X" or as "X has". In other words, X is neither a
subject nor an object ofyu,JI That existence is an action of a subject (an agent) as Gilson
emphasizes, or a predicate applied to a concept (in the sense of quantification) is
inconceivable for the Chinese mind, which regards existence as essentially self--originating
in things.
It has been debated whether Heidegger's notion of Ereignis should be understood
in terms of self-origination, which is indeed close to the Chinese conception of existence
expressed by yu. Yet the fact that Ereignis in Heidegger depends largely on the
interpretation of the German idiomatic expression "es gibt" which focuses on the meaning
of "sending" and "giving" seems to suggest that it is rather more Medieval than Oriental
in spirit. The question Peter Harris puts forward touches upon the core of this issue: "why
does Heidegger not allow this idiomatic expression to wither away in its use?,,19
The connection between the existential and the copulative senses, as we have shown
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above. can be found in both tndo-European and Chinese languages. However, such a subtle,
yet intimate connection, while being stabilized in a particular way in Indo-European
languages, is dissolved entirely in Chinese.
V From "To Be" to the Concept of Bejng
The question of Being as raised in Western philosophy was not only due to the verb
"to be" which persistently embraces the two senses - the existential and the copulative
senses which are disconnected in many languages - but also conditioned by a particular
linguistic device in Indo-European languages, namely, the transformation of the verb "to
be" into a noun (substantive) "Being". a crucial step toward the ultimate establishment of
the Western ontology. Benveniste points out:
... In addition, "to be" could become. thanks to the article, a nominal notion,
treated as a thing; it gave rise to varieties. for example its present participle.
which itself had been made a substantive, and in several kinds (/0 on, 0;
on/es, 10 on/a); it could serve as a predicate itself, as in the locution to ti en
einai designating the conceptual essence of a thing, not to mention the
astonishing diversity of particular predicates with which it could be
construed, by means of case forms and prepositions. Listing this
abundance of uses would be endless; but they really are facts of language,
of syntax, and of derivation. Let us emphasize this, because it is in a
linguistic situation thus characterized that the whole Greek metaphysic of
"being" was able to come into existence and develop -- the magnificent
images of the poem ofParmenides as well as the dialectic of The Sophist.
The language did not, of course, give direction to the metaphysical
definition of "being" -- each Greek thinker has his own -- but it made it
possible to set up "being" as an objectificable notion which philosophical
thought could handle, analyze, and define just as any other concept.41)
Such a transformation seems inevitable as far as anything that is to be thought or
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spoken of, that is, to be the subject matter ofdiscourse, must be in the noun form, or treated
as a noun. But the nominalized "to be" obtains new meaning that seems lacking in its
verbal form. Like all verbs, "to be" is transformed into "Being", a noun, through a definite
fonn of the verb, infinitive (modus infinitivus). Heidegger writes:
It is easy to see that in the formation of the word from "das Sein" <Being>
the decisive preliminary form is the infinitive "sein" <to be>. This form of
the verb is transposed into the form of a substantive. Verb, infinitive,
substantive are accordingly the three grammatical forms which determine
the word character of our word "Being" <das Sein>. (1M, p.55)
lnfmitive is a mode of"unlimitedness", and "indeterminateness"; it is opposed to its various
finites. "To be" is infinitive, while "am", "is", "are", "was", "were", "have been", etc., are
finites. Infinitive is that from which all finites derive. We talk about "to be", instead of "arn",
"is", etc., for the basic meaning of all the finites is presented in the infinitive. But, according
to Heidegger, the originalfunction of inflection (enklisis) is showing or pointing out· the
manifestation of person, number, tense, voice, mood, along with its basic meaning. Thus
what in Greek is a deficiency gains a privileged position in the sense of"not limited" instead
of"not manifested". Heidegger remarks:
According to the Latin term the infinitive is a form that may be said to cut off
the meaning from all definite relations. The meaning is drawn out (ab·
stracted) from all the particular relationships. In this abstraction the infinitive
yields only what is represented by the word as such. Hence present-day
grammarians say that the infinitive is the "abstract verbal concept:' It
comprehends and formulates the meaning only in a general sense. It
designates only this general meaning. In our language the infinitive is the
form by which one refers to a verb. And there is a lack, a deficiency in the
form and mode of meaning of the infinitive. The infinitive no longer
manifests what the verb otherwise reveals. (1M, pp.67-68)
The infinitive, while underlying all inflections of the verb, is at the same time an abstraction
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of finites, In other words, the infinitive, as an independent word fonn opposed to the finites,
actually gives rise to, or at least reinforces the fundamental separation of, the universal from
the particular,
The next step is to transfonn the infinitive into the substantive (noun), This is done
in Greek and in many modem languages by prefacing the infinitive with an article: to einai,
das Sein, /'etre,41 According to Heidegger, the article "signifies that the object indicated
stands as it were for itself, and is." (1M, p,69t2 1n such a way, "to be" finally becomes an
entity, or an object submined to our analysis, The transfonnation results in emptying the rich
meanings of"to be" and hence giving rise to the emergence of"Being" as the most universal,
yet emptiest concept of all, Heidegger writes:
If we say only "sein", what is named is already indefinite enough, But the
transfonnation of the infinitive into a verbal substantive further stabilizes as
it were the emptiness that already resided in the infinitive; "sein" is set down
like a stable object. The substantive "Sein" <Being> implies that what has
thus been named itself"is," Now "Being" itselfbecomes something that "is,"
though manifestly only beings are and not Being in addition. But if Being
itself were something being in a being, then we should have to find it,
particularly as the Beingness <das Seiendsein> of a being confronts us even
when we do not definitely apprehend its particular properties, (1M, p,69)
For Heidegger, Sein (Being) should never be thought of as an abstraction, or as an
entity, It is not merely "the last cloudy streak ofevaporating reality," Thus to keep the "to be"
in its abundant meanings, is to fight with the grammar which persistently tends to reduce
Being to emptiness. The linguistic peculiarity of Indo-European languages is certainly the
obstacle of our access to Being itself, the true meaning of "to be",
No doubt, metaphysics or metaphysical thinking is tied up with a particular mode of
180
discourse, a kind of language, which to some extent is already "metaphysical". But it does
not follow that the nature ofa language may properly be revealed by such reflection, that the
possibilities of the language can simply be exhausted by various "language games". If
thinking, according to Heidegger, is a response to language which addresses us, what we can
hear from language is not merely grammar, but that which gives grammar, which still allows
us to free ourselves from the constraints of grammar.
It is worthwhile to note that Heidegger, after listing almost all the uses of "to be" that
conform to grammar, presents a verse containing "to be" which seems alien to all
aforementioned common understandings of the verb.
Ober allen Gipfeln
istRuh.
(Over all the summits
is rest.) (1M, p.89)
The '10 be" that occurs in the verse does not fit any of the elucidations of the "to be"
drawn from everyday speech, nor is it the sum of them. "Hence the 'intelligibility' of the 'is'
that precludes all elucidation, the 'intelligibility' that has perhaps a completely different
mode than that familiarity in which the 'is' otherwise occurs to us constantly unthought, in
everyday discourse.... in this 'is' speaks of the uniqueness ofa gathered wealth." (BC, p.2S)
It is precisely what Heidegger refers to as "a liberation from grammar into a more original
essential framework" which "is reserved for thought and poetic creation." (BW, p. I94)
However, such a liberation cannot be carried out by human endeavor. it is rather the
possibility of language itself. In this sense, Heidegger claims:
It must remain an open question whether the nature of Western languages is
in itself marked with the exclusive brand of metaphysics, and thus marked
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permanently by onto-theo-Iogic, or whether these languages offer other
possibilities ofunerance, and that means at the same time of telling silence.
(!D, p.73)
Apparently, Heidegger does not draw the linguistic relativist conclusion that the
question of Being, due to the peculiarity ofIndo-European languages in which it has been
raised, is merely a provincial, arbitrary speculation. For although Heidegger unequivocally
contends that the formation of the question of Being as the central concern of Western
philosophy is somehow determined by Western languages in respect of their grammar and
semantics, he asserts that the languages still contain the capacity of transcending their own
confinement. lbat is why Heidegger constantly appeals to the poets who articulate Being
in a rather primordial way. Yet a dialogue between different languages can lead to the
origin of language that can show how the (derivative) ontological difference of Indo-
European languages determines the metaphysical nature of the question of Being and thus
covers in a particular way the primordial meaning of Being, and how Chinese, on the other
hand, erases it altogether. As far as Being concerns the nature of language, we can still trace
the fugitive Being in different languages and find the various ways it addresses us. The
original meanings of Being which, as we have shown, can be found in both Western
languages and Eastern languages (Chinese), the "two extreme realizations of human
languages" (Humboldt), constitute the common ground which sustains a meaningful
dialogue between East and West.
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H The example Kahn gives is, "Oude moi esli pater kai potnia meter" from Iliad 6.413.
The literal translation of this is, "Nor to me is father and honored mother" which simply
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}7 A. C. Graham: Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, State
University ofNew York Press, Albany, 1990, p.324.
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~l The English "Being", however, is not in the fonn of "article + infinitive", but of
participial origin, Such an expression as 'The To Be" is prohibited in English although
it is what the Greek to einai, the Gennan das Sein, or the French I'etre really mean. The
English Being is more like the Latin esse in respect to its lack ofdefinite article although
as in the fonn of the infinitive is still not the exact equivalent of Being. I indebted to
Peter Harris for pointing this out to me.
~2 The use of the article in English has a different significance than in other languages.
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Glossary
Hermeneutic "As Stmeture" and Aoophantic "As Structure'" philosophical terms used by the
early Heidegger to designate two ways of Dasein's encounter with beings. They
parallel with the notions of "readiness-to-hand" and "presence-to-hand". The
hermeneutic "as" is more primordial than the apophantic "as" in that before any
theoretical assertion (apophantic "asj about beings is made Dasein is already in a
certain kind of understanding of beings. "The primordial 'as' of an interpretation
which Wlderstands circumspectively we call the 'existential-hermeneutical 'as' in
distinction from the 'apophantical"as'" of the assertion." (ST, p.201)
"The House of Being'" a term used by the later Heidegger to designate language. "Language
is the house ofSeing. In its home man dwells." (BW, p.193) It is meant to show the
intrinsical relation between Being and language.
~ a term used primarily to refer to the stale of release or salvation in Buddhism. It is
the final cessation of the circulation of birth and death.
The Nothing' The word is used in this these in two senses: (I) relative nothing, and (2)
absolute nothing. The first as opposed to being simply means pwe absence or nullity.
The second refers to the non~ifferentiation of being and nothing (relative nothing); it
is used changeably with "emptiness" and "siiTyals',
Ontological Difference' The difference between Being and beings. According to Heidegger.
traditional metaphysics thinks Being as the highest being and hence still a being
among other beings, thus it fails to realize the real difference between Being and
beings. The fundamental ontology in the early Heidegger tries to think Being through
an analysis ofDasein's existence. The existential analysis is conceived by Heidegger
as a proper way to reveal the meaning of Being which is different from the
metaphysical conceptualization of Being. The later Heidegger attempts to think Being
in a more radical way, that is, "to think Being without any reference to beings."
(It should be noted, as Professor Cyril Welch points out, that the rendering ofSeiendes
as "being" is itself ambiguous in that it seems to limit its reference to 'entities',
whereas it may include almost anything detenninate]
~ Sanskrit, it means the cycle of birth and dealh, referring to an individual's series of
lives, analogous to the lighting ofsuccessive lamps, one lamp from another.
Suchness: The English trnnslation of the Sanskrit lalhala. It means that everything is in itself,
or that everything is as it truly is.
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